Opinion
CASE NO.: 02-74151
July 29, 2003
OPINION
Plaintiffs, acting pro se, have brought a three count complaint against Defendants alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), violation of Article I of the United States Constitution (Count II), and violation of the Anti-Ku Klux Klan Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Count III). Plaintiffs argue that the actions of Defendants, in disciplining their attorney (a non-party to this suit) have "prejudiced the interests of [Plaintiffs] in proceeding in court with their counsel of choice." (Compl. at ¶ 11). Further, the complaint alleges that defendants "have acted unlawfully to deprive [Plaintiffs] of legal counsel, under color of law and custom in their capacity as guardians of the standards of conduct for Michigan attorneys." (Compl. at 1). Count I of the complaint states that it is "unlawful to strip from any person the right to make a petition to any court." (Compl. at ¶ 17). Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction against Defendants barring them from punishing their attorney, David H. Raaflaub.
There are currently several motions before the Court: Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and to appoint class counsel, Plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, Plaintiffs' renewed motion for temporary restraining order, and Plaintiffs' "Proposed Concurrent Motion for Preliminary Injunction." For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. The remaining motions brought by Plaintiffs are denied.
Background
Plaintiff Robert W. Schubring ("Schubring") is, according to the complaint, a candidate for the United States House of Representatives, in the Ninth Congressional District of Michigan. (Compl. at ¶ 1). Schubring is challenging a subsection of a state compaign finance law in state court. (Compl. at 2). He is represented by David H. Raaflaub ("Raaflaub") in this matter, an attorney licensed to practice law in Michigan.
Plaintiff Michelle Carla Lynne Grew ("Grew") is involved in two bankruptcy proceedings before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. (Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 5). She is represented by Raaflaub in these proceedings.
On July 10, 2001, the Grievance Administrator, an appointee of the Michigan Supreme Court, filed a formal complaint against attorney Raaflaub. That complaint alleges that Raaflaub, as counsel for a criminal defendant, signed and filed a Motion for Rehearing that contained false statements about an assistant prosecutor and a Michigan circuit court judge which Raaflaub knew to be false, or were made with reckless disregard for their truth. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1 at ¶ 10).
Defendant Michigan Attorney Discipline Board ("the Board") assigned the complaint against Raaflaub to Defendant Miles Hurwitz "sitting as a Master." (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2). As Master, Hurwitz held public hearings on the complaint and filed a report finding that the Grievance Administrator had established that Raaflaub "had committed professional misconduct." (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 2). The Master's report was then considered by a hearing panel consisting of Defendants Jerold Lax, Steffani Carter, and Thomas Dew. The hearing panel issued a written decision dated June 25, 2002, concluding that "the record supports the Master's findings of fact and conclusion of law. Hence, the panel directs that a hearing on appropriate discipline be scheduled." (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 3). On September 26, 2002, the hearing panel filed an Order of Suspension suspending Raaflaub for one hundred eighty (180) days. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 4).
On October 14, 2002, Raaflaub filed a petition for review of the Order of Suspension and a petition for stay of the discipline which was granted by the Board. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3). The Board conducted a review hearing on January 9, 2003, and filed an Order of Suspension on June 16, 2003, vacating the September 26, 2002 Order of Suspension and increasing Raaflaub's disciplinary suspension to one year. (See Pls.' Proposed Concurrent Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 4).
Standard of Review
Defendants' motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which addresses the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss may be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1975).
Discussion
Defendants' motion to dismiss is based on several grounds. First, Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits against the States in federal court, is a bar to Plaintiffs' claims. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feidman doctrine. Third, citing Younger v. Harris, Defendants argue that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case because important state interests are involved. 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971). Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the attorney discipline proceedings of Raaflaub. Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that abstention is not warranted in this case. Plaintiffs maintain that they have standing to bring this action.
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that absent unusual circumstances, federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state criminal prosecutions. Younger abstention has since been applied in the context of challenges in federal court to attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (1982). In Middlesex, the Supreme Court articulated a three part inquiry in determining that abstention was warranted in a suit brought by an attorney challenging disciplinary rules under the First Amendment:
1) Do state bar disciplinary hearings within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding;
2) Do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and
3) Is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges?Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521. The Sixth Circuit has applied this test in Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 1996).
In Fieger, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission from prosecuting a disciplinary complaint filed against him. The district court did not abstain. In applying the test set forth in Middlesex, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Michigan attorney disciplinary proceedings are "judicial in nature for purposes of Younger abstention." Fieger, 74 F.3d at 744. With respect to the "important state interest prong," the Sixth Circuit concluded that:
Regulating lawyers' conduct is a fundamentally important state interest. Michigan, like many other states, vests exclusive responsibility for regulation of the bar with its Supreme Court. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 5 . . . Because the administration of justice in Michigan and the entire Michigan judicial system is dependant upon the ethical conduct and professional proficiency of Michigan lawyers, the State has an important interest in the pending State proceedings.Id. at 745 (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the "Michigan lawyer discipline proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges." Id. at 746. Having found all the requirements for Younger abstention met, the Sixth Circuit remanded with an instruction that the complaint be dismissed. Id. at 750-751.
In this Court's view, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fieger mandates dismissal of this action. The attorney disciplinary proceedings at issue in this case are ongoing state judicial proceedings, those proceedings implicate an important state interest, and provide an opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Plaintiffs argue that "Defendants' proceeding against Mr. Raaflaub affords Plaintiffs no opportunity to raise constitutional questions relevant to Plaintiffs." (Pls. Answer at 3). This argument does nothing to bolster Plaintiffs' position. Like the plaintiff in Fieger, Plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the Defendants from punishing their attorney. A favorable ruling for Plaintiffs in this case would seriously interfere with the state court's disciplinary proceedings against Raaflaub. Younger, as applied by the Sixth Circuit in Fieger, bars Plaintiffs' suit and this case is dismissed.
The Court acknowledges that the case at bar is distinct from Fieger because in that case, the attorney who was actually subject to the disciplinary proceedings brought suit in federal court attacking his disciplinary proceedings. However, in the instant case, although clothed in constitutional challenges, Plaintiffs' claims are in essence a collateral attack on the state attorney disciplinary proceedings against Raaflaub. Therefore, there is no distinction between the central issues in the cases.
In this case, the Board filed an Order of Suspension on June 16, 2003. It is unclear from the record whether Raaflaub has appealed this Order. However, the Court is satisfied that the "ongoing state judicial proceeding" test under Younger is met. See Beltran v. State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988)(" Younger abstention requires that the federal courts abstain when state court proceedings were ongoing at the time the federal action was filed.)"
Raaflaub did raise constitutional challenges during the disciplinary proceedings.
Even if this Court did not find abstention to be warranted in this case, Plaintiffs' claims would still fail. Plaintiffs' claim that the Defendants have "acted unlawfully to deprive [plaintiffs] of legal counsel" is without merit. (Compl. at 1). Federal courts have consistently rejected attempts by clients to thwart state disciplinary proceedings against their legal counsel.
In Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pa., 353 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1394 (3rd Cir. 1973), plaintiffs, representing a class consisting of all attorneys in Pennsylvania and clients "allegedly deprived of chosen counsel, " challenged attorney discipline rules. Id. at 1311. In Cantor, the plaintiffs argued that the rules "deprive clients of their right to qualified counsel of their choice." Id. at 1319. In rejecting this argument, the court acknowledged a right to counsel of one's choice, but found that "there must be an implied reservation that counsel must be read to be an attorney in good standing and licensed to practice in some state. Here, once an attorney has been summarily suspended . . . he no longer has the right to represent anyone." Id. at 1319.
Similarly, in Kissell v. Breskow, the Seventh Circuit rejected a § 1983 claim brought against the executive secretary of a state attorney discipline committee by clients of an attorney who was subject to disciplinary proceedings. 579 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). In that case, as in the case at bar, plaintiffs argued that the defendant violated their rights to court access and choice of counsel. Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant's actions in the disciplinary proceedings were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 430. In addition, the court reasoned:
Quite apart from the question of immunity for state officials charged with discipline of attorneys, there is no basis for the [plaintiff]'s argument that [the defendant] "s actions denied their constitutional right of access to the courts or choice of counsel. To so hold on the facts of this case would have the absurd result of foreclosing all disciplinary action against any attorney who was appearing as counsel in any litigation. The client's right of access to court and free choice of counsel was never intended as a shield for attorneys toward whom the sword of discipline may be directed. Nor were those clients' rights intended as a basis for virtual immunity of attorneys from properly brought charges of professional misconduct. We see no reason, in policy or law, for restricting state officials to disciplinary action against attorneys who do not at the moment have a client in court.Id. at 430, n. 7.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. A judgment consistent with this opinion shall issue.