In the record of this case we are unable to find any evidence legally sufficient to prove that the will in dispute was the product of an influence which destroyed the testator's free agency. Longanecker v. Sowers, 148 Md. 584; Malone v. Malone, 148 Md. 200; Kelley v. Stanton, 141 Md. 380; Watson v. Y.W. C.A., 137 Md. 355; White v. Bramble, 124 Md. 400; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 124 Md. 38; Dudderar v. Dudderar, 116 Md. 605; Saxton v. Krumm, 107 Md. 399; Kennedy v. Dickey, 100 Md. 152; Somers v. McCready, 96 Md. 437; Schwanteck v. Berner, 96 Md. 138. No reference is made in the brief of the appellants to the action on any of the prayers other than those relating to undue influence, and in none of the rulings on the prayers have we found error.

The expressed intentions of the testator should not be thwarted without clear reasons.'" And in Schwanteck v. Berner, 96 Md. 143, in passing upon a similiar question, we said: "The testimony in the record when taken all together does not in our judgment furnish any evidence tending to prove that the testator did not make the will which he intended to make or that the caveatee, who is not shown to have had any connection with the making of the will, procured its execution by the exercise of such undue influence upon the testator as to deprive him of his free agency and subordinate his will to her own, which is the degree of influence that the law regards as undue and sufficient to avoid a will procured by its exercise." And in Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 446, it was said: "Undue influence is that degree of importunity which deprives a testator of his free agency, which is such as he is too weak or too feeble to resist, and will render the instrument executed under its influence not his free and unconstrained act. Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. J. 269. It is closely allied to, and in many of its aspects strongly resembles, act

It is apparent from the contents of the Act that it relates solely to cases in which the Court rejects the defendant's prayer offered at that stage of the trial and its purpose is to prevent the defendant whose prayer has been thus rejected from having the right of offering evidence in his own behalf because of having submitted the prayer as would have been the case before the passage of the Act." Schwanteck v. Berner, 96 Md. 138, 143 (1902). The practice evolving from that statute and the case law interpreting it was codified in the General Rules of Practice and Procedure as G.R.P.P.Pt. Three, III, Rule 4 (Directed Verdicts), with minor additions.