Before Passolt , however, we considered an appeal in which a district court did not attribute income to a recipient of permanent spousal maintenance. In Schroeder v. Schroeder , 405 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. App. 1987), a former husband moved to modify his obligation to pay permanent spousal maintenance to his former wife, and the district court denied the motion. Id. at 268-69.

1997) (addressing shift in burden of proof regarding change in circumstances). Indeed, we held in Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987), that a permanent-maintenance recipient who worked part-time had no obligation to undertake full-time employment. While we acknowledge the statutory requirement that uncertainty be resolved in favor of a permanent award, the significance of the burden-shifting that occurs upon such a finding mandates that this decision be fully supported by the evidence in the first instance.

But because a recipient of permanent maintenance is not obligated to rehabilitate herself or to become self-sufficient in order to relieve her former spouse from his maintenance obligation, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987) (determining that permanent-maintenance recipient who worked part time had no obligation to undertake full-time employment). Husband disputes the district court's finding that husband had the ability to pay $2,000 per month in maintenance.

And that duty persists after an obligor's remarriage. See Minn. Stat. § 518.68, subds. 1, 2 (2002) (requiring maintenance-related orders to include a notice stating, among other things, that parties who accept additional obligations of support do so with the "full knowledge" of their prior obligations); Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303.06(d) (same); see generally Ramsay v. Ramsay, 305 Minn. 321, 323, 233 N.W.2d 729, 731 (1975) (reversing district court's termination of maintenance obligation, stating, among other things, "[n]or is the fact of [obligor's] remarriage . . . sufficient change of circumstances to support a termination of alimony"); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987) (affirming denial of motion to reduce maintenance, stating "[obligor's] remarriage by itself is insufficient to support a reduction or termination of maintenance"); Halverson v. Halverson, 402 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn.App. 1987) (affirming denial of motion to reduce maintenance, stating "[obligor's] remarriage is an insufficient change of circumstances to support a termination of maintenance"). Indeed, if a substantial increase in the income of a maintenance obligor renders the existing maintenance award unreasonable and unfair, a maintenance obligation can be modified, despite the lack of an increase in the maintenance recipient's reasonable monthly expenses. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a)(1) (2002).

1981). Deference is given even where a party was not represented by counsel if the party was advised of the right to counsel and waived that right. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987). Respondent contends appellant agreed to pay maintenance in exchange for retaining his pension fund, but appellant claims the maintenance obligation was not meant to be permanent.

By contrast, rehabilitative maintenance anticipates self-sufficiency of the recipient spouse after a period of retraining, at which time the maintenance award ends or is modified. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987). But modification or termination are not part of the plan when permanent maintenance is awarded.

See Minn. Stat. § 518.68, subds. 1, 2 (2000 Supp. 2001) (requiring maintenance-related orders to include a notice stating, among other things, that parties who accept additional obligations of support do so with the "full knowledge" of their prior obligations); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 305 Minn. 321, 323, 233 N.W.2d 729, 731 (1975) (holding that obligor's remarriage to a woman with three children was not a sufficient change in circumstances to support a change of maintenance); Halverson v. Halverson, 402 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn.App. 1987) (holding that remarriage of obligor who had two young children by his second marriage was not a sufficient change in circumstances to support termination of maintenance). The district court relied on Ramsay, Halvorson, and Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267 (Minn.App. 1987), for the proposition that remarriage is not a change in circumstances within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 518.64. Martins argues that these cases are distinguishable because his claimed change in circumstances is not his remarriage but rather his need to pay his own living expenses after his separation from his second wife.

But because permanent maintenance was awarded to mother, she is under no obligation to become self-sufficient to relieve father of his obligation. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987) (recognizing difference between rehabilitative maintenance and permanent maintenance, and that latter did not require wife from "traditional marriage" to gain full-time employment). Father claims, "There is no statement that said maintenance was `permanent.

But, because Engen received permanent maintenance, she is not required to become self sufficient. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987). Additionally, viewing the information in Engen's affidavit regarding her employment and health in the light most favorable to the district court's finding of her income, the district court's implicit finding that Engen is not able to work full time could not be deemed clearly erroneous.

In addition, a recipient of permanent maintenance is not obligated to rehabilitate herself or become self-sufficient so as to relieve her former spouse from his maintenance obligation. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 405 N.W.2d 267, 269 (Minn.App. 1987). The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to alter the plain terms of the parties' 1992 stipulation.