Opinion
Civil Case No. 00-B-790, Civil Case No. 00-B-791, Civil Case No. 00-B-806, Civil Case No. 00-B-808, Civil Case No. 00-B-1611, Civil Case No. 00-B-1612, Civil Case No. 00-B-1613, Civil Case No. 00-B-1614 (Consolidated with 01-B-718 and 01-B-969), Civil Case No. 00-B-1615, Civil Case No. 01-B-731.
November 27, 2001
CONSOLIDATED ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
The April 20, 1999, tragedy at Columbine High School is unspeakable. The magnitude of Eric Harris' and Dylan Klebold's rampage of murder and mayhem is unparalleled in our historic system of public education. Their rampage resulted in the deaths of twelve students and one teacher and serious physical injuries to at least twenty-four others. Abhorrence of the murderers' conduct is absolute. The agony of so many is heartrending and gut wrenching. Who in their right minds would think two young students capable of inflicting such indiscriminate horrific injury on their fellow students, teachers, and the victims' families.
These cases were filed in response to events leading up to the April 20th attack and the attack itself. Common threads wind their way through these cases. Numerous Jefferson County Sheriff's Department officers are sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on pre-attack and attack response conduct for violation of the Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. Colorado State tort law claims have also been asserted against these law enforcement officers.
School officials and teachers have also been sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and Colorado State tort law claims based upon their conduct preceding the attack. All of these claims present difficult and complex issues of the law of duty. All of these claims present difficult and complex issues surrounding Defendants' claims of entitlement to qualified immunity to the § 1983 claims and immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-101, et. seq. Plaintiffs also assert municipal liability claims that turn, in large part, upon the fundamental issue of duty.
Although these cases have not been consolidated, because the pre-attack and attack events encapsulate these fundamental common issues, briefing and argument of the Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 motions was coordinated to enhance uniform analysis of the motions to dismiss while recognizing, where appropriate, unique facets of individual cases. For example, Daniel Rohrbough's case is unique in that it is alleged an unknown law enforcement officer fatally shot him. As the order in teacher David Sanders' case reflects, his unique circumstances give rise to a determination not only of viable claims statement, but denial of qualified immunity. Liberal opportunity to amend Plaintiffs' complaints was afforded.
The orders entered concurrently herewith do not address pending motions in cases where Harris' or Klebold's parents have been sued or where suppliers of firearms have been sued. It appears that the Harris and Klebold parents have settled with some, but not other Plaintiffs. Likewise, it appears that one defendant involved in assisting procurement of firearms, Mark Manes, may have settled claims against him by certain Plaintiffs.
Although not in response to motion, the starkly unique circumstances of these cases, leads me to enter this consolidated Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) order. My knowledge of and experience with these cases leaves no doubt in my mind that the orders in the above captioned cases involve controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the orders of dismissal will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. There is no just reason for delay. I do not believe that further proceedings in these cases before me should be stayed, however, so that I may turn my attention to other motions outstanding in a number of these cases. Of course, this certification is unnecessary in David Sanders' case, as I fully expect the Defendants there to appeal interlocutory my denial of qualified immunity.
Accordingly, in the exercise of my discretion,
IT IS ORDERED that final judgment is directed to enter upon the orders issued concurrently herewith in all cases, excepting Case No. 00-B-791.