Schulz v. State of New York

7 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Kentucky Transp. Cabinet

    884 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1994)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that “[p]ractical, moral or righteous claims do not pass the test of contract or constitutional law”

    Dieck v. Unified School District of Antigo, 165 Wis.2d 458, 477 N.W.2d 613 (1991), rejects similar arguments as advanced by the appellant and the special amicus in a municipal revenue bond case in Wisconsin. See also, Dept. of Ecology v. State Finance Committee, 116 Wn.2d 246, 804 P.2d 1241 (1991); State ex rel. Kane v. Goldschmidt, 308 Ore. 573, 783 P.2d 988 (1990), in which the Oregon Supreme Court approved a serial lease revenue bond plan as not an obligation of the state treasury; Schulz v. State of New York, 193 A.D.2d 171, 606 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y.App. 1993). The bondholders in this case take the risk that future legislatures will not appropriate the annual lease payments.

  2. Forrer v. State

    471 P.3d 569 (Alaska 2020)   Cited 13 times
    Applying the canon to the interpretation of Alaska’s constitution

    See Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7.See, e.g. , Lonegan II , 176 N.J. 2, 819 A.2d 395, 397 (2003) (4-3 decision) (relying on "over fifty years of precedent" and "the need to maintain stability" to uphold subject-to-appropriation bonds); Schulz v. State , 193 A.D.2d 171, 606 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (1993) (conceding that challenged bonds "have all the earmarks of a long-term State obligation" but relenting to "inescapable conclusion" dictated by "applicable precedent"); Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm'n , 731 S.W.2d 797, 804 (Ky. 1987) (4-3 decision) (relying on need for "stability to the law" in upholding purported revenue bond supported only by "incremental taxes"). We are thus in the fortunate position of being able to learn from the missteps of other jurisdictions, in much the same way as the framers did when drafting article IX.

  3. Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County

    338 Md. 75 (Md. 1995)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that laches barred a claim that a county ordinance enacted four years earlier was void due to a procedural defect in its enactment when there was no substantive objection to the ordinance's validity

    Several jurisdictions have applied laches to defeat a taxpayer suit in cases where the only objection to the acts of the municipality was, as here, a matter of procedure. See, e.g., Price v. Sixth Dist. Agric. Ass'n, 201 Cal. 502, 258 P. 387 (1927); Smith v. Daffin, 115 Fla. 418, 155 So. 658 (1934); Edel v. Filer Township, Manistee County, 49 Mich. App. 210, 211 N.W.2d 547 (1973); Fielding v. Board of Educ. of Paterson, 76 N.J. Super. 50, 183 A.2d 767 (1962); Schulz v. State of N.Y., 193 A.D.2d 171, 606 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1993). Choosing the applicable measure of impermissible delay for cases where an equitable remedy is sought is most straightforward in cases when there are concurrent legal and equitable remedies and the applicable statute of limitations for the legal remedy is equally applicable to the equitable one.

  4. Local Government Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp.

    5 A.D.3d 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    Such financing schemes repeatedly have withstood constitutional attack (see e.g. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 618;Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 252). Indeed, we have had occasion to observe that "in order to constitute debt within the meaning of the State and local finance articles of the N.Y. Constitution, the State or locality must legally be obligated to the bondholders in the event of default" (Schulz v. State of New York, 193 A.D.2d 171, 179, affd 84 N.Y.2d 231, cert denied 513 U.S. 1127 [emphasis in original]). Such is not the case under the provisions of the Act.

  5. Schulz v. N.Y.S. Legislature

    244 A.D.2d 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    The remaining arguments advanced by plaintiffs on this point, including their assertion that they have citizen-taxpayer standing pursuant to State Finance Law § 123-b (1), have been examined and found to be lacking in merit. Such standing does not, however, extend to plaintiffs' claims that the Act violates N.Y. Constitution, article VII, § 8 (gift or loan of State money or credit), article VIII, § 12 (limits upon local indebtedness) or article X, § 5 (restriction on assumption of obligations of a public corporation), as such provisions are not linked to any voting rights (see, e.g., Schulz v. State of New York, 193 A.D.2d 171, 177, affd 84 N.Y.2d 231, cert denied 513 U.S. 1127). As for Supreme Court's finding that certain plaintiffs are entitled to standing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 51, we note that plaintiffs do not appear to have asserted standing under this provision and, in our view, the record as a whole does not support such a claim (see generally, Mesivita of Forest Hills Inst. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 1014, 1016 [requiring allegation of fraudulent acts or the use of public property or funds for an entirely illegal purpose]).

  6. Schulz v. State Executive

    233 A.D.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    Addressing first the issue of standing, we agree with respondents that petitioners lack citizen-taxpayer standing to mount either of the challenges at issue here. As shall be discussed in some detail, because State Finance Law § 123-b (1) specifically excepts from its application "the authorization, sale, execution or delivery of a bond issue or notes issued in anticipation thereof by the state or any agency, instrumentality or subdivision thereof or by any public corporation or public benefit corporation", a taxpayer has neither common-law nor statutory standing to challenge the issuance of State bonds or bond anticipation notes ( see, Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y., 46 NY2d 394, 399-400; Schulz v State of New York [hereinafter Schulz I], 193 AD2d 171, 177, affd 84 NY2d 231, cert denied 513 US 1127; Schulz v State of New York [hereinafter Schulz II], 185 AD2d 596, 597, appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 336). Petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of State Finance Law § 123-b (1), raised for the first time in their reply brief, is not properly before us ( see, Fishman v Beach, 237 AD2d 705, 706; O'Sullivan v O'Sullivan, 206 AD2d 960) and lacks merit in any event ( see, Schulz II, supra, at 597).

  7. Matter of Kaplan v. State

    202 A.D.2d 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 1 times

    The Court found that the issuance and sale of bonds in reliance upon the enactment and the concomitant possibility that the requested recall of the bonds would cause "traumatic disturbance to settled matters of public finances and governance" necessitated dismissal of the proceeding (supra, at 348). Similarly, this Court recently held that laches barred a challenge to another "moral obligation" bond plan where the proceeding was brought two years after the enactment of enabling legislation (Schulz v. State of New York, 193 A.D.2d 171). The instant case presents an even more compelling basis for dismissal, as it was brought approximately six years following enactment of the legislation authorizing the challenged financing plan and nearly seven months following the sale of the challenged bonds.