See TRE HARGETT, SECRETARY OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 2015–2016 506–07 (2015). The North Carolina legislature abolished the incidental right of survivorship in joint tenancies in that territory by enacting the Act of 1784, chapter 22, section 6. 1 EDWARD SCOTT, LAWS OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, INCLUDING THOSE OF NORTH CAROLINA NOW IN FORCE IN THIS STATE FROM THE YEAR 1715 TO THE YEAR 1820, INCLUSIVE 294 (Heiskell & Brown 1821); seeGaines v. Catron , 20 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 514, 515–16 (1840) ; Bennett , 179 S.W. at 631 ; Scholze v. Scholze , 2 Tenn.App. 80, 90 (1925). The Act of 1784 provided:
When a word in a statute has a well recognized common-law meaning, that meaning will be given to the word unless a different meaning is required based on the context in which the word appears or on the purpose of the statute. Lively v. Am. Zinc Co. of Tenn., 137 Tenn. at 272-73, 191 S.W. at 978; Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 92, 1925 WL 1935, at *8 (1925). The technical meaning of the word "heirs" includes the class of persons appointed by law to succeed to a decedent's real estate in the case of intestacy.
The Court of Civil Appeals in Bellar v. Ferrell, Nashville, 1923, held that such tenancy did exist in such property since the enactment of that statute. The Middle Tennessee section of the Court of Appeals held to the contrary in Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, the latter court expressing the opinion that tenancy by the entirety with respect to personal property never existed in Tennessee, nor indeed at common law. It will be recalled that chapter 26 of the Public Acts of 1913 fully emancipated the married woman from the disabilities of coverture and enabled her to hold her estate as a feme sole, and, as said in some of our cases, to a great extent destroyed the legal unity between husband and wife as to property rights.
We presume that the General Assembly was aware of the common law offense of "official misconduct" when it enacted the Racing Control Act of 1987 and that it intended that the scope of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-36-401(d) should be synonymous with the well-recognized common law meaning of the term. Lively v. American Zinc Co., 137 Tenn. 261, 272-73, 191 S.W. 975, 978 (1917); Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 92 (1925). Accordingly, we find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-36-401(d) empowers the courts to review the commission's decisions with regard to applications for initial race licenses to determine whether they were affected by misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of the commission or its staff.
Statutes are to be construed as nearly to the rule and reason of the common law as may be. Snyder v. McEwen, 148 Tenn. 423, 256 S.W. 434. It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that words with a fixed meaning at common law or by decisions of the courts are presumed to be used in a statute in that sense unless there is something in the context which indicates an intention to use them in a different sense. Lively v. American Zinc Co., 137 Tenn. 261, 191 S.W. 975; State v. Smith, 137 24 Tenn. 394; Apple v. Apple, 38 Tenn. 348; Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80. Since the statute purports to regulate procedure in "equity causes", is to be presumed that the language employed was used in the sense commonly attributed to it in that field of jurisprudence.
Parol evidence about the advancements was inadmissible as the will purported to dispose of the whole estate and did not mention the advancements, therefore she forgave the advancements. Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80. It is not admissible on the question of renunciation, because his motive for renunciation is immaterial. 69 C.J., 974, sec. 2168.
There is no delivery unless the complete dominion and control of the subject of the gift, to the fullest extent consistent with its nature, is renounced and relinquished by the donor and acquired by the donee. The rules which we have thus briefly summarized are, we think, well supported by the Tennessee cases, some of which are as follows: Chandler v. Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43 S.W.2d 397; Williams v. Thornton, 160 Tenn. 229, 22 S.W.2d 1041; Wilson v. Wilson, 151 Tenn. 486, 267 S.W. 364; Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366, 30 A.L.R. 1481; Scott v. Union Planters' Bank Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 272, 130 S.W. 757; Shugart v. Shugart, 111 Tenn. 179, 184, 76 S.W. 821, 102 Am. St. Rep., 777; Balling v. Manhattan Sav. Bank Trust Co., 110 Tenn. 288, 293-295, 75 S.W. 1051; Marshall v. Russell, 93 Tenn. 261, 265, 25 S.W. 1070; O'Brien v. Waggoner, 20 Tenn. App. 145, 153, 96 S.W.2d 170; McConnell v. Fayette County Bank, 8 Tenn. App. 461; Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 95. "The burden of proving that a gift was made, including the elements necessary to its validity, is on the donee."
"Delivery and intention to give must accompany each other to make a valid gift." Atchley v. Rimmer, supra, 148 Tenn. 303, at page 319, 255 S.W. 366, 30 A.L.R., 1481; Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80, 95; 12 R.C.L., p. 932. "An absolute gift which will divest the donor's title, requires a complete renunciation on his part, and acquisition on the part of the donee, of all the title to and interest in the subject of the gift."
Of course, the delivery may be actual or constructive, but the fact of delivery must be shown by other evidence than the mere declarations of the donor. The courts require strict proof of delivery or some act or circumstance amounting to an actual delivery rather than attribute delivery to a declaration of gift. Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 319, 255 S.W. 366, 30 A.L.R., 1481; Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 95. Hence I am of the opinion that the gift of the note to Ewin and its cancellation was not completed as a gift inter vivos or causa mortis.