Thus, municipalities are not permitted to adopt traffic regulations in conflict with Ohio general statutes. Ohio Constitution, Section 3, Article XVIII; Schwartz v. Badila (1938), 133 Ohio St. 441, 443-444, 11 O.O. 144, 145, 14 N.E.2d 609, 610-611. C.C.O. 431.34 provides:
State v. Hauser (1920), 101 Ohio St. 404, 407, 131 N.E. 66, 67; Kelch v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 146, 45 N.E. 6. See, also, the civil cases of Schwartz v. Badila (1938), 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609; Indus. Comm. v. Ripke (1935), 129 Ohio St. 649, 196 N.E. 640; Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Goldman (1930), 122 Ohio St. 73, 170 N.E. 641; Montanari v. Haworth (1923), 108 Ohio St. 8, 140 N.E. 319. The jury propounded seven questions in their attempt to understand the court's charge as to the burden of proof on the affirmative defense.
We hold that the provision of Section 6307-63 (c) as to the height of the letters in stop signs is prospective in reference to through thoroughfares designated by municipal authorities. Defendant argues that this court has decided that ordinances which are in conflict with statutes are invalid and cites the cases of Schneiderman, an Infant, v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158, 64 A.L.R., 981, and Schwartz, Admx., v. Badila, Jr., 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609. In the former case it was held:
ntion to the need of an injured party for compensation rather than the real issues in the case, and tend to incite the rendition of verdicts which are excessive as the result of passion or prejudice. Arguments of the nature of the one presented in this case have been held by this court to have resulted in prejudicial error. Attention is directed to the following: Hayes v. Smith, 62 Ohio St. 161, 56 N.E. 879, argument outside the record and charging a suppression of evidence on the part of the defendant; Landesman v. Western Reserve University, 132 Ohio St. 131, 5 N.E.2d 322, argument that the jurors should consider themselves as trustees of the defendant, an educational institution, and, therefore, protect the fund of the institution for the benefit of the public; and Jones v. Macedonia-Northfield Banking Co., supra, where an argument was made that officials of a bank might steal without penalty from the bank but that others are punished for doing the same thing. See, also, Schwartz, Admx., v. Badila, Jr., 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609. The rule applicable in this case seems to be well stated in 39 Ohio Jurisprudence, 722, Section 136, as follows:
In the opinion of this court, Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Constitution do not take away that power. City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210; Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, supra; Schwartz, Admr., v. Badila, 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609; Thompson v. City of Marion, supra; State, ex rel. Moewer, v. Underwood et al., Civil Service Commission, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the writ allowed.
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158. This case was approved and followed in Schwartz, Admx., v. Badila, Jr., 133 Ohio St. 441, 14 N.E.2d 609. "It is not negligence for a person, entering a street intersection with the 'go' traffic signal, to rely upon all persons from a cross street, who are not at the time in the intersection, observing the 'stop' signal, so long as it is against them."