Recoupment is a method of reducing or satisfying a plaintiff's claim. Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc. , 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo. 1968). Here, Ms. Crouch asserted that her affirmative defense based upon the alleged ECOA violation entitled her to have any award of damages to Boone National reduced in the amount of that damage award.

20 Am.Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 1, p. 228. For other definitions of recoupment, see Russell v. Empire Storage Ice Co., 332 Mo. 707, 725, 59 S.W.2d 1061, 1067(2); Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., Mo., 427 S.W.2d 414, 419(5); 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim § 2, p. 5; 3 Williston on Sales § 605, l. c. 334, 335. The main driveway followed the path of a pre-existent drive sharply upgrade from Route HH over an irregularly sweeping curve (roughly resembling an inverted "U") to the hilltop home of defendant Wood.

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Estes, 118 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 16 F. App'x 534 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ("[U]nder Missouri law, when an insurer pays a mortgagee for loss from an insured's arson, the property insurer is entitled to recoupment and restitution of that amount from the insured."). But see Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo. 1968) ("[R]ecoupment is a purely defensive matter ... and is available only to reduce or satisfy a plaintiff’s claim."). We may affirm the district court’s ruling as a valid exercise of its authority to fashion a "remedy under § 2202 of the Declaratory Judgment Act."

"Recoupment is a purely defensive matter growing out of [a] transaction constituting plaintiff's cause of action and is available only to reduce or satisfy plaintiff's claim and permits of no affirmative judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (6th ed. 1990) ( citing Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo. 1968)); see also United Structures of America, Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng., S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1993). As statutes of limitations merely bar the bringing of a suit after a certain period of time, they normally do not bar claims of recoupment because such claims are defensive in nature.

" 20 Am. Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 6 (1965) (citations omitted). Accord e.g., Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3rd Cir. 1984); Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo. 1968). Here the Banks seek affirmative relief to create a cause of action so that, if the collateral is insufficient to pay them, they can take the further affirmative step of netting out the obligation they would create against the amount owed by Drexel.

However, under Missouri law, the doctrine of recoupment — whether called a counterclaim or an affirmative defense — is solely a matter of defense. Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo. 1968). It is not a method for obtaining affirmative relief, but "is available only to reduce or satisfy a plaintiff's claim and permits no affirmative judgment." Id.

Other decisions imply a broader view. See Patton v. May Dept. Stores Co., 762 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. banc 1988); Pike v. Pike, 609 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977); Middleman v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. 1972); Danforth v. Orton, 465 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1971); Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1968). We do not directly address this issue here.

" When variance occurs without objection between pleading and proof, such variance, especially in court tried cases, shall be considered immaterial and the pleadings deemed amended to conform to the proof. See, Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Mo. 1968). Here, though the proof supports the judgment declaring the deed invalid for reasons somewhat different than those propounded in the pleadings or the trial court's finding, it is clear the deed should be set aside because of undue influence exercised in its procurement.

Finally, we take up the court's denial of Utility's motion for a continuance. We recognize that the denial of a continuance rarely is reversible error; yet, the trial court enjoys neither an absolute nor an arbitrary discretion, and the court's action will be reversed if there has been an abuse of discretion. Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc., Mo.Sup., 427 S.W.2d 414; Van Fleet v. Van Fleet, Mo.App., 253 S.W.2d 508. In the instant case, since a similar motion had been previously overruled, Utility claimed surprise.

"[R]ecoupment is a purely defensive matter growing out of the transaction constituting plaintiff's cause of action, and is available only to reduce or satisfy a plaintiff's claim and permits of no affirmative judgment." Schroeder v. Prince Charles, Inc. , 427 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Mo.1968). Where the counterclaim seeks affirmative relief by asserting what is essentially a new cause of action, the statute of limitation properly bars the counterclaim.