Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2578, Section: I/2.
July 28, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of plaintiff, Madeline Schwartz, individually and on behalf of her minor son, Roy Walker, Jr., and defendant, MONY Life Insurance Company. Additionally, defendant has filed a motion to strike certain evidence submitted by plaintiff in support of her motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant's motion to strike is DISMISSED as moot.
Rec. Doc. Nos. 16 17.
Rec. Doc. No. 20. Defendant moves to strike certain evidence submitted by plaintiff pertaining to the contracting parties' intent and the interpretation of the terms of the life insurance policy. Because, as explained below, the Court does not reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim regarding the interpretation of the policy, defendant's motion to strike does not bear on the Court's disposition of this action.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 16, 1991, plaintiff and her then eighteen-year-old son, John Douglas Schwartz, executed an application for life insurance. On that application, John Douglas Schwartz was named as the "Insured" and plaintiff signed the application as the "Applicant." Named as the beneficiary of the policy was the brother of the Insured. Roy Walker, Jr. The policy provides that all rights, including the right to change the beneficiary, "belong exclusively as set forth in the application for this policy unless otherwise provided by endorsement."
See Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-1, MONY life insurance policy number 1351-81-09-P ("Policy") and attached application ("Application"), Application, at 3.
Id., at 1.
Policy, at 5, ¶ 7.
Two different sections of the application govern the assignment of rights during the term of the policy. Paragraph 12 of the application is entitled "Rights — If Adult Insured," and paragraph 13 is entitled "Rights — If Juvenile Insured." In executing the application, the parties left paragraph 12 blank and filled in paragraph 13 as follows:
Application, at 1, ¶¶ 12, 13.
13. Rights — If Juvenile Insured Unless otherwise specified, during Insured's lifetime all rights belong: a) Before Insured's 21st birthday to the Applicant, if living, if not, to INSURED ________________________________________ (Name and Relationship to Insured)
if living, if not, to Insured. b) On and after Insured's 21st birthday to Insured.
See id The word "INSURED" appears in the Application as handwritten text. The remainder of the text cited above appears as preprinted text on the Application.
John Douglas Schwartz was born on September 15, 1972, and he reached the age of twenty-one on September 15, 1993. On March 6, 2001, John Douglas Schwartz executed a beneficiary designation change form in which he changed the policy beneficiary to "The Estate of John Schwartz." On March 7, 2001, he executed a second beneficiary change form in which he designated "The Fidelity Trust . . . Charles R. Sussman, [Trustee]" as the beneficiary. MONY accepted the foregoing changes and it recorded the Fidelity Trust as the designated beneficiary effective March 7, 2001.
Application, at 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-5, Title Change Form.
Id., Ex. A-6, Title Change Form.
Id., Ex. A-7, MONY's record of beneficiary designation.
John Douglas Schwartz died on May 27, 2002. On September 4, 2002, plaintiff authorized Dominick Impastato, who had served as the insurance agent in connection with the purchase of the policy, to act on her behalf on "all matters concerning my Life Insurance on my son John Douglas Schwartz." Impastato assisted plaintiff in contacting MONY in September, 2002, by placing several telephone calls to MONY. In one of the telephone calls, occurring on or about September 4, 2002, Impastato informed MONY of the Insured's death and he requested that MONY forward claim forms and a lost policy form to him. On September 11, 2002, MONY sent a letter to Impastato, accompanied by blank claim forms and instructions pertaining to their completion. In that letter, MONY stated that the designated beneficiary of the policy was Charles R. Sussman, as trustee for the Fidelity Trust. On September 18, 2002, Impastato placed a follow-up telephone call to MONY. MONY's documentation of that telephone call reflects that Impastato stated that plaintiff "feels she should be [the beneficiary] because she was the applicant." During that telephone call, the MONY representative advised Impastato that once the Insured turned twenty-one years old, he retained the right to change the beneficiary. Also on September 18, 2002, MONY returned a premium payment submitted by an individual named either "Mr. Wayne Clark" or "Mr. Brent Clark." In that correspondence, MONY informed Mr. Clark that the premium payment was being returned because there was a "death claim" pending with respect to the policy. On September 25, 2002, MONY contacted Impastato's office and left a message for Impastato's assistant to contact MONY. MONY did not receive a return phone call from Impastato's assistant.
Rec. Doc. No. 1, Pl. complaint, ¶ 12.
Rec. Doc. No. 23, Ex. A, at 2.
Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-8, MONY documentation of Impastato's request for claim package. It is undisputed that Impastato's telephone call was MONY's first notice of the Insured's death. See Rec. Doc. No. 23, Ex. B, MONY e-mail dated September 9, 2002(referring to the documented record of Impastato's telephone call as the "first notice of death on this orphan policy"); Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A., declaration of Karen Conlan ("Decl. Conlan"), at ¶ 9.
Id., Ex. A-9; see also id., Ex. D, documents produced by plaintiff in response to discovery requests by defendant. Plaintiff produced a copy of the September 11, 2002, letter with Impastato's handwritten notes and the various claim forms that accompanied that letter. Impastato testified that although he recalled receiving the letter informing him that the beneficiary was the Fidelity Trust, he could not recall whether claim forms were attached. See id, Ex. C, deposition of Dominick Impastato ("Dep. Impastato"), at 108-09. However, Impastato also testified that whatever he received from MONY, he forwarded to plaintiff. Id. at 105.
Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-10, case documentation sheet.
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 23, Ex. E, letter addressed to "Mr. Wayne Clark or Mr. Brent Clark" dated September 18, 2002.
Id.
Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-11.
Decl. Conlan, at ¶ 12.
On December 3, 2002, MONY received a telephone call from a representative of the Fidelity Trust requesting claim forms. On December 10, 2002, MONY forwarded claim forms and associated instructions to the Fidelity Trust. When the Fidelity Trust failed to submit a claim for the policy proceeds, MONY again contacted the Fidelity Trust on January 9, 2003, and February 10, 2003. On February 18, 2003, the Fidelity Trust submitted a claim for the policy proceeds. On March 13, 2003, MONY paid the policy proceeds, in the amount of $94,096.67, to the Fidelity Trust. It is undisputed that neither plaintiff nor Impastato had any communication with MONY between September, 2002, and March 13, 2003. It is also undisputed that plaintiff did not return the claim forms to MONY prior to March 13, 2003.
Id., Ex. A-12.
Id., Ex. A-13.
Id., Exs. A-14, A-15.
Id., Ex. A-16.
See id., Ex. A, declaration of Karen Conlan, ¶ 16; Ex. A-17, copy of check making payment to the Fidelity Trust.
Plaintiff filed this action on September 12, 2003, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and claims for penalties and interest pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:1220 and § 22:656. On April 30, 2004, plaintiff and defendant filed their motions for summary judgment. MONY moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) plaintiff's claims against MONY are precluded by the facility of payment statute, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:643; and (2) in any event, payment to the Fidelity Trust was proper pursuant to the policy. Alternatively, defendant moves for a partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims for statutory penalties and interest pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:656 and La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:1220 and plaintiff's claim for damages as a result of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
See Rec. Doc. No. 1, Pl. complaint; Rec. Doc. No. 6, first amended complaint.
Rec. Doc. Nos. 16, 17.
Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment claiming that as the Applicant, she retained all ownership rights in the policy after her son turned twenty-one years old, including the right to change the beneficiary. She argues that the application for the policy is ambiguous with respect to whether the Insured or the Applicant retained the rights pursuant to the policy and, therefore, it must be construed in her favor. From this proposition, she reasons that because she retained such rights, any change to the beneficiary designation by her son, John Douglas Schwartz, was ineffective. Therefore, she concludes that the beneficiary of the policy remained her other son, Roy Walker, Jr. Additionally, plaintiff opposes defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the facility of payment statute. She contends that payment to the Fidelity Trust at a time when MONY had oral and/or actual notice that she was claiming an entitlement to the proceeds constitutes bad faith and such payment does not discharge MONY's obligation pursuant to the policy.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That burden is not satisfied by creating merely some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or by only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The materiality of facts is determined by "the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (internal quotation omitted).
In order to demonstrate that summary judgment should not lie, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001). A court will resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. The Court will not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. See id. (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 307 (5th Cir. 2000) ("A complete failure of proof as to one element requires summary judgment against the entirety of the claim") (citation omitted).
II. Facility of payment statute
La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22:643 (West 2004), referred to as the facility of payment statute, provides:
Whenever the proceeds of, or payments under a life endowment or health and accident insurance policy or any annuity contract issued by a life insurance company, heretofore or hereafter issued, become payable and the insurer makes payment thereof in accordance with the terms of the policy or contract or in accordance with any written assignment thereof or of any interest thereunder, hereafter made, the person then designated in the policy or contract or by such assignment as being entitled thereto, shall be entitled to receive such proceeds or payments and to give full acquittance therefor, and such payment shall fully discharge the insurer from all claims under the policy or contract unless, before payment is made, the insurer has received at its home office, written notice by or on behalf of some other person that such other person claims to be entitled to such payment or some interest in the policy or contract. Nothing contained in this Section shall affect any claim or right to any policy or contract or the proceeds thereof or payments thereunder as between persons other than the insurer.
Pursuant to the statute, if (1) payment is made by a defendant insurer to the person then designated in the policy as being entitled thereto; and (2) such payment is made before the insurer has received (a) written notice (b) at its home office (c) by or on behalf of some other person that such person claims to be entitled to such payment, an insurer's obligation is discharged. In short, absent written notice of an adverse claim, an insurer "must be held to have fully discharged its obligation under the insurance contract by making payment to the named beneficiary." Morein v. N. Am. Company for Life and Health Ins., 271 So.2d 308, 315-16 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1973). Such payment fully discharges an insurers obligation notwithstanding contentions that an insurer received oral notice, prior to payment, that the person "then designated" as the named beneficiary is not the intended beneficiary. See id. (concluding that notwithstanding oral notice to the insurer prior to insured's death that insured wanted to change beneficiary, the insurer was discharged because no written request had been received changing the designated beneficiary and no written notice of any other claim had been received by the defendant at its home office before such payment was made).
Construing facility of payment clauses in insurance contracts, the Louisiana courts have held that such clauses are intended to protect insurers in the event payment is made to a person designated as a beneficiary "even should it later appear that some one else was in fact possessed of a superior right to the proceeds." Smooth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 So. 298, 299 (La.App. Orleans 1935). Although an insurer does not have an absolute right to choose a beneficiary if multiple beneficiaries are named, an insurer is protected from liability "if, in the exercise of its discretion and acting on such information as it has before it, it makes payment in good faith to the person apparently equitably entitled thereto." Hooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 So. 601, 604 (La.App. Orleans 1937). As stated by one Louisiana Court of Appeals:
What is intended by [a facility of payment clause] is simply this: That if the insurer shall make reasonable effort to place the proceeds of the policy in the hands of the person to whom the insured intended that they should go, whether as beneficiary or as representative of the estate, or as the person equitably entitled thereto, but after making such reasonable effort shall make payment in good faith to some person other than the one really intended by the insured, nevertheless such payment, if made to a person or persons included in the various classes set forth, shall constitute a full discharge of the policy obligation.Dorsey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 So. 304, 308 (La.App. Orleans 1933). The facility of payment statute recognizes that there may be circumstances pursuant to which a person may submit a written claim for the proceeds of a life insurance contract subsequent to an insurer's payment of the proceeds to a designated beneficiary. The insurer will be discharged from such claim (absent a written claim prior to payment) and such claim will be preserved against parties other than the insurer. See § 22:643 ("Nothing contained in this Section shall affect any claim or right to any policy or contract or the proceeds thereof or payments thereunder as between persons other than the insurer.").
Although the facility of payment statute does not specifically refer to an insurer's "good faith" payment of life insurance proceeds, it is well established that all contractual obligations in Louisiana must be performed in good faith. See La. Civ. Code art. 1983 (West 2002) ("Contracts must be performed in good faith."); La. Civ. Code art. 1759 ("Good faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation."); La.Rev.Stat. § 22:1220(A) (West 2004) (providing that "[a]n insurer . . . owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing"); see also Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Cagle, 68 F.3d 905, 911 (5th Cir. 1995); Reed v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 857 So.2d 1012, 1022 nn. 9 10 (La. 2003); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 557 So.2d 966, 967 (La. 1990). "The Civil Code, however, does not define 'good faith,' but does define 'bad faith' as 'an intentional and malicious failure to perform.'" Cagle, 68 F.3d at 911 (quoting LSA-C.C. art. 1997 cmt. c.). "Louisiana courts have looked to this definition of 'bad faith' for guidance in determining conduct that breaches the duty of good faith." Id. (citations omitted). As stated by one court of appeal:
"Bad faith" is the opposite of "good faith", generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive.Adams v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 644 So.2d 219, 222 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (citing Palombo v. Broussard, 370 So.2d 216 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1979); see also Cagle, 68 F.3d at 911 (noting that "bad faith" is a term "'connoting fraud, deception or sinisterly-motivated nonfulfillment of an obligation'") (quoting Adams, 644 So.2d at 222); Delaney v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 703 So.2d 709, 718 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1997) ("Bad faith generally implies actual or constructive fraud or a refusal to fulfill contractual obligations, not an honest mistake as to actual rights or duties.") (citation omitted). In the context of payment of life insurance proceeds pursuant to a facility of payment clause in an insurance contract, the Louisiana courts have stated that "there can be no question 'of bad faith on the part of an insurer who pays the avails of the policy in accordance with the letter of the contract of insurance.'" Hooks, 171 So. at 604 (quoting Dorsey, 145 So. at 310) (Westerfield, J. concurring).
It is undisputed that MONY paid the proceeds of the policy to the Fidelity Trust and that when payment was made, the Fidelity Trust was the party "then designated" as the policy beneficiary. Accordingly, MONY will be discharged from its contractual obligation pursuant to § 22:643 if its payment was made in good faith and at a time when MONY had not received another written claim for the proceeds at its home office.
Plaintiff argues that MONY's payment to the Fidelity Trust should not preclude her claims because MONY had actual notice and written documentation that plaintiff was claiming the proceeds pursuant to the policy. To support this argument, plaintiff first points to the letter in which plaintiff authorized Impastato to act on her behalf in matters relating to "my Life Insurance on my son John Douglas Schwartz with Mony Insurance Company." Plaintiff's reliance on this letter is unavailing. First, there is no record evidence that this letter was sent to or received by MONY. Moreover, plaintiff's authorization for Impastato to act on her behalf is not equivalent to a written claim for the policy proceeds.
Rec. Doc. No. 23, Ex. A, at p. 2.
Plaintiff cites certain MONY internal documents and argues that MONY had written documentation of plaintiff's claim. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the "written notice" requirement is satisfied by MONY documents memorializing Impastato's telephone inquiries in which he informed MONY that the Insured had died and that plaintiff thought she should receive the proceeds because she was the owner of the policy. This argument also fails. MONY is discharged from its obligation absent "written notice by or on behalf of some other person that such other person claims to be entitled to such payment." § 22:643. Written notes generated by MONY personnel which merely document Impastato's oral inquiries do not constitute written notice by plaintiff or on plaintiff's behalf. Although Impastato's oral assertions of plaintiff's entitlement to the proceeds may have been made on plaintiff's behalf, the documents cited by plaintiff in support of her argument were generated by MONY personnel, on behalf of MONY, in order to document its oral communications with Impastato. For the same reason, plaintiff cannot satisfy the "written notice" requirement by relying on the September 18, 2002, letter to Mr. Clark in which MONY returned a premium payment and stated that "there is a death claim pending on this policy." The existence of written documents generated by MONY, even if such documents refer to an oral "claim," do not satisfy the plain language of the facility of payment statute.
The crux of plaintiff's argument is that MONY should not be discharged because the evidence shows that MONY had actual notice of plaintiff's claim and acted in bad faith in paying the Fidelity Trust. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court notes that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that MONY was aware, through oral communications with Impastato, that plaintiff may have intended to file a written claim and that she felt she was entitled to the proceeds of the policy. Nevertheless, the statute clearly and unambiguously discharges an insurer absent "written notice" of a claim. Construing other provisions of the Louisiana statutory insurance scheme, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed certain well-established canons of statutory constructions stating:
It is presumed the Legislature acts with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction. State v. Bedford, 01-2298 (La. 1/28/03), 838 So.2d 758. It is also presumed that every word, sentence or provision in a statute was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect be given to each such provision, and that the Legislature used no unnecessary words or provisions. Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So.2d 1357 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984).Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 860 So.2d 1112, 1119, (La. 2003) (construing § 22:1220 which provides for statutory penalties for an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing). Applying those principles, had the Louisiana legislature intended that an insurer's policy obligation not be discharged once oral or actual notice of a claim was received by it, the Legislature would have drafted the statute to reflect that intent. The requirement of written notice to an insurer is clear, unambiguous, and elementary. There is no summary judgment evidence before the Court upon which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that either plaintiff or Impastato gave MONY written notice of plaintiff's claim prior to MONY's payment to the Fidelity Trust.
Plaintiff also asserts that MONY acted in bad faith by refusing to communicate and cooperate with her and Impastato. Impastato testified that during September, 2002, there came a point, subsequent to his initial inquiries and MONY's responses thereto, at which MONY refused to furnish him or the plaintiff with further policy information. Plaintiff argues that because MONY had, in effect, verbally denied her oral assertion of entitlement to the policy proceeds, filing a claim by sending in the claim forms MONY had forwarded to her through Impastato would have been futile. Describing one telephone conversation, Impastato testified:
To the extent that plaintiff's "bad faith" argument is predicated upon MONY's payment to Fidelity Trust in the face of actual, as opposed to written, notice of her claim, the Court rejects the argument for the reasons stated above.
Impastato testified that during a telephone call during which plaintiff was present, MONY did not respond to his inquiry pertaining to whether MONY had given plaintiff notice that the right to change the beneficiary became Douglas Schwartz's upon his twenty-first birthday. See Rec. Doc. No. 16, Ex. 3, deposition of Dominick Impastato, Jr. ("Dep. Impastato"), at 101. According to Impastato, MONY informed him that they could not give him any information because he was no longer a MONY agent. See id. Additionally, Impastato testified that MONY orally told plaintiff that it could not communicate with her because, according to MONY, she was not the owner of the policy. See id.
I will tell you what happened in a conversation with [MONY]. I said, so are you telling me that if you won't give us any information the only recourse this lady has is to get an attorney involved? And very sarcastically, the answer from [MONY] was, I guess that's what I'm telling you, get a lawyer.
See id. at 104.
Plaintiff argues that, under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to conclude that plaintiff should have filed any claim forms or attempted any further communication with MONY.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court concludes that the evidence does not support a finding of bad faith. A reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that plaintiff's evidence establishes "actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive." Adams, 644 So.2d at 222 (original emphasis omitted). The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence demonstrates that in response to Impastato's initial inquiry in September, 2002, MONY informed Impastato who, in turn, informed plaintiff that the designated beneficiary pursuant to the policy was the Fidelity Trust. In addition, MONY forwarded claim forms to plaintiff with instructions for their completion. Impastato testified that when plaintiff initially contacted him after Douglas Schwartz died, he recommended that plaintiff write a letter to MONY. Between September, 2002, and March 13, 2003, there is no record evidence of any communication between either plaintiff or Impastato and MONY. There is no evidence to suggest that plaintiff completed the claim forms or submitted any written claim to MONY. Moreover, at the time MONY paid the Fidelity Trust, MONY was in possession of beneficiary change forms executed by the Insured.
See Rec. Doc. No. 17, Ex. A-9.
Dep. Impastato, at pp. 99,106.
Given these undisputed facts, this Court cannot conclude that MONY's payment to the designated beneficiary was not in good faith. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to assert her claim with MONY by filing a written claim with MONY for the proceeds of the policy. There is no evidence suggesting that MONY attempted to mislead plaintiff or prevent her from doing so. Having been informed by MONY that the Fidelity Trust was the named beneficiary four months prior to MONY's disbursement of the proceeds to the Fidelity Trust, plaintiff nevertheless failed to submit any written notice or explanation of her claim. Accordingly, MONY's payment fully discharged MONY's obligation pursuant to the policy. See Morein, 271 So.2d at 308.
Because plaintiff's claims against MONY are precluded by the discharge afforded MONY by § 22:643, the Court need not, and expressly does not, reach the merits of plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment pertaining to MONY's contractual liability. Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with respect to MONY's contractual liability because plaintiff failed to preserve that claim against MONY. For the same reason, MONY's motion to strike certain evidence submitted by plaintiff in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is moot.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendant, MONY Life Insurance Company, is GRANTED and plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of plaintiff, Madeline Schwartz, is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike filed on behalf of defendant, MONY Life Insurance Company, is DISMISSED as moot.