Since in the Second Department execution of a contract of sale is not a sine qua non to acceptance, the defendants' argument lacks merit. In this jurisdiction, if the seller has orally agreed to enter into a contract he will be deemed to have accepted the buyer and, unless the seller's subsequent refusal to sign the contract is based upon the buyer's alleged financial incapacity, the broker will be relieved of the burden of establishing financial ability (Goldmann v Goldmann Realty Corp., 227 App. Div. 28, supra; Heller Henretig Inc. v 3620-168th St. Inc., 274 App. Div. 1007, app den 274 App. Div. 1065; Hommick v New York Dock Trade Facilities Corp., 246 App. Div. 844; Brand v Nagle, 122 App. Div. 490; Schneidman v Shapiro, 125 Misc. 892). The Second Department rule does not appear to have achieved recognition either in the First or Fourth Department where it has been held that in the absence of a contract proof of financial ability will be required from the broker even where the seller has agreed to enter into a contract (May Co. v Mailman, 276 App. Div. 1073 [1st Dept]; Neuman v Uris, 244 App. Div. 285 [1st Dept]; Rubin v Collins, 214 App. Div. 161 [1st Dept]; Epstein v Bossard, 206 Misc. 48, affd 286 App. Div. 920 [4th Dept]; but, see, Tulp v Padula, 70 Misc.2d 306).