We thus agree with defendant that, in this case, the greeter's mere presence in a crowded and busy entryway did not, in itself, create an unreasonable risk of harm of the sort giving rise to premises liability. Schnell v. Goodwill Industries, 253 Or. 100, 102, 451 P.2d 484 (1969), is illustrative. There, the trial court refused to withdraw a specification that the defendant store owner had been negligent in "unloading rugs in that portion of said store normally occupied by customers during business hours."

In other words, the interest of the plaintiff under the terms of that stipulation and order was of such a nature, in our judgment, as to be "entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant."Schnell v. Goodwill Industries, 253 Or. 100, 103, 451 P.2d 484 (1969).See Prosser on Torts 206, § 37 (4th ed 1971).

See also ORS 483.114. In Schnell v. Goodwill Industries, 253 Or. 100, 451 P.2d 484 (1969), cited by defendant, there was no direct allegation that an alternate route or alternate course of conduct was available, as in this case, and that question was not considered by this court. In my view, by the application of these well-established rules of law to the facts of this case, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, a jury could find that defendant had a choice between two equally available and convenient routes for the moving of its log loader, one by a public highway and the other by an "immediately adjacent private road"; that a reasonably prudent owner of such a slow and heavy piece of logging equipment should have realized that to move it at night on a highway and at a slow rate of speed involved the danger of a rear-end collision with a rapidly moving automobile, with the result that a reasonably prudent person would have chosen to move the equipment by the "immediately adjacent private road," and that defendant was negligent in failing to do so in the absence of a showi