Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:CV-03-0610.
December 7, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Background.
The Plaintiff, Roy Schofield, formerly an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy ("SCI-Mahanoy"), Frackville, Pennsylvania, originally filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 16, 2003, naming five (5) Defendants, including Prison Health Services (PHS), three (3) individual employees of PHS, and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5). Since the Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we screened the complaint in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA") of 1995. In reviewing the original complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), we found that the Plaintiff was unable to maintain his action as it was presented against all of the named Defendants. We found that Defendants Beard and PHS should be dismissed. We also found that the Plaintiff should file an amended complaint against the remaining Defendants. (Doc. 8). The District Court adopted our recommendations. (Doc. 10). Subsequently, the Plaintiff was directed to file his amended complaint against the remaining Defendants, Dr. Ciaglia, Dr. Modery and Marilyn Connell.
Defendants' evidence indicates Plaintiff was released from prison in April 2005. (Doc. 95, Ex. B, ¶ 33.).
Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996).
Plaintiff correctly referred to Defendant Modery as "Modery" (Doc. 42) despite our previous note that this Defendant's name was "Modera." Also, Defendants now indicate in their dispositive motion that this Defendant doctor's name is Modery. (Doc. 94). We have directed the Clerk of Court to once again correct the docket as to Defendant Modery's proper spelling of her name. Thus, we now use the proper spelling of Defendant Modery's name herein.
The Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on June 27, 2003. (Doc. 12). Following service of Plaintiff's amended pleading, Defendants Ciaglia and Modery filed a joint Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 19). Defendant Connell filed a separate Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 21). On April 8, 2004, we issued a second Report and Recommendation in which we recommended that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed as against the stated three remaining Defendants. (Doc. 32). On July 2, 2004, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant Connell's Motion to Dismiss but denying Defendants Ciaglia and Modery's Motion to Dismiss. The Court also directed the Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint in order to state his claims against the two Defendant doctors in terms of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. (Doc. 40).
The Plaintiff timely filed his Second Amended Complaint, and it was served on remaining Defendants Ciaglia and Modery. (Doc. 42). On August 17, 2004, the two Defendant doctors filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with attached Exhibits and a Brief in support thereof. (Doc. 44 45). Defendants contended that the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleged only negligence and a disagreement with the medical care which they provided, and that it did not allege that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. The Plaintiff filed his opposition Brief and Affidavit. (Docs. 46 47).
We considered Plaintiff's Affidavit (Doc. 47) as a supplemental pleading, since it supplemented his Eighth Amendment allegations contained in his Second Amended Complaint by adding related claims that occurred after the filing of his latest pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d).
On November 10, 2004, we issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint be denied, and the District Court adopted our Report and Recommendation. (Docs. 51 56). Discovery then ensued, including Plaintiff's deposition. The discovery period has ended, and Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 94). Defendants also filed their support Brief with numerous exhibits and a Statement of Material Facts attached to their Summary Judgment Motion. (Docs. 94 95). The Plaintiff failed to file his opposition brief, and on October 31, 2005, we issued an Order and directed Plaintiff to file his brief by November 20, 2005. (Doc. 99). To date, Plaintiff has neither filed his brief in opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion nor has he requested an extension of time within which to do so.
The Summary Judgment Motion of the Defendants has been briefed by them and is ripe for disposition.
II. Section 1983 Standard.
In a § 1983 civil rights action, the Plaintiff must prove the following two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct complained of deprived the Plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the law or the Constitution of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F. 3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993). Further, Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Rather, it is a means to redress violations of federal law by state actors. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). See also Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498-499 (M.D. Pa.).
It is undisputed that Defendants were physicians employed by SCI-Mahanoy. (Doc. 95, Ex. B, p. 1). This is sufficient to show that Defendants were state agents.
It is well established that personal liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed upon a state official based on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 1546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976); Parratt, supra. It is also well settled in the Third Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a § 1983 case and that a complaint must allege such personal involvement. Id. Each named defendant must be shown, through the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences upon which Plaintiff's claims are based. Id. As the Court stated in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998):
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. (Citations omitted).
III. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard.
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "`genuine' only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the nonmoving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-694 (3d Cir. 1988) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence could affect the outcome of the action pursuant to the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "Facts that could alter the outcome are material facts." Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F. 3d 194, 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994).
The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is initially upon the movant. Forms, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem. 725 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983). Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Id. The nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file" designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In doing so, the court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id., quoting Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985); Goodman v. Mead Johnson Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment must be entered where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celetox Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
IV. Eighth Amendment Standard.
The Plaintiff raised denial of medical care claims as against the Defendants. We therefore discuss the Eighth Amendment standard with respect to such a claim.
"A prison official's `deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). An inadequate medical care claim, as we have here, requires allegations that the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" of the plaintiff, while a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (1976); Unterberg v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. "The question . . . is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to his future health.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
In order to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that the Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and that those needs were serious. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support a claim of an Eighth Amendment violation. Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lensaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988); see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F. 2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) "`[T]he law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation.") As such, "[a] distinction must be made between a case in which the prisoner claims a complete denial of medical treatment and one where the prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment." Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F. Supp. 542, 547 (M.D. Pa. 1988) citing United States ex. rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 549 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1979).
Defendants, in their Brief, agree upon the applicable Eighth Amendment standard as we have recited above. (Doc. 95, pp. 5-8).
V. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiff alleged that while he was previously incarcerated at another prison (SCI-Chester), he suffered an ear infection and lost hearing in his right ear. In May, 2002, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Graterford and he was referred to see an ear, nose, and throat specialist (ENT). (Doc. 42, pp. 2-3). Subsequently, the Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Mahanoy, his current place of confinement. ( Id. at p. 3).
The Plaintiff's factual allegations contained in his Second Amended Complaint, for the most part, are the same as those contained his Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff omitted his prior references to negligence in his second amended pleading, and he added deliberate indifference language. (Doc. 42, ¶'s 48.-50.).
Plaintiff averred that on September 5, 2002, he signed up for sick call due to blood coming out of his ear. Defendant Dr. Ciaglia examined him, prescribed seven (7) days of medication for him, and ordered a hearing test. ( Id. at p. 3, ¶ 15.). Plaintiff states that the doctor told him that he had a hole in his ear drum and that there was nothing that could be done for it. ( Id.). Also on September 5, 2002, Plaintiff states that Nurse Supervisor Connell, a former Defendant, responded to his request slip regarding the condition of his right ear and that she recommended that he go to sick call for a plan of care. ( Id. at ¶ 16.). Plaintiff claims that he signed up for sick call on September 9, 2002, because he continued to have an ear infection and the medication Dr. Ciaglia prescribed was not effective. ( Id. at ¶ 18.). Plaintiff states that he then went to the medical department at SCI-Mahanoy on "September 1, 2002", and he was given Motrin. Plaintiff returned to the medical department on September 15, 2002, and he was given a hearing test in his right ear, which he failed. ( Id. ¶'s 20.-22.).
In his second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff erroneously stated that he went to the medical department on September 1, 2002. (Doc. 42, ¶ 19). However, in his previous pleading, the Plaintiff stated that this event occurred on September 11, 2002.
Plaintiff alleged that in response to his sick call request, on September 18, 2002, Nurse Connell told him that "not everyone who has a long term hearing loss requires a specialist" and then she suggested he sign up for sick call. ( Id. at ¶ 24.). Plaintiff alleged that he went to sick call on September 20, 2002, asked about seeing a specialist, and was told no and that if he had any further problems to sign up for sick call again. Plaintiff had a second hearing test on September 22, 2002, and on September 23, 2002, he went to sick call again and was denied permission to see a specialist for the third time. ( Id. ¶'s 25.-27.). On October 1, 2002, Plaintiff went to sick call due to pain in his ear, and he was given medications and advised that his ear condition still did not warrant a specialist. Plaintiff alleged that he submitted a request to see an ENT, and on October 3, 2002, Nurse Connell advised him that the prison medical director would see him regarding his request for referral to an ENT. ( Id. at ¶'s 29.-30.). On October 4, 2002, Plaintiff went to sick call due to continued ear pain and headaches, and his pain medications were changed. Plaintiff again was examined by the medical staff at SCI-Mahanoy on October 7, 2002, due to continued ear pain and headaches, and he was given more pain medications despite their prior ineffectiveness in helping his pain. Plaintiff went back to sick call on October 8, 2002, and he was given pain medication, but he claims that he was not given anything for his infection. ( Id. at ¶'s 30.-34.).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Modery treated Plaintiff on October 10, 2002, and he was advised that he will never hear again in his right ear even if his ear drum was repaired. Plaintiff was also given pain medication and medication for his infection. Plaintiff states that Dr. Modery told him that after a follow-up visit to see if the medications worked, he would be seen by a specialist. ( Id. at ¶ 34.). Plaintiff avers that the medications were making him ill, and he was seen by Dr. Modery on October 13, 2002. The doctor changed his medication, but his pain and infection continued. ( Id. at ¶ 36.).
Plaintiff then indicates that he was treated on October 16, 2002 and October 21, 2002, and he was told that not all ear drum perforations are repairable. ( Id. at ¶'s 37.-38.).
On October 22, 2002, Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance claiming denial of medical treatment, and in response, Nurse Connell advised him to continue to come to sick call if he had any problems. ( Id. at ¶'s 39.-40.).
In ¶'s 45.-49. of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged as follows:
45. Despite the severity of his medical condition and the excruciating pain Plaintiff suffered as a result of his condition, only tylenol and motrin were administered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff endured and continue (sic) to endure severe pain in his ear and head as a result of the infection in his ear. Each time Plaintiff reported to sick call for the pain and infection Defendants Ciaglia and Modery prescribed only motrin and/or tylenol for pain relief. Although Plaintiff's pain was not alleviated, no stronger pain killer was administered.
46. Notwithstanding the opinion of other medical personnel that Plaintiff required specialized care, Defendants Ciaglia and Modery refused to allow Plaintiff to be seen by the referred Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) specialist. They instead told Plaintiff "there was nothing that could be done," and "he will never hear again in his right ear even if the ear drum was repaired." Despite Plaintiff's repeated request, Defendants Ciaglia and Modery refused to arrange for Plaintiff to see a specialist.
47. Defendant's (sic) Ciaglia and Modery is (sic) responsible for medical care generally and for arranging for specialized medical care outside the prison.
48. Defendant's (sic) Ciaglia and Modery exercised deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's (sic) health by failing to provide adequate medical care to him following being diagnosis (sic) of an ear infection which resulted in the loss of hearing in his right ear. Defendants Ciaglia and modery (sic) intentionally delayed treatment of the continued infection, denied access to medical personnel qualified to exercised (sic) judgement about Plaintiff's particular problem, and failed to act on medical recommendation for specialized care.
49. As a result of defendants Ciaglia and Modery's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's condition, Plaintiff suffered further pain and mental anguish. He continue (sic) to suffer migraine headaches and general pain in his head. In addition, Plaintiff is unable to hear the call of daily activities, if he happens to fall asleep on his left side.
( Id. at ¶'s 45.-49.).
As relief, the Plaintiff sought injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. ( Id. at p. 9).
VI. Discussion.
At the outset, we find that Plaintiff, by failing to oppose Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion and failing to comply with our October 31, 2005 Order, should be deemed as not opposing Defendants' Motion, and as failing to prosecute his action. See Local Rule 7.6 M.D. Pa. and Fed.R.Civ.P. 41.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action for "failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or order of court, . . ." (emphasis added). In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to both prosecute the action and to comply with an Order of the court by his failure to file a brief in opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion as directed. There is no dispute that Defendants served their Summary Judgment documents on Plaintiff and that Plaintiff failed to file any opposition to them. (Doc. 95, attached COS). Further, this case has been pending with this Court since April 16, 2003, and we see no reason for any additional delay. Thus, we shall recommend that Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion be granted as unopposed. We also find merit to Defendants' Motion.
As mentioned, Defendants properly filed their Statement of Material Facts. (Doc. 94, attached Statement of Material Facts). Defendants have referenced the evidence to support their Statement of Material Facts. ( Id.). We thus accept and adopt all of Defendants' Statements of Material Facts as uncontested. See Local Rule 56.1 M.D. Pa. Therefore, we shall not reiterate the undisputed material facts of this case. Based on the undisputed material facts and Defendants' uncontroverted evidence, we agree with Defendants that they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious ear condition during their treatment of him.
Dr. Modery thoroughly details Plaintiff's medical treatment for his ear condition in her Verification. (Doc. 95, Ex. B). We accept her averments, which are not contested by Plaintiff via his own evidence as required during the summary judgment stage. Moreover, in their Brief, Defendants refer to Plaintiff's own deposition testimony in which he conceded that he had no evidence to bolster his claims that Defendant doctors failed to give him antibiotics and only treated him with over-the-counter medication. (Doc. 95, p. 8 Ex. C, NT 15-17). Plaintiff also admitted that Defendant doctors never refused to see him or to examine him when they saw him, and that each time they saw him, they examined him. ( Id., NT 16). In his deposition, Plaintiff seemingly contends that Defendant doctors were negligent in only treating him with antibiotics, which he claims were ineffective, and argues that they should have referred him to an ENT specialist. ( Id., NT 17-18). Plaintiff did not testify that either Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious ear condition. Further, Defendants' evidence in the nature of Plaintiff's extensive medical records indicate that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's ear condition. (Doc. 95, Ex. A). The evidence shows that Defendants treated Plaintiff with antibiotics and referred Plaintiff to an ENT when his ear infection cleared.
Since Plaintiff did not present any evidence controverting the medical records submitted by Defendants and he has in fact testified that his medical records were accurate, we accept all of these records as undisputed. (Doc. 95, Ex. C, NT 8).
The record, as Defendants indicate, also shows that Defendants did not ignore any treatment prescribed by the ENT (Dr. Newfield) who saw Plaintiff while he was incarcerated at SCI-Graterford. (Doc. 95, p. 8 and cited evidence). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate through his own evidence that Defendants failed to follow any recommendations by the ENT specialist. Further, the evidence shows that Defendants told Plaintiff that a repair of his perforated ear drum was not medically advisable in October 2002 since he had an infection at that time. ( Id., p. 9). Defendants did not simply refuse to repair the perforation as Plaintiff alleges. (Doc. 95, Ex. B, ¶'s 16.-17.). Defendants had to continue treating Plaintiff's ear infection with antibiotics and not simply over-the-counter medication, as Plaintiff alleges. ( Id.).
The record also reveals that Defendant Doctor Ciaglia left her employment with SCI-Mahanoy on December 31, 2002 and did not treat Plaintiff at any time thereafter. (Doc. 95, Ex. B, ¶ 20.). Thus, any allegations against Dr. Ciaglia after this time are meritless.
The undisputed evidence also reveals that when Plaintiff was transferred back to SCI-Mahanoy from SCI-Graterford in January 2003, Dr. Modery treated Plaintiff for the next fourteen to fifteen months for chronic middle ear (right) infection. ( Id., ¶ 21.). Plaintiff was continually treated with antibiotics by Defendant. After Plaintiff's ear infection finally cleared up in March 2004, he was referred to an ENT specialist for repair of his right ear drum. ( Id., ¶'s 22.-24.). After objective medical tests were performed and the result received, the ENT left the area. ( Id., ¶ 25.-26.). Plaintiff then had another ear infection in late March 2004, which delayed another referral to an ENT. Plaintiff then saw an ENT in October 2004, and surgery was performed in December 2004. ( Id., ¶'s 27, 30.).
Plaintiff's medical record, as well as Dr. Modery's detailed Verification, clearly show that at no time were Defendants deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious ear condition. Thus, the undisputed evidence shows that there is no merit to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff has failed to prove an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against them. Therefore, we shall recommend that Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion be granted.
The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendants delayed the treatment of his ear infection which started before his transfer to SCI-Mahanoy but continued thereafter; that the Defendants denied him access to specialized medical personnel to treat his condition; and that the Defendants failed "to act on medical personnel qualified to exercise judgment about Plaintiff's particular problem, and failed to act on medical recommendation for specialized care while knowing of serious risk." (Doc. 46, p. 1).
In particular, the Defendants have proven that they were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. As stated, in order to satisfy the second element of an Eighth Amendment claim, there must be more than an ordinary lack of due care alleged, and that there must be deliberate indifference or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" alleged. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985). As stated above, according to Farmer, a subjective recklessness test must be utilized in determining if the prison personnel can be found liable under the Eighth Amendment. Dr. Modery's undisputed Verification establishes that Plaintiff's case must fail under Farmer.
The Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Ciaglia and Modery are doctors employed to provide medical care to inmates at SCI-Mahanoy. (Doc. 42, ¶'s 6.-7.). The Plaintiff claims that:
50. The failure of Defendants Ciaglia and Modery (sic) to provide adequate medical care to Plaintiff following being diagnosed with an ear infection by intentionally delaying treatment of the continued infection, denied access to medical personnel qualified to exercised (sic) judgment about Plaintiff's particular problem, and failed to act on medical recommendation for specialized care constitutes deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(Doc. 42, p. 8, ¶ 50.).
The Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Ciaglia was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by prescribing only Motrin and Tylenol for his pain, by refusing to allow him to see an ENT specialist even though he had been referred to see one and even though both Defendants were responsible for arranging inmate specialized medical care, and by delaying treatment for his continuing ear infection. (Doc. 42, ¶'s 45.-48.). Defendants have proven that they treated Plaintiff with antibiotics and that they referred him to an ENT after his infection had cleared. Further, Defendants have shown through their evidence that at no time did they delay any treatment to Plaintiff.
Further, it is well-settled, as Defendants state (Doc. 95, p. 7), that mere negligence is not an actionable § 1983 claim. See Davidsen v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Plaintiff's claims against Dr. Ciaglia and Dr. Modery, based on the evidence as discussed above, do not even amount to negligence claims.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits Defendants from acting deliberately indifferent to conduct which places an inmate in substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, supra. The undisputed evidence offered by Defendants Ciaglia and Modery sufficiently shows that Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard. Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial risk of harm to himself which was directly caused by these Defendants.
"The Eighth Amendment prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards of humanity and decency." Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992). As noted, to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must show that he has been deprived of the `minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.' Id. This includes that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, and that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference in subjecting him to that deprivation. Id. at 361. Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997). The evidence presented shows that Plaintiff received extensive medical care and that the Defendant doctors were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Thus, Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference by Defendants Ciaglia and Modery, which is a prerequisite for an Eighth Amendment improper medical treatment claim, must fail in light of the undisputed evidence to the contrary. See Gindraw v. Dendler, 867 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Therefore, we shall recommend that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Ciaglia and Modery (Doc. 94) be granted.
VII. Recommendation.
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Ciaglia and Modery (Doc. 94) be granted. It is also recommended that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.