Opinion
47930.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 1973.
DECIDED MARCH 14, 1973.
Robbery. Hancock Superior Court. Before Judge Jackson.
Jordan D. Luttrell, for appellants.
Joseph B. Duke, District Attorney, for appellee.
1, 2, 3. The trial judge did not err in denying the defendants' motions to set aside sentences and to withdraw pleas of guilty on the grounds of involuntariness and denial of the right to counsel.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 1973 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 1973.
Pursuant to their pleas of guilty, the defendants were sentenced for the commission of robbery by use of force. The record contains a document described as "Judge's Interrogatory to Felony Defendant," as to each defendant. In summary each defendant answered questions posed by the court as follows: That they understood the nature of the charge in the case; the maximum punishment for the offense, twenty years; that neither the district attorney, defendants' attorney, or any policeman or law officer has made any promise to influence them to plead guilty; that they have not been threatened to plead guilty; that they have had time to confer and have conferred with their lawyer; that they have had time to subpoena witnesses if desired; that they authorized their counsel to enter pleas of guilty; that they were satisfied with the services of their court appointed counsel; that they were in fact guilty; and that the questions posed had been read to them and explained. Each defendant's signature appears thereon and following each document, the trial judge's certificate that each defendant, represented by an attorney who was court appointed, plead guilty to the offense of robbery and that after further examination of the court, the court ascertained, determined and adjudged that the pleas of guilty were freely, understandingly and voluntarily made. Within the same term of court the defendants filed motions "to vacate judgment and withdraw plea." Their motions alleged that it was not the intention of the defendants to plead guilty to the offense charged prior to consulting with an attorney of their own choosing; that they were not advised of the right to counsel nor the right to remain silent by the arresting officers who questioned the defendants on the day after their arrest and obtained a signed confession from them; that the guilty pleas were not voluntary; that an attorney introduced himself as defendants' counsel on the day that defendants were sentenced; that defendants did not even talk to this attorney; that before they entered the pleas through counsel they were not advised of their "constitutional rights" nor did the court ask defendants if they had counsel or desired counsel; nor did the court appoint counsel for them; that the court did not at any time advise the defendants as to the charges made against them; that the defendants did not plead guilty to the charge of their own free will. All the motions were verified. A hearing on the motions was held and no evidence was offered. The trial court denied the motions and this appeal follows from the denial.
1. With respect to their claim that involuntary confessions were obtained from them, it must be noted that no extra judicial confession was ever offered in evidence against these defendants. Thus it is unnecessary to decide whether there was a violation of the accused's privilege against self incrimination insofar as any alleged out of court statement is concerned.
2. A plea of guilty may only be accepted by a trial judge when the court makes a determination that the plea is made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and the record must affirmatively show that the pleas of guilty were entered intelligently and voluntarily. Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764 ( 182 S.E.2d 892). The trial judge's interrogatories and defendants' answers comply with the Purvis rule. The pleas were entered voluntarily after complete and full explanation by the trial court as to each defendant.
3. There is no merit in the contention that the guilty pleas should be set aside because the defendants were deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel. The record shows that the defendants were afforded court appointed counsel and there is no showing in the record that at the time these defendants appeared before the trial court that they made any objection to being represented by court appointed counsel or had any desire to obtain counsel of their own choice. Before a final conviction can be set aside on the ground of incompetent or ineffective counsel, it must appear that the trial was a farce or mockery of justice or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court. Heard v. State, 126 Ga. App. 62 (8) ( 189 S.E.2d 895). This case does not fall within that rule.
Judgment affirmed. Deen and Quillian, JJ., concur.