On direct examination, an expert is not permitted to refer to the findings of any literature or treatises, even if he would testify that his opinions are based, in part, on the literature in question. People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1986); Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill. App. 3d 209, 230 (1990); Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 124 Ill. App. 3d 42, 54 (1984). This rule is based upon the theory that it would be unfair to allow this sort of testimony where the author of the article is not subject to cross-examination.

Thus, the conflicting testimony was sufficient to raise a question of fact to be decided by the jury and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and reweigh the credibility of the witnesses. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452-53; see also Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill. App. 3d 209, 222 (1990) (the jury is uniquely qualified to resolve conflicting medical testimony concerning the applicable standard of care and a defendant's breach of that standard); Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill. App. 3d 458, 472 (2001) (it is the jury's duty to consider the conflicting evidence and resolve the discrepancies). Further, the record shows that defendants at trial stipulated that based on Dr. Fields' testimony "there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of a jury instruction that contains an issue about whether Dr. Kelsey violated the standard of care by not having the Fields type discussion about the two different strategies and allowing the patient to choose."

Nonetheless, it is well established that where a defendant is found not liable, alleged errors pertaining solely to the question of damages do not afford grounds for a reversal. Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill. App. 3d 209, 231 (1990). Here the jury was instructed that if it decided for the defendant on the question of liability, it would have no occasion to consider the question of damages.

• 9 Over defendant's objection, the trial judge allowed Dr. Wagoner to summarize, in detail, various medical and industrial articles published before 1955 pertaining to studies performed and their results regarding the effects of asbestos. Defendant argues that the doctor's testimony was inadmissible under Schuchman v. Stackable (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 209, 555 N.E.2d 1012, appeal denied (1990), 133 Ill.2d 573, 561 N.E.2d 708, which defendant claims held that an expert may not read from medical literature. We decline to follow Schuchman, not because we believe it is wrong; rather, we believe it to be distinguishable.

Plaintiff does not quarrel with the well-established principle that where conflicting expert testimony is introduced at trial, it is the province of the jury as the trier of fact to resolve the conflict. ( Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill.2d 249, 260, 381 N.E.2d 279, 284; Topp v. Logan (1990), 197 Ill. App.3d 285, 298-99, 554 N.E.2d 454, 463; Piano v. Davidson (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 649, 666, 510 N.E.2d 1066, 1078, appeal denied (1988), 119 Ill.2d 574, 522 N.E.2d 1256.) Although this court is required to scrutinize the evidence in a medical malpractice action when reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial ( Schuchman v. Stackable (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 209, 222, 555 N.E.2d 1012, 1020, appeal denied (1990), 133 Ill.2d 573, 561 N.E.2d 708; Piano, 157 Ill. App.3d at 665, 510 N.E.2d at 1078), we will not sit as a second jury and reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Evans v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (1987), 154 Ill. App.3d 137, 140, 506 N.E.2d 965, 967, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill.2d 553, 515 N.E.2d 106; Anderson v. Beers (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 619, 623, 393 N.E.2d 552, 556.

Thus, the jurors were aware that they would only need to consider IPI Civil 2d No. 105.08 if they first determined that at least one defendant was liable for plaintiff's injuries. See Schuchman v. Stackable (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 209, 231 (alleged errors pertaining solely to question of damages do not afford grounds for reversal where a defendant is found not liable); Mackey v. Daddio (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 604, 610 (same). Furthermore, we do not view this instruction as completely barring plaintiff from recovery if the jury finds that plaintiff did not follow his physicians' instructions.

As already discussed, this instruction directs a jury to consider whether "something" other than the defendant's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. That "something" has, in the past, included a variety of nonnegligent causes. See, e.g., Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 223 Ill. App.3d 597, 615 (1991), aff'd in part rev'd in part on other grounds, 157 Ill.2d 29 (1993) (condition of the fetus in the womb); Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill. App.3d 209, 225 (1990) (falling tree top); Burge v. Morton, 99 Ill. App.3d 266, 268-69 (1981) (penicillin-resistant bacteria); Bauer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 150 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1998) (foul weather). Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that defendants did not simply argue that some blameless conduct was the sole proximate cause of McDonnell's death; rather, defendants argued, in closing, that Dr. Ahstrom's negligent conduct was the sole proximate cause.

It is well established that if a defendant is not liable, any alleged trial errors relating only to the question of damages offer no grounds for reversal. Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill.App.3d 209, 231 (1990). Here, the finding in favor of defendant on liability fully sustains the verdict, and plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of reversible error on the issue of liability.

Generally, the hearsay rule prevents an expert witness from reading or summarizing medical literature on direct examination. See Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill.App.3d 209, 230 (1990); Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 124 Ill.App.3d 42, 52-56 (1984). However, an expert witness may make limited reference on direct examination to medical literature that serves as a basis for that expert's opinion. See Lawson v. G.D. Searle &Co., 64 Ill.2d 543, 557 (1976); Fragogiannis v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 141788, ¶ 28; Becht v. Palac, 317 Ill.App.3d 1026, 1034 (2000).

Generally, the hearsay rule prevents an expert witness from reading or summarizing medical literature on direct examination. See Schuchman v. Stackable, 198 Ill.App.3d 209, 230 (1990); Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 124 Ill.App.3d 42, 52-56 (1984). However, an expert witness may make limited reference on direct examination to medical literature that serves as a basis for that expert's opinion.