(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Schofield v. Palmer , 279 Ga. 848, 851-852 (2), 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule, and includes evidence of "any deals or agreements between the State and [a] witness."
Without any detailed analysis, the habeas court found that Whatley had failed to show cause for his failure to raise this claim in the trial court and on direct appeal, concluding that the claim "was available for presentation" at that time. Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726) (2005). We find that the habeas court's finding of an absence of cause to excuse the procedural default was erroneous.
To succeed on this Brady claim, Brookins must satisfy four factors: (1) the State, including any part of the prosecution team, possessed evidence favorable to Brookins; (2) Brookins did not actually possess the favorable evidence and could not have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) the State suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability that the outcome of Brookins's trial would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed to him. See Schofield v. Palmer , 279 Ga. 848, 852 (2), 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). We decline Brookins's invitation to revisit our prior reasoning in applying this four-part test as a means of applying the original three-part test of Brady ; that prior reasoning, if traced to its origin through our case law and then through that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was borrowed from various federal courts of appeals.
The "prejudice" portion of the test is satisfied only where the omission or waiver resulted in actual and substantial prejudice, infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726) (2005). A petitioner is not required to meet the cause and prejudice test in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice; however, an extremely high standard applies in such cases.
In addition to these four cases, this Court has located additional cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court applied the procedural default rule to various Brady claims. See Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2005) (explaining that there was withheld evidence not discovered until after direct appeal and claim raised for the first time at state habeas, but petitioner able to "show cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default"); Whatley vTerry, 284 Ga. 555, 558-59 (2008) (explaining that when the State conceals evidence during trial and direct appeal, and, therefore, petitioner does not raise a Brady claim until at the state habeas level, the habeas court is correct in finding, "at least as an initial matter" that the claim is barred by procedural default but the petitioner can overcome the bar by showing cause and prejudice). Given its review the of the Georgia case law, the Court finds that the Georgia Supreme Court does regularly apply the procedural default rule to Brady claims first made at the state habeas level.
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Schofield v. Palmer , 279 Ga. 848, 852 (2), 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). On appeal, a trial court's factual findings on a Brady claim are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and its application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See also Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848(2), 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). To prevail on a Brady claim, Chapman was required to show that
To prevail on their Brady claim, appellees were required to show four factors: (1) the State, including any part of the prosecution team, possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defendant did not possess the favorable evidence and could not obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) the State suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 852, 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005). Pretermitting a discussion on whether the medical examiner is part of the prosecution team and whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the defense received the missing page, is the fact that James and Lawson did not establish that the missing page could not have been obtained with any reasonable diligence.
Thus, "the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive." Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 ( 621 SE2d 726) (2005). 2.
Only writs or processes so issuing are governed by the statute. This is the view expressed more than thirty years ago by Judge McDowell in two cases ( Leas McVitty v. Merriman, supra, and Schofield v. Palmer, 134 F. 753), which did much, we may be confident, to guide the conduct of the federal bar in adhering to the Virginia practice. It is the view expressed by Judge (later Mr. Justice) Sanford in the District Court of Tennessee. "In any proceeding which may be properly instituted and proceeded with upon mere notice to the parties in interest, without process from the court itself, the requirements of section 911 have no application." In re Condemnation Suits by United States, 234 F. 443, 445. It is the view accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Eley v. Gamble, supra, and again in the case at hand.