Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 23, 66 P.3d 364; Larman v. Larman, 1999 OK 83, ¶ 18, 991 P.2d 536; In re Matter of Bartlett, 1984 OK 9, ¶ 19 fn. 13, 680 P.2d 369.Larman v. Larman, see note 9, supra; Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Walter, 1961 OK 172, ¶ 0, 363 P.2d 293; Schock v. Fish, 1914 OK 591, ¶ 0, 144 P. 584. I.

Under the well-established doctrine laid down in numerous decisions of this court it is the duty of this court to weigh the evidence and determine which side has the clear weight of the evidence and decide this appeal in accordance therewith. Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12. 144 P. 584: Overstreet v. Citizens Bank, 12 Okla. 383, 72 P. 379; Wimberly v. Winstock, 46 Okla. 645, 149 P. 238; Cook v. Warner, 41 Okla. 781, 140 P. 424. We have examined the entire record and the testimony in behalf of the defendant shows that he had a deed to the lot in controversy absolute upon its face containing all the usual covenants of warranty.

"(1) The court's fourth finding of fact, namely, that no marriage existed between Johnson Hodge and Lucy Sanders, is not supported by any competent evidence, and is 'clearly against the weight of the evidence.' Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584. "(2) If Betsy Hodge, the mother of defendant's grantor, was not born a legitimate child of Johnson Hodge, then she became such by legitimation."

In an equity case this court will order the trial court to render that decree which the chancellor should have rendered on the record presented. Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584, 587 [1914]; Sango v. Sango, 105 Okla. 166, 232 P. 49, 51-52 [1924]; Champion v. Champion, 203 Okla. 105, 218 P.2d 354, 356 [1950]; Marshall v. Marshall, Okla., 364 P.2d 891, 895 [1961]; and Johnson v. Johnson, Okla., 674 P.2d 539, 546 [1983]. DOOLIN, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.

The true rule for cases cognizable in chancery is that on appeal ". . . it is the duty of this court to consider the whole record, to weigh the evidence, and, when the judgment of the trial court is clearly against the weight of the evidence, render or cause to be rendered such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. * * *" Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584, 587 [1914]; Sango v. Sango, 105 Okla. 166, 232 P. 49, 51-52 [1924] (syllabus 2); Champion v. Champion, 203 Okla. 105, 218 P.2d 354, 356 [1950]; Marshall v. Marshall, Okla., 364 P.2d 891, Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

It is provided by 12 O. S. 1941 § 221, that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, with certain exceptions noted. In an early case in this court, Shock et al. v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584, it was held: "In a suit in equity to cancel a certain conveyance and to quiet title to land, the uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff had conveyed all his right, title and interest in the land to a third party prior to the institution of this suit.

Our statute, 12 O.S. 1941 § 317[ 12-317], is the same as that of Kansas. Substitution as to party plaintiff is permissible under our statute where the cause of action remains the same and defendant is deprived of no defense. Mainard et al. v. Fowler et al., 171 Okla. 582, 42 P.2d 878; McIntire v. Torrance, 185 Okla. 19, 90 P.2d 17; Reeves v. Noble, 88 Okla. 179, 212 P. 995; Illinois Oil Co. v. Block, 129 Okla. 122, 263 P. 650; Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584; Clark v. Holmes, 31 Okla. 164, 120 P. 642; Lewis v. Clements, 21 Okla. 167, 95 P. 769; Davis v. Robedeaux, 97 Okla. 86, 222 P. 990; Starr v. Thompson, 80 Okla. 223, 195 P. 758; Atlas Assurance Co. of London v. Fairchild, 171 Okla. 609, 43 P.2d 482; Crisp v. Nunn, 173 Okla. 203, 47 P.2d 139. In this case Gerald Walsh could have brought and maintained the action, subject, of course, to any defense defendants had, including champetty, and it was not error to allow the substitution.

The defendant argues that under 12 O.S. 1941 § 1141[ 12-1141], as applied to the above facts, the plaintiff was not in actual possession of the property and was not the proper party to maintain the action. In support of his argument defendant relies on the following cases: Cox v. Fowler, 169 Okla. 355, 37 P.2d 291; Akers v. Brooks, 103 Okla. 98, 229 P. 544; Moore v. Barker, 186 Okla. 312, 97 P.2d 776; Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584. The case of Cox v. Fowler, supra, holds that where realty is sold under valid contract and deed is placed in escrow to be delivered upon payment of purchase money, equitable title passes at once to vendee.

Therefore, in considering this contention we are governed by the rule obtaining in actions of equitable cognizance and must examine the entire record and weigh the evidence, but should not reverse the judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence. Schock v. Fish (1914) 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584. We must therefore examine the record to whether the view that Irene Taylor was the beneficial owner of the McCracken-Mitchell mortgage, even though Charles E. Douglas held legal title by reason of the blanket reassignment to him by Irene Taylor on August 18, 1924, is against the clear weight of the evidence.

This is an equitable action, and the finding and judgment of the trial court will be reversed when it appears from an examination of the record that the same are against the clear weight of the evidence. Schock v. Fish, 45 Okla. 12, 144 P. 584. When the judgment and findings, however, are not against the clear weight of the evidence, but are supported thereby, the same will be affirmed.