Opinion
CV116008142S
04-29-2016
David Schroeder et al. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge
In the complaint filed in this case, the remaining plaintiff, Sandra Schroeder, seeks money damages against the defendant, Chicago Title Insurance Co., for failure to pay costs, attorneys fees and expenses incurred in the defense of her title to property, known as 294A Cossaduck Hill Road, North Stonington, CT, pursuant to a certain title insurance policy in effect. The defendant has moved to dismiss this case for lack of standing. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied.
The complaint was brought by David Schroeder and Sandra Schroeder. After counsel for the plaintiffs was allowed to withdraw, Sandra Schroeder filed an appearance as a self-represented party. David Schroeder did not file an appearance, and he was nonsuited for failure to appear on December 22, 2014. See Order on Doc. No. 121.00.
I
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) RC Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission of Borough of Newton, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008). " Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008). The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is, therefore, a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-30(a); McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 63, 946 A.2d 862 (2008).
" [I]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader[.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 290, 933 A.2d 256 (2007). " [I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008). Nevertheless, where subject matter jurisdiction is involved, the court may also consider any affidavits or other uncontroverted evidence and even conduct an evidentiary hearing when appropriate. See, e.g., Fennelly v. Norton, 103 Conn.App. 125, 139 n.11, 931 A.2d 269 (2007), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 918, 931 A.2d 936 (2007); Bellman v. Town of West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 394, 900 A.2d 82 (2006); Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 121, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). When, as in the present case, a motion to dismiss " is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." Barde v. Board of Trustees of Regional Community Colleges, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).
" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted) St. Germain v. LaBrie, 108 Conn.App. 587, 591, 949 A.2d 518 (2008).
" Standing is established by showing that the party . . . is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 538, 893 A.2d 389 (2006). " [I]t is [t]he plaintiff [who] bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Thompson, 163 Conn.App. 827, 836 (2016).
II
The complaint in the instant case alleges that, at all relevant times, David and Sandra Schroeder owned fee title to a parcel of land known as 294A Cassoduck Hill Road [sic], Stonington, CT. David acquired his interest to the land by warranty deed filed in the land records of the town of North Stonington at Volume 101, Page 548. Sandra acquired her interest to the land by quit claim deed filed in those same land records at Volume 103, Page 523. On or about May 12, 2009, James Johnson claimed an easement over the plaintiff's property, and the Schroeders filed suit for injunctive relief to prevent Johnson from trespassing on their land. At all relevant times, the plaintiffs had a title insurance policy with the defendant that was in full force and effect as of the date the easement was claimed and suit commenced. The policy provided that the defendant shall pay costs, attorneys fees and expenses incurred in the defense of the title of the property. The complaint alleges that the Schroeders have incurred costs, attorneys fees and expenses in defense of the title against the claims of Mr. Johnson, but the defendant refused to cover any costs, attorneys fees or expenses incurred in breach of its duties under the title insurance policy. The court finds that the complaint raises an arguable and colorable claim.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant filed an affidavit by Sharon H. Quirk, who identifies herself as an AVP/Legal Assistant for the company. She avers that a loan policy and an owner's policy were issued by Chicago Title concerning this property dated May 31, 1994. Copies of deeds supplied in support of the motion demonstrate that Sandra Schroeder did not hold title to the property on the date the policy was issued. Rather, title to the property was initially taken on May 27, 1994, in the names of David L. Schroeder and Robert E. Riviera. Sandra Schroeder acquired title to the property through two conveyances. The first occurred on October 3, 1994, by quit claim deed from Robert E. Riviera of all of his interest in the property. The next occurred on or about March 21, 2014, by quit claim deed from David Schroeder of all of his interest in the property.
The copy of the insurance policy supplied by the defendant shows two policy numbers on one document titled " Loan Policy Form." That document identifies the insured as the Bristol Mortgage Corporation and the land title holders as David L. Schroeder and Robert A. Riviera [sic]. Defendant's affiant asserts that one loan number is for the lender's policy and the other is for the owner's policy. She asserts that the insured on the owner's policy was David L. Schroeder and Robert A. Rivera [sic]. However, there is no document identifying the insured on the owner's policy. The only document identifying any insured is on the lender's policy form, and it identifies the insured as Bristol Mortgage Corporation.
The plaintiff, who is self-represented, filed a written objection that is not responsive to the issues. At hearing, however, she argued that she was a party to the contract and, as proof, she supplied correspondence from Chicago Title with release papers attached from another case showing that Chicago Title paid on a claim made by her in 2001 on the same owner's policy that is the subject of the instant case, and that, at that time, the release papers referred to Sandra Schroeder as one of the insureds on the subject owner's policy.
" It is well settled that one who [is] neither a party to a contract nor a contemplated beneficiary thereof cannot sue to enforce the promises of the contract . . . Under this general proposition, if the plaintiff is neither a party to, nor a contemplated beneficiary of, [the] agreement, she lacks standing to bring her claim of breach of [contract]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Strong, 149 Conn.App. 384, 401, 89 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 923, 94 A.3d 1202 (2014) citing Cimmino v. Household Realty Corp., 104 Conn.App. 392, 395-96, 933 A.2d 1226 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 912, 943 A.2d 470 (2008). Whether the plaintiff was an insured or a contemplated beneficiary depends on the intent of the parties. That intent is determined from the terms of the contract read in the light of the circumstances attending its making, including the motive and purposes of the parties. Wasniewski v. Quick and Reilly, Inc., 292 Conn. 98, 109, 971 A.2d 8 (2009). Unless the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, the question of contractual intent presents a question of fact for the ultimate factfinder. Wilcox v. Webster Ins. Co., 294 Conn. 206, 217, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009). The language is not clear and unambiguous in the instant case. Accordingly, the issue is one for the trier of fact, and it is not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
III
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.