Opinion
2002-06039
Argued March 24, 2003.
April 14, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated June 3, 2002, which granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant City of New York which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Greenberg Stein, New York, N.Y. (Ian Asch of counsel), for appellants.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Stephen J. McGrath and Cheryl Payer of counsel), for respondent City of New York.
Before: MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant City of New York is denied, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against that defendant.
On November 23, 1998, the plaintiff Michael Schuman (hereinafter the plaintiff) allegedly was injured when he fell while walking on a sidewalk adjacent to 1568 48th Street, in Brooklyn. The plaintiff claimed that he fell in a square three-feet by three-feet hole, adjacent to the curb. He and his wife commenced this action against the defendant City of New York, and the abutting property owners, the defendants Moses Blau and Etta Blau, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants "caused and created" the defective condition. At her deposition, Etta Blau testified that "up until November of 1998," a parking sign "from the City" was placed in the location of the accident. Subsequently, the Blaus moved to strike the City's answer for failure to provide discovery regarding the City's installation, maintenance, and/or existence of signs on the curb or sidewalk at the location of the plaintiff's accident. The City cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the cross motion and we reverse.
"It is true that `[a]n exception to the prior written notice rule exists when the municipality caused or created a defect or dangerous condition'" (Brody v. Town of Brookhaven, 207 A.D.2d 425 quoting Combs v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 139 A.D.2d 688; see also Kiernan v. Thompson, 73 N.Y.2d 840; Zinno v. City of New York, 160 A.D.2d 795). Here, the City failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with regard to whether it caused or created the alleged defect (see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324; Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the City's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
ALTMAN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, LUCIANO and RIVERA, JJ., concur.