Schultz v. Kneidl

4 Citing cases

  1. Liqui-Box v. Estate of Elkman

    238 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1990)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that, "since vacating required no evidence of intent beyond an intentional removal of animate and inanimate objects," the tenant had vacated the premises even though it continued to pay rent as required by the lease and was trying to negotiate a sublease arrangement when it moved out

    The trial judge correctly found that there was no ambiguity with regard to this provision so as to require him to apply any special rules of construction, such as by favoring the tenant over the landlord, the non-draftsman over the draftsman, or nonforfeiture over forfeiture. See Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 127, 228 A.2d 674 (1967); Schultz v. Kneidl, 56 N.J. Super. 575, 581-82, 153 A.2d 779 (Law Div. 1959), aff'd, 59 N.J. Super. 382, 157 A.2d 861 (App.Div. 1960). The judicial function when interpreting a contract is to accord the language a rational meaning in keeping with the purpose expressed.

  2. Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co.

    234 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    Construction of the language of an insurance policy, as other contracts, is essentially a question of law for the court. See Schultz v. Kneidl, 56 N.J. Super. 575, 581 (Law Div. 1959), aff'd. 59 N.J. Super. 382 (App.Div. 1960); Korb v. Spray Beach Hotel Co., 19 N.J. Super. 226, 230 (Law Div. 1952), aff'd, 24 N.J. Super. 151 (App.Div. 1952). Moreover, in construing the language of an insurance policy, a contract of adhesion, ambiguities are construed strictly against the insurer.

  3. Selective Builders v. Hudson City Savings Bank

    137 N.J. Super. 500 (Ch. Div. 1975)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that a party's failure to object when a condition was not satisfied and the party's conduct constituted a waiver of such condition

    There was no such requirement expressly stated in the commitment nor can such condition be implied from the expressed provisions contained therein. See Schultz v. Kneidl, 56 N.J. Super. 575, 584-585 (Law Div. 1959), aff'd 59 N.J. Super. 382 (App.Div. 196 0). There was nothing in the nature of the contract or the surrounding circumstances which could be the basis for this condition. See Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957); Casriel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 50-51 (1949).

  4. Levin v. Frishman

    73 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1962)

    The first provision of the lease, requiring the tenant to surrender the premises in as good state and condition as they were at the commencement of the term, standing alone, would appear to obligate the tenant to repair the fire damage. Schultz v. Kneidl, 56 N.J. Super. 575, 579 ( Law Div. 1959), affirmed 59 N.J. Super. 382 ( App. Div. 1960); Pivnick v. Seaboard Supply Company, 30 N.J. Super. 605, 611 ( Cty. Ct. 1954); 1 American Law of Property (1952), ยง 3.79, p. 349. The hardship visited upon tenants because of this principle of law led to the adoption of R.S. 46:8-6 which provides: