A dismissal of a complaint after the opening statement of a plaintiff's attorney is warranted only where it can be demonstrated either (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action, (2) that a cause of action that is otherwise stated is conclusively defeated by something interposed by way of a defense and clearly admitted as a fact, or (3) that the counsel for the plaintiff, in his or her opening statement, by some admission or statement of fact, so completely compromised his or her case that the court was justified in awarding judgment as a matter of law to one or more defendants ( see Ballantyne v City of New York, 19 AD3d 440, 440-441; see also CPLR 4401; Hoffman House, N.Y. v Foote, 172 NY 348, 350 [1902]; Schomaker v Pecoraro, 237 AD2d 424, 425-426; De Vito v Katsch, 157 AD2d 413, 416-417).

The grant of such an application prior to the close of the opposing party's case is generally disfavored ( see Kamanou v. Bert, 94 A.D.3d 704, 941 N.Y.S.2d 260;De Vito v. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d 413, 416–417, 556 N.Y.S.2d 649). However, judgment as a matter of law may be warranted prior to the presentation of any evidence if the plaintiff has, “by some admission or statement of fact, so completely compromised his or her case that the court was justified in awarding judgment as a matter of law to one or more defendants” ( Beshay v. Eberhart L.P. No. 1, 69 A.D.3d 779, 781, 893 N.Y.S.2d 242;see Ballantyne v. City of New York, 19 A.D.3d 440, 797 N.Y.S.2d 506;Schomaker v. Pecoraro, 237 A.D.2d 424, 425–26, 654 N.Y.S.2d 830;see also Hoffman House, N.Y. v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 350, 65 N.E. 169;Hardy v. State of New York, 294 A.D.2d 400, 401, 742 N.Y.S.2d 346;Fuller v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 206 A.D.2d 452, 453, 614 N.Y.S.2d 557;De Vito v. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d at 416–417, 556 N.Y.S.2d 649).

However, "'bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the record are not presumed to be true'" ( Paolino v Paolino, 51 AD3d 886, 887, quoting Parola, Gross Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021-1022; see Parsippany Constr. Co., Inc. v Clark Patterson Assoc. P.C., 41 AD3d 805). A cause of action alleging fraud requires a plaintiff to establish a misrepresentation or omission of material fact which the defendant knew was false, that the misrepresentation was made to induce the plaintiffs reliance, the plaintiffs justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and a resulting injury ( see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421; Jablonski v Rapalje, 14 AD3d 484, 487; Schomaker v Pecoraro, 237 AD2d 424, 426). Damages are limited to actual loss, not to provide compensation for a possible gain ( see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d at 421).

A dismissal of the complaint after the plaintiff's attorney's opening statement is warranted only where "it can be demonstrated either (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action . . . (2) that a cause of action well stated is conclusively defeated by something interposed by way of defense and clearly admitted as a fact or (3) that the learned counsel for the plaintiff, in his [or her] opening address, by some admission or statement of fact, so completely ruined his [or her] case that the court was justified in granting a nonsuit" ( Hoffman House, N.Y. v. Foote, 172 NY 348, 350; see CPLR 4401; Gleyzer v. Steinberg, 254 AD2d 455; Schomaker v. Pecoraro, 237 AD2d 424; De Vito v. Katsch, 157 AD2d 413; McLoughlin v. Holy Cross High School, 135 AD2d 513). None of these three criteria was satisfied here.

The Supreme Court properly concluded that the complaint satisfied the pleading requirements of RPAPL 1515 (2) in that it described the property at issue with "common certainty" ( cf., Concerned Citizens v. State of New York, 140 A.D.2d 842, 843; Lake Louise Marie Community Assn. v. Lake Louise Marie Corp., 25 A.D.2d 475). However, the complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages either for slander of title ( see, Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Assocs., 136 A.D.2d 222) or fraud ( see, CPLR 3016 [b]; Schomaker v. Pecoraro, 237 A.D.2d 424). Furthermore, New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort as an independent cause of action ( see, Island Condo Mgt. Corp. v. Katan Gardens Condominium, 250 A.D.2d 816; Rivera v. Greenberg, 243 A.D.2d 697; Truong v. ATT, 243 A.D.2d 278).

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the case is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for trial. Motions to dismiss made after a plaintiff's opening statement are disfavored and should be granted only where the defendant establishes either that (1) the complaint does not state a cause of action, (2) the cause of action is conclusively defeated by an admitted defense, or (3) admissions or statements of fact made by plaintiff's counsel in the opening absolutely preclude recovery ( see, Hoffman House v. Foote, 172 N.Y. 348, 350; Schomaker v. Pecoraro, 237 A.D.2d 424, 425-426; De Vito v. Katsch, 157 A.D.2d 413, 417-418). Generally, "the prospect of a dismissal on opening exists only when, from all available indications, the case is doomed to defeat" ( De Vito v. Katsch, supra, at 416).

"The elements of a cause of action for fraud require a material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity [scienter], an intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and damages. A claim rooted in fraud must be pleaded with the requisite particularity under CPLR 3016 (b)" (Eurcyleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 559 [2009] [citations omitted]; see also Schomaker v Pecoraro, 237 A.D.2d 424, 426 [2d Dept 1997]).

To the extent that plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges a claim for fraud, it is well settled that a cause of action alleging fraud requires a plaintiff to establish a misrepresentation or omission of material fact which the defendant knew was false, that the misrepresentation was made to induce the plaintiff's reliance, the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and a resulting injury (see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]; Hense v Baxter, 79 AD3d 814, 816 [2010]; Jablonski v Rapalje, 14 AD3d 484, 487 [2005]; Schomaker v Pecoraro, 237 AD2d 424, 426 [1997]). It is also well settled that "New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when the parties deal at arm's length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active concealment" (Simone v Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 42 AD3d 518, 520 [2007]; see Margolin v I M Kapco, Inc., 89 AD3d 690, 691 [2011]; Laxer v Edelman, 75 AD3d 584 [2010]; Daly v Kochanowicz, 67 AD3d 78, 87 [2001]; Platzman v Morris, 283 AD2d 561, 562 [2001]; cf. Real Property Law §§ 462, 465).