Opinion
No. 01 C 702
May 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
After the completion of discovery in this multicount action by Chris Schultz ("Schultz") against. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation ("Advocate") and two of its employees, on April 26, 2002 this Court entered its final pretrial order looking toward trial of the action. At the same time defendants have moved for summary judgment on one of the claims advanced by Schultz: Count III's common law claim (which is on this federal court's plate under the auspices of the supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a)) that asserts the intentional infliction of emotional distress. With Schultz now having responded to that motion, it is ripe for decision.
No useful purpose would be served by calling for a reply from defendants. Once material facts have been scrambled into omelette form by bona fide disputes as is the case here, they can't be placed back into a Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 56 eggshell via the summary judgment movants' quarrel with the factual version proffered by the target of the Rule 56 motion.
There is no dispute as to the demanding requirements that Illinois caselaw has established for the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort. Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 4771 490 (7th Cir. 2001) (most citations as well as internal quotation marks omitted) sets out an admirable statement of the operative principles:
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized in Illinois since 1961, when the Illinois Supreme Court explained that persons could be liable under the tort only for acts truly "outrageous," that is, an "unwarranted intrusion . . . calculated to cause severe emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities." More recently, in McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78, 127 Ill. Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court set forth three requirements necessary to demonstrate the intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress and (3) the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress. This tort does not require a contemporaneous physical impact or injury. It is clear, however, that the tort does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Instead, the conduct must go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered intolerable in a civilized community. Thus, to serve as a basis for recovery, the defendant's conduct must be such that the recitation of he facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim[:] "Outrageous!" Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged on an objective standard, based on the facts of the particular case.
For present purposes it is unnecessary to dwell on the matter at any length. Suffice it to say that Schultz' counsel have tendered additional facts that provide a far less sterile version of events than defendants — particularly in terms of the background that preceded the direct adverse employment decision that forms the gravamen of Schultz' federal Family and Medical Leave Act claim.
In that respect defendants' Mem. 6-8 points to a portion of Schultz' deposition (Dep. 114-18) as purportedly limiting the nature and scope of Schultz' Count III claim. But that contention is unduly crabbed, although defendants will of course have the opportunity at trial to seek to elicit the relied-on portions of the deposition for possible impeachment. In brief, as demanding as the Illinois caselaw may be in this area, when Schultz' submissions are taken as true (as they must be for summary judgment purposes), they call for resolution by a factfinder — a jury — and not by the court as a matter of law.
Accordingly defendants' motion for summary judgment must be and is denied because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Count III, like Schultz' other claims, will be the subject of disposition at trial.