Opinion
11-08-2017
Madeleine E. Schwartz, West Hempstead, NY, appellant pro se. L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP, Garden City, NY (Anthony P. Colavita and Mateo J. Vila of counsel), for respondents.
Madeleine E. Schwartz, West Hempstead, NY, appellant pro se.
L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP, Garden City, NY (Anthony P. Colavita and Mateo J. Vila of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for professional malpractice, the plaintiff Madeleine E. Schwartz appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Driscoll, J.), entered November 17, 2014, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by her.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Actions to recover damages for malpractice against nonmedical professionals are governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(6) (see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 N.Y.3d 538, 539, 788 N.Y.S.2d 648, 821 N.E.2d 952 ; 730 J & J, LLC v. Polizzotto & Polizzotto, Esqs., 69 A.D.3d 704, 705, 893 N.Y.S.2d 174 ). A cause of action alleging professional malpractice against an accountant accrues upon the client's receipt of the accountant's work product (see Williamson v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 N.Y.3d 1, 8, 840 N.Y.S.2d 730, 872 N.E.2d 842 ; Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 541, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 644 N.E.2d 1009 ; CRC Litig. Trust v. Marcum, LLP, 132 A.D.3d 938, 939, 19 N.Y.S.3d 291 ; Rodeo Family Enters., LLC v. Matte, 99 A.D.3d 781, 783, 952 N.Y.S.2d 581 ).
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Madeleine E. Schwartz (hereinafter the plaintiff) by demonstrating that the professional malpractice causes of action accrued more than three years prior to the commencement of the action (see Meredith v. Siben & Siben, LLP, 130 A.D.3d 791, 792, 13 N.Y.S.3d 520 ; Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d 159, 164, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646 ; Napoli v. Moisan Architects, 77 A.D.3d 895, 895–896, 909 N.Y.S.2d 389 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine (see Rodeo Family Enters., LLC v. Matte, 99 A.D.3d at 784, 952 N.Y.S.2d 581 ; M.G. McLaren, P.C. v. Massand Eng'g, L.S., P.C., 51 A.D.3d 878, 878, 858 N.Y.S.2d 340 ; Giarratano v. Silver, 46 A.D.3d 1053, 1055, 847 N.Y.S.2d 698 ; Booth v. Kriegel, 36 A.D.3d 312, 314, 825 N.Y.S.2d 193 ; Mitschele v. Schultz, 36 A.D.3d 249, 253, 826 N.Y.S.2d 14 ).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff.