Opinion
No. 31189.
April 16, 1934.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
In absence of statutory authority, rural separate school district, being governmental subdivision of state exercising governmental functions, cannot sue or be sued.
APPEAL from Chancery Court of Pike County.
J.N. Ogden and J.H. Price, both of Magnolia, for appellant.
A Mississippi rural separate school district is a political subdivision and agency of the state.
This court has held agricultural high schools and consolidated high schools to be political subdivisions and agencies of the state.
Ayers et al. v. Board of Trustees, Leake County Agri. High School, et al., 134 Miss. 363, 98 So. 847; Nabors v. Smith, 135 Miss. 608, 100 So. 177; Stringer v. Roper, 152 Miss. 559, 120 So. 460.
Since this court has seen fit to hold consolidated school districts and agricultural high schools as being political subdivisions and agencies of the state, then it must of necessity hold that separate school districts are likewise political subdivisions and agencies of the state.
Secs. 6584, 6630, 6648, 6665, 6674, 6676 and 6737, Code of 1930.
Schools organizations like townships and counties, are subdivisions of the state, and are not subject to an action unless permitted by statute.
56 C.J. 777 and 778, Schools School Districts, par. 928; Ayers v. Leake Co. Agri. High School, 134 Miss. 368, 98 So. 847; Nabors v. Smith, 135 Miss. 608, 100 So. 117.
It is familiar learning that the state and its subdivisions and agencies are not subject to suit unless made so by statute; and the statute, where a statute exists, is the measure of the power to sue such board or agency.
Miss. Central Exposition v. Luderback, 86 So. 517; Ayers v. Board of Trustees, Leake Co. Agri. High School, 134 Miss. 363, 98 So. 847; Stringer v. Roper, 152 Miss. 559, 120 So. 460; 56 C.J. 268, 113.
James A. Wiltshire, of Magnolia, for appellee.
Counsel wants the court to hold that there is no difference between a rural separate school district and a consolidated and agricultural high school. If there was no difference then the learned counsel would win his case. However there is a difference. A separate school district, whether municipal or rural, is under the control and supervision of its trustees, they are the boss of the schools, they make their contracts, hire their teachers and operate their schools, while, of course the agricultural high schools and consolidated schools are operated by the county superintendent of education.
Counsel is in error when he cites authorities holding that a private individual cannot sue a school district, or county, etc., and assumes that an agricultural high school and consolidated school is governed by the same rule of law that controls a suit where a school district is suing for money to operate a school on and for which it is entitled, under the idea that the same rule of law applies in both cases. As a matter of fact in the cases cited by counsel private parties were undertaking to take money from the district to pay private parties what they claimed the district owed them to the hurt of the school — here we are asking for what the district owes us — money that is not needed by them — for us to operate our school on — manifestly a different proposition.
This court in no uncertain terms has differentiated between separate school districts and other schools and school districts.
Campbell v. Warwick, 107 So. 657; 35 Cyc. 825, sec. 111, Effect of Alteration of School District.
Argued orally by J.N. Ogden, for appellant.
Appellee filed its bill in the chancery court of Pike county against appellant to recover the sum of one thousand five hundred fifty-one dollars and ninety-five cents, and to enjoin appellant from expending that amount of school funds under the control of appellant, to which appellee claims right and title, and to restrain appellant from interfering with a certain school building and the furniture therein, to which appellee claims title, and for a decree establishing its title thereto. Appellant demurred to the bill, which demurrer was overruled by the court, and an appeal granted appellant to settle the principles of the cause.
Until June 25, 1932, the appellant school district contained twenty-three and eleven-sixteenths square miles with an assessed value for taxation of nine hundred one thousand seven hundred twenty-three dollars. On that date the Pike county school board created appellee district by carving out of appellant district approximately four and seven-sixteenths square miles of territory with an assessed value for taxation of three hundred sixty-six thousand six hundred forty-nine dollars. Since that time both districts have operated and maintained separate rural schools. The assessed value of the property in the new district was forty-one per cent of the property of the entire old district. When the new district was created, there was either on hand or coming to the old district the sum of one thousand five hundred fifty-one dollars and ninety-five cents. The old district claimed the furniture in the school building, situated in the new district and made some sort of claim to the building itself.
Appellant contends that one rural separate school district has no right to sue another school district of the same character; that such a school district, under the law, can neither sue nor be sued; that there is neither express nor implied authority in the school code authorizing such suits; that a rural separate school district is like a consolidated school district, and for the same reasons is a governmental subdivision of the state, exercising governmental functions, and, in the absence of a statute either expressly or impliedly authorizing such districts to sue and be sued, they have no right to sue and are exempt from suit. Appellant's position is supported by Ayres v. Board of Trustees, 134 Miss. 363, 98 So. 847, Nabors et al. v. Smith, 135 Miss. 608, 100 So. 177, and Stringer et al. v. Roper, 152 Miss. 559, 120 So. 460.
Appellee relies on Campbell v. Warwick, 142 Miss. 510, 107 So. 657, but that decision does not support appellee's contention. That was not a suit against the school district, but a bill for injunction by Campbell to prevent Warwick from interfering with his rights and duties as superintendent of the Tutwiler municipal separate school district.
There may be a remedy for the enforcement of appellee's rights under the certiorari statute (section 73, Code 1930), or under section 271 of the Code 1930. We do not decide this question because it is not presented.
Reversed and remanded.