Schomp v. Brown

9 Citing cases

  1. Kerper v. Kerper

    780 P.2d 923 (Wyo. 1989)   Cited 22 times
    In Kerper v. Kerper, 780 P.2d 923, 929-30 (Wyo. 1989), we considered similar language in a trust and held that such a provision "is a limitation on liability," although it is "strictly construed."

    We went on to state: "We said in Stringer, supra, adopting the holding in Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, that mutual or reciprocal wills, even though revoked, will stand as evidence of the contract. The agreement which provides the underpinning for the contractual wills is irrevocable if the survivor takes advantage of the provisions of the will made by the other.

  2. Ricks v. Brown

    515 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 4 times

    Defendants' second contention in effect argues that notwithstanding the intent of the parties a contractual provision such as the one in question here does not apply to survivorship property as distinguished from property passing by virtue of the will. Schomp et al v. Brown et al, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, 337 P.2d 358 (1959), is to the contrary. There the parties executed reciprocal wills which provided in pertinent part, Article IX:

  3. Scott v. United States

    225 F. Supp. 257 (D. Or. 1963)   Cited 5 times
    In Scott v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 257 (D. Oreg. 1963), it was held that payments received by the wife were pursuant to a property settlement and not taxable under Section 71, even though neither the wife nor the husband knew what property stood in their individual names and what property stood in their joint names.

    Putting aside the residence, the present record discloses property owned by the entirety by the plaintiff and her husband of an estimated value of $55,000.00. If Howard had died at any time prior to her deed to him, she would be the outright owner of this property. Wenker v. Landon, 161 Or. 265, 88 P.2d 971; Dahlhammer Roelfs v. Schneider, 197 Or. 478, 252 P.2d 807; Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, and on re-hearing 337 P.2d 358. Property in which ownership was claimed by the plaintiff had an estimated value of $17,400.00. The net value of the husband's estate at that time being $314,000.00.

  4. Wadsworth v. Talmage

    365 Or. 558 (Or. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    In several cases, we have referred to a court "impressing" property with a constructive trust. See Montgomery v. U.S. Nat’l Bank et al. , 220 Or. 553, 570, 349 P.2d 464 (1960) (using that wording); Schomp et al. v. Brown et al. , 215 Or. 714, 716, 335 P.2d 847, decision clarified on denial of reh’g , 215 Or. 714, 723, 337 P.2d 358 (1959) (same). And in several more cases, we have made references to courts "imposing" constructive trusts or the "imposition" of a constructive trust by a court.

  5. Schaad v. Lorenz

    69 Or. App. 16 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    The limitation period for a contract to make a will begins to run on the death of the testator whose actions are challenged. See Lewis v. Siegman, 135 Or. 660, 665, 296 P. 51, reh'g den. 135 Or. 660, 667, 297 P. 1118 (1931); see also Schomp, et al. v. Brown, et al, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, reh'g denied 215 Or. 723, 337 P.2d 358 (1959); Ellinwood and Ellinwood, 59 Or.App. 536, 651 P.2d 190, rev. den. 294 Or. 460, 658 P.2d 1162 (1982). Plaintiffs brought these actions within the statutory limit.

  6. Shook v. Bell

    599 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979)   Cited 6 times
    In Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d at 1324, we intimated that mutual wills, which recited a contract to dispose of spousal estates, might be evidence of such a contract sufficient in itself to establish its existence.

    79 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, supra, § 811 at p. 865. We said in Stringer, supra, adopting the holding in Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 217, 335 P.2d 847, that mutual or reciprocal wills, even though revoked, will stand as evidence of the contract. See, Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 181 Or. 646, 182 P.2d 969, rehearing denied 185 P.2d 575 (1947).

  7. American Nat'l Red Cross v. Wilson

    518 P.2d 629 (Or. 1974)   Cited 1 times

    See Stevens v. Meyers, 91 Or. 114, 147-48, 177 P. 37, 2 ALR 1155 (1919); 1 Restatement of Contracts (1932) 158, § 135; and 11 Williston on Contracts (3d ed 1968) 741-49, § 1421. See also Schomp et al v. Brown et al, 215 Or. 714, 719-20, 335 P.2d 847, 337 P.2d 358 (1959); Florey et al v. Meeker et al, 194 Or. 257, 277, 240 P.2d 1177 (1952); Taylor v. Wait, 140 Or. 680, 684, 14 P.2d 283 (1932); Phez Co. v. Salem Fruit Union et al, 113 Or. 398, 419, 233 P. 547 (1925); Note: Contracts, Third Party Beneficiaries — Donee's Rights in Oregon, 22 Or L Rev 297, 301, 304 (1943); and Annots., 2 ALR 1193 (1919); 33 ALR 739 (1924); and 73 ALR 1397 (1931). See James, Civil Procedure (1965) 397, § 9.8. See also Sparks, Contracts to Make Wills (1956) 152.

  8. In re Call's Estate

    386 P.2d 125 (Utah 1963)   Cited 1 times

    When an estate is so devised in one clause, the interest so devised cannot be taken away or diminished by any subsequent provisions of doubtful import, or by any inferences deductible therefrom repugnant to the estate given. Schomp v. Brown, 215 Or. 714, 335 P.2d 847, 337 P.2d 358 (1959); In re Shira's Estate, Ohio Prob. 165 N.E.2d 60 (1959); 4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, p. 647. Affirmed. Costs to respondent.

  9. In re Stringer's Estate

    80 Wyo. 389 (Wyo. 1959)   Cited 22 times

    And to the same effect is 57 Am.Jur., Wills, § 174, p. 154. In Schomp v. Brown, Or., 335 P.2d 847, 850, it is clearly stated: "* * * Such a reciprocal or mutual will, even though revoked, still stands as evidence of the contract. * * *"