See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554. Cf. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163; Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183; Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583; Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583.Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 607; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 231; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U.S. 150; Corry v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466; Ayer Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409; New York ex rel. New York C. H.R. R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584; Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63; Kansas City, F. S. M. R. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 232, 235; Kansas City, M. B.R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111, 118-119; Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325; Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88; Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441; Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506, 514-516; Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313;State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 603; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305; Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 364; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113; Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U.S. 330; Bass, Ratcliff Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271; Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503; Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 424-427; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 29-31; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435; International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435; International Harvester C

In this respect, as this Court has often pointed out, the taxation of chattels rests on a different basis than does the taxation of intangibles, which have no physical situs and may be reached by the tax gatherer only through exertion of the power of the state over the person of those who have some legal interest in the intangibles. Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 205-6; Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 92; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 494; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 16-18; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209-10; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363-6; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383; Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657; State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174. A state may, within the Fourteenth Amendment, tax a chattel located within its limits, although its owner is domiciled elsewhere.

Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, supra, and the cases that have followed it, afford a wholly adequate basis for affirming the judgments below. See Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109; Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 92; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U.S. 137, 141; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Shanks, 273 U.S. 407, 413; Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 238; Montgomery Ward Co. v. Emmerson, 277 U.S. 573; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 391; Nebraska ex rel. Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Marsh, 282 U.S. 799, 800; First Bank Stock Corp v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 237.

See Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 2060, p. 35; Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 8206, p. 13.In only three cases in which opinions were written, aside from those involving municipal ordinances and commission orders, does jurisdiction appear to have been exercised under the clause in the Act of 1916 allowing a writ of error in cases where the validity of an authority exercised under a State has been challenged and sustained: Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88; Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32; Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403. Possibly, under the view announced by the Court, even such state action as was involved in these cases amounts to "a statute of a state." In five cases jurisdiction seems to have been based on the clause allowing a writ of error where the validity of an authority exercised under the United States has been denied: American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135; Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163; Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292; Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U.S. 427. The first and the last of this group concerned orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which, presumably, must be held to be statutes of the United States if the orders of state commissions are statutes of a state.

Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174, 175; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326-329; Shaffer v. Carter, supra; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119, 120; Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413, 416, 420. See also Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88; Transport Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150, dissent; 32 Harv. L.R. 634-640, 646-649; 12 Calif. L.R. 39-44.

While a State may not use its taxing power to regulate or burden interstate commerce, it is settled that a state excise tax which affects such commerce only indirectly and remotely, may be entirely valid, where it is clear that it is not imposed with the covert purpose or with the effect of defeating federal constitutional rights. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217; U.S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335; Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68; Kansas City, etc. R.R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111; Kansas City, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227; U.S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321; Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88. III. The Missouri Franchise Tax Act has been held by this Court not to be a burden on interstate commerce.

But a tax that only indirectly affects the profits or returns from such commerce is not within the rule." In Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 44 S.Ct. 60, 62, 68 L.Ed. 183, it was contended that a tax assessment was an attempt to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and a burden upon interstate commerce. The court observed that the cases "have been careful to declare the immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation, but as careful to declare the power of a state to tax values within its borders though they may get enhancement from the exercise of rights outside of those borders."

See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 163-167. See Society for Sav. v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 606-611 (deposits); Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611, 630-632 (deposits); Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 635-638 (excess of value of capital stock over locally taxed tangibles); The Delaware R.R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 229-232 (value of stock); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594, 599-600, 606 (dividends); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U.S. 150, 154-155 (intangibles); Kansas City, Fort Scott Memphis Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, 232-235 (graduated excise according to capital); Kansas City, Memphis Birmingham R.R. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111, 116-120 (percentage of capital stock); Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 92-93 (intangible values of capital stock apportioned by formula). With respect to foreign corporations, the permissible measures of an excise or franchise tax may be more strictly limited.

This rule stems from the fact that tax legislation cannot have effect apart from the state's ability to control the act or the thing taxed. Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 44 S.Ct. 60, 68 L.Ed. 183; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 S.Ct. 477, 69 L.Ed. 916; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69, 46 S.Ct. 256, 70 L.Ed. 475; Wachovia Bank Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, 47 S.Ct. 202, 71 L.Ed. 413; Southern Railway Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76, 47 S.Ct. 542, 71 L.Ed. 934; Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S.Ct. 59, 74 L.Ed. 180; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673. If it is a fact that the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company received the reinsurance premiums in question without an act on its part within the State of Mississippi, then it must necessarily follow that the State of Mississippi has no power to impose the tax asserted.

The franchise tax thus exacted, with any increase in its rate, is not a property tax, and is not a denial of due process of law, if otherwise valid. Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88, 44 S.Ct. 60, 68 L.Ed. 183; Cooper v. United States, 280 U.S. 409, 50 S.Ct. 164, 74 L.Ed. 516, supra. The added tax in the case at bar is double the amount of the usual levy.