School Dist. No. 35 v. School Dist. No. 32

4 Citing cases

  1. Chicago B. & Q. R. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1

    260 P. 537 (Wyo. 1927)   Cited 16 times

    194 N.W. 8. Financial necessities of one district do not justify change of boundary. Dist. v. Dist., (Mo.) 235 S.W. 470; Houck v. Dist., 239 U.S. 240. The discretion of boundary boards may be questioned where it is shown that their action was arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable. Dist. v. Dist., (Mo.) 235 S.W. 470; Board v. Brunton, 217 S.W. 709. L.A. Bowman, Ray E. Lee and Samuel M. Lee, for defendant in error.

  2. School Dist. 42 v. School Dist. 45

    254 S.W. 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923)   Cited 4 times

    Sec. 1201, R.S. 1919; School District No. 14 v. School District No. 27, 195 Mo. App. 504; Dist. No. 14 v. Sims, 193 Mo. App. 481; State ex rel. Martin v. Buckner, 54 Mo. App. 452. (4) A change of boundary adding only uninhabited territory is in violation of Sec. 11201, R.S. 1919, and said section precludes a district from adding territory from other district simply for revenue to be derived. School Dist. No. 14 v. School Dist. No. 27; 195 Mo. App. 504; School Dist. No. 35 v. School Dist. No. 32, 235 S.W. 470. (5) If the Board of Arbitrators had jurisdiction to determine the controversy between the two school districts as to a change of the boundary line, yet where the facts show that the territory sought to be detached from District 42 and attached to District 45 had no child of school age residing on said territory, its judgment was void for want of jurisdiction. State ex rel. v. Spencer, 164 Mo. 48; State ex rel. v. Spencer, 166 Mo. 279; Carter v. Bolster, 122 Mo. App. 143.

  3. Spiking Sch. Dist. v. Purpor. Enl. Sch. Dist

    362 Mo. 848 (Mo. 1952)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the existence of a municipal corporation must be challenged by the state

    (1) A declaratory judgment action is not the proper relief or remedy afforded to the appellants, and such action does not lie herein, nor is the same available to appellants in this type of proceeding. State ex rel. Smith v. Gardner, 204 S.W.2d 319; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2, Clinton County, v. Hunt, 199 S.W. 944; State ex rel. Frank v. Goven, 167 Mo. App. 613, 152 S.W. 93; State ex rel. Musser v. Birch, 79 S.W. 148, 186 Mo. 205; Bonderer v. Hall, 205 S.W. 542; School District of Columbia v. Jones, 129 S.W. 705, 229 Mo. 510; School District, etc., v. Pace, 113 Mo. App. 134; State ex inf. Barker v. Smith, 196 S.W. 17; Black v. Earley, 208 Mo. 281; State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy, 148 S.W.2d 527; School District No. 35 v. School District No. 32, 247 S.W. 232; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 130 S.W.2d 945; State ex rel. v. Terte, 176 S.W.2d 25; O'Meara v. New York Life Ins. Co., 169 S.W.2d 116; Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d 269. (2) The use of the declaratory judgment action rested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d l.c. 271; O'Meara v. New York Life Ins. Co., 169 S.W.2d 116; State ex rel. v. Terte, 176 S.W.2d 25; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 130 S.W.2d 945. (3) The exercise of sound discretion by trial court in sustaining respondent's motion should not be disturbed. Arno v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 202 S.W.2d 787; Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Missouri Motor Bus Co., 251 S.W. 756. (4) The fact that the appellants were unable to secure the assent of the attorney general or of the prosecuting attorney to the use of their name in a quo warranto proceeding does not afford them declaratory judgment relief. State ex rel. Smith v. Gardner, 204 S.W.2d 319. (5) An action in quo warranto is the only and p

  4. Karnes v. Barton

    272 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)   Cited 8 times

    The following authorities cited by appellant support our conclusion on this question. Pomroy, vol. 5, § 2110; 26 R.C.L. 644, p. 25, 654, p. 39; 26 R.C.L. 25; 26 R.C.L. 648, p. 30; 38 Cyc. 162; Jones on Mortgages, vol. 2, § 893; Black on Rescission, vol. 2, p. 1427, § 618; State Bank Trust Co. v. Kelly et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 202 S.W. 357; Poff v. Miller (Tex.Com.App.) 235 S.W. 470; Bledsou v. Palmer (Tex.Civ.App.) 81 S.W. 97; Miller v. Hodges (Tex.Com.App.) 260 S.W. 168; Taylor v. Hemphill (Tex.Civ.App.) 238 S.W. 986; Lewis v. Lee, 75 Ind. App. 263, 130 N.E. 443. The cause will be reversed and remanded.