Furthermore, they contend, the statute must be so narrowly drawn as to express only the legitimate State interests at stake. In Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill.2d 504, the plaintiff taxpayers sought to enjoin the fluoridation of the defendant city's water supply. Plaintiffs contended that fluoridation infringed upon fundamental liberties protected by constitutional guarantees of due process of law.

Further, as quoted by defendants in their motion, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Young v. Board of Health of Borough ofSomerville, made the following poignant statement on the issue: Safe Water Foundation of Texas, 661 S.W.2d at 192-93 (citing to: Paduano v. City of New York, 45 Misc.2d 718, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y.Sup. 1965), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 437, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.A.D. 1965), aff'd 17 N.Y.2d 875, 218 N.E.2d 339, 271 N.Y.S.2d 305 (N.Y. 1966), cert.denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); DeAryanv. Butler, 119 Cal.App.2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954); and Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 43 A.L.R.2d 445 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955)). It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Safe Water on the grounds that no substantial federal question was presented.

¶ 22 Although described by this court as "ministerial" officers (Bottom v. City of Edwardsville, 308 Ill. 68, 73 (1923); Hards v. Burton, 79 Ill. 504, 509 (1875)), masters in chancery frequently functioned as hearing officers, taking testimony, considering the evidence, and reporting back their findings of fact and conclusions of law to the chancery court. See e.g., Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 507 (1964) (where the trial court referred a taxpayers' action to enjoin the city from fluoridating the city's water supply to a master who heard the evidence, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended the complaint be dismissed); Dineff v. Wernecke, 27 Ill. 2d 476, 477-78 (1963) (where the trial court referred a complaint for specific performance to a master who heard the evidence and returned a report recommending dismissal); Maley v. Burns, 6 Ill. 2d 11, 12-13 (1955) (where the trial court referred a complaint by certain beneficiaries under a will to set aside two deeds to a master to take the proof and report his recommendations to the court); see also James R. Bryant, The Office of Master in Chancery—Development and Use in Illinois, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 458, 466-67 (1954) (discussing "The Nature of the Office of Master in Chancery"). The master's findings and recommendations were advisory only, and were not binding upon the parties unless approved by the court.

To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests which is sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective. ( Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill.2d 323, 327; Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill.2d 504, 509.) Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter for the court, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest.

In fact, the state courts have been unanimous in holding fluoridation to be a proper exercise of the state's police power. See, Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969); Opinion of the Justices, 243 A.2d 716 (Del. 1968); Attaya v. Town of Gonzales, 192 So.2d 188 (Ct.App. La. 1966); Paduano v. City of New York, 45 Misc.2d 718, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531, affirmed, 24 App.Div.2d 437, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1965), affirmed, 17 N.Y.2d 875, 271 N.Y.S.2d 305, 218 N.E.2d 339 (1966), certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 1026, 87 S.Ct. 754, 17 L. ed. 2d 674 (1967); Hall v. Bates, 247 S.C. 511, 148 S.E.2d 345 (1966); Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 69 Wn.2d 148, 417 P.2d 632 (1966); Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, 132 N.W.2d 16 (1965); Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326 (1964), certiorari denied, 379 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 655, 13 L. ed. 2d 558 (1965); Stroupe v. Eller, 262 N.C. 573, 138 S.E.2d 240 (1964); City Commission of Fort Pierce v. State ex rel. Altenhoff, 143 So.2d 879 (Ct.App. Fla. 1962), appeal dismissed, 154 So.2d 208 (Ct.App. Fla. 1963); Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs, 253 Iowa 162, 110 N.W.2d 569 (1961); Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co. 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 8, 83 S.Ct. 20, 9 L. ed. 2d 47 (1962); Birnel v. Town of Fircrest, 53 Wn.2d 830, 335 P.2d 819 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 10, 80 S.Ct. 71, 4 L. ed. 2d 51 (1959); Teeter v. Municipal City of LaPorte, 236 Ind. 146, 139 N.E.2d 158 (1956); Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Or. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935, 76 S.Ct. 833, 100 L. ed. 1463 (1956); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wn.2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1955); Froncek v. City of Milwaukee, 269 Wis. 276, 69 N.W.2d 242 (195

To put it otherwise, an ordinance, "to be beyond the pale of constitutional infirmity, must bear a reasonable relation to the public health or other purpose sought to be served, the means being reasonably necessary and suitable for the accomplishment of such purpose * * *." ( Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 504, 509; accord, Strub v. Village of Deerfield, 19 Ill.2d 401.) In deciding this question of reasonableness the court may consider "all the facts and circumstances, the evil sought to be remedied, the purpose sought to be accomplished and the necessity for legislation on the subject."

Messrs. John W. Sholenberger and Edward A. Harter,Jr., of Columbia, for Respondents, cite: As to Appellantnot being denied due process of law within the meaning ofthe Federal and State Constitutions where the City Councilafter a hearing, ordered fluorides added or adjusted to theCity water supply to improve the dental health of the residentsof the City and others using its center: 225 La. 859, 74 So.2d 142; 75 S.Ct. 216, 348 U.S. 892, 99 L.Ed. 701; 119 Cal.App.2d 674, 260 P.2d 98; 74 S.Ct. 863, 347 U.S. 1012, 98 L.Ed. 1135; 273 P.2d 859, 43 A.L.R.2d 445; 75 S.Ct. 292, 348 U.S. 912, 99 L.Ed. 715; 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609; 76 S.Ct. 833, 351 U.S. 935, 100 L.Ed. 1463; 30 Ill.2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326; 85 S.Ct. 665, 379 U.S. 964, 13 L.Ed.2d 558; 43 A.L.R.2d 453; 56 Am. Jur., Waterworks and Water Companies, Sec. 76, 1965 Cum. Supp. p. 79; Anno. 43 A.L.R.2d 459; 1965 Cum. Supp., McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Section 24.265, p. 26; Rhyne's Municipal Law 499, Sec. 23.6; 16 C.J.S., Const. Law, Sec. 2026, p. 991, 16 C.J.S., Const. Law, Sec. Sec. 206 (2), p. 1039; 16A C.J.S., Const. Law, Sec. 493, note 48, p. 255; 16A C.J.S., Const. Law, Sec. 566, p. 536; 16A C.J.S., Const. Law, Sec. 606, p. 737, note 69; 94 C.J.S., Waters, Sec. 278, p. 139; 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 50(4), p. 1040, note 59.5. As to due processin South Carolina: 190 S.E. 286, 183 S.C. 263; 246 S.C. 268, 143 S.E.2d 455; 243 S.C. 351, 133 S.E.2d 843; 190 S.E. 826, 183 S.C. 263; 82 S.E.2d 191, 225 S.C. 289; 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296; 87 S.C. 573, 70 S.E. 299; 126 N.C. 999, 35 S.E. 459.

) To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests which are sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective. ( Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill.2d 323, 327; Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill.2d 504, 509.) Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter for the court, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest.

To be beyond the pale of constitutional infirmity, the ordinance must also be reasonably related to the purpose it is intended to serve, in this case the protection of the public health and safety. ( Schuringa v. City of Chicago (1964), 30 Ill.2d 504, 198 N.E.2d 326, cert. denied (1965), 379 U.S. 964, 13 L.Ed.2d 558, 85 S.Ct. 655; Cheetah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Lake (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 306, 317 N.E.2d 129.) The reasonableness of an ordinance is a question of law for the court.

The authorizing statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 38730, 38742) are very general and evince no intent to exclude local autonomy in the administration of municipal water systems. [8] In California, as in other states, the action of city councils directing fluoridation of municipal water supplies is regarded as an exercise of the local police power. ( DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal.App.2d 674, 681-682 [ 260 P.2d 98], cert. den. 347 U.S. 1012 [74 S.Ct. 863, 98 L.Ed. 1135]; Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 504 [ 198 N.E.2d 326]; Wilson v. City of Council Bluffs, 253 Iowa 162 [ 110 N.W.2d 569]; Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co. (Mo.) 352 S.W.2d 622; see Note 43 A.L.R.2d 453; Dietz, Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California, 4 Hast.L.J. 1; Nichols, Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So.Cal.L.Rev. 158; Notes, 12 Am.U.L.Rev. 97; 38 Notre Dame Law. 71; 24 Md.L.Rev. 353.) In recent years fluoridation of public water supplies as a means of reducing the incidence of dental caries among children has been the subject of widespread and heated controversy.