Schneider v. Schneider

12 Citing cases

  1. Schmidt v. Schmidt

    373 So. 3d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    Third, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it imputed income earned by Former Husband’s girlfriend to Former Husband. See Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, Former Husband did not challenge a lack of factual findings concerning the girlfriend’s expenses on appeal.

  2. Schmidt v. Schmidt

    No. 5D22-466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2023)

    Third, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it imputed income earned by Former Husband's girlfriend to Former Husband. See Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, Former Husband did not challenge a lack of factual findings concerning the girlfriend's expenses on appeal.

  3. Vega v. Swait

    961 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 2 times

    Unless there is some showing on the part of the wife that the husband terminated or reduced his employment in order to keep from paying alimony and that he was relying upon his present wife for his living expenses in completion of the scheme, we can see no possibility of relevance concerning the present spouse's income. Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); see also Hayden v.Hayden, 662 So.2d 713, 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (if wife shows that husband terminated or reduced employment to keep from paying alimony and was relying on present wife for living expenses, or that husband transferred significant assets to present wife and thus cannot satisfy his support obligations, present wife's finances are relevant to question of former husband's ability to pay alimony). To make Vega's finances discoverable, Tracy was required to show that John ended or reduced employment to evade paying alimony and that he was relying upon Vega for his living expenses.

  4. McCormick v. Boyd

    693 So. 2d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

    We hold that it was not error, however, to deny the former wife's request to depose the present wife. In Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), this court stated the following with regard to discovery of a current spouse's assets: Unless there is some showing on the part of the wife that the husband terminated or reduced his employment in order to keep from paying alimony and that he was relying upon his present wife for his living expenses in completion of the scheme, we can see no possibility of relevance concerning the present spouse's income.

  5. Hayden v. Hayden

    662 So. 2d 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 9 times

    In Condon v. Condon, 295 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), the court held that discovery of a new spouse's finances can be conducted only upon a clear and convincing showing that the remarried parent is unable to provide for the needs of the child out of her or his own funds. Relying on Condon, this court in Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), reversed an order allowing discovery by the former wife of the new wife's finances in the husband's action for modification, stating: Unless there is some showing on the part of the wife that the husband terminated or reduced his employment in order to keep from paying alimony and that he was relying upon his present wife for his living expenses in completion of the scheme, we can see no possibility of relevance concerning the present spouse's income.

  6. Pratt v. Pratt

    645 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    While a successor spouse may not be required to pay support obligations owed by his or her spouse to a former spouse, and the financial status of a successor spouse is not ordinarily relevant to a determination of the amount of alimony which the divorced spouse is capable of paying, evidence relating to such status is relevant where a party who is entitled to alimony demonstrates that a party owing the alimony has deliberately limited his or her income for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the alimony obligation, and is living off the income of the successor spouse to avoid the alimony obligation. Schneider v. Schneider, [ 348 So.2d 612] (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Harman v. Harman, 523 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the Court finds that the Husband has deliberately limited his income by establishing a business in his new wife's name. While the Husband has had the benefit of the business income in the joint accounts, which he has had the unilateral right to withdraw, he now wants this Court to view his circumstances as being limited only to his pension income, notwithstanding that the Wife, at age 77, has no independent means of support and must look to dissipate the marital assets which she received as part of the Marital Settlement Agreement in order to meet her monthly expenses.

  7. Rosales v. Rosales

    599 So. 2d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

    The trial judge correctly sustained the appellee-mother's exceptions to the general master's "downward departure" from the child support guidelines. See § 61.30(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Weinstein v. Steele, 590 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Lau v. Lau, 407 So.2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (income of custodial parent's new spouse not properly considered in determining noncustodial parent's child support obligation); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 426 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same); Fried v. Fried, 375 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (same); Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (same). Affirmed.

  8. Sullivan v. Sullivan

    593 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    We have some difficulty with the trial court's treatment of the roommate's income as though it were appellant's. Even though appellant may be the beneficiary of her largess, since there is no legal obligation, we believe attribution to him is not allowable in this context. See Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Lau v. Lau, 407 So.2d 927 (Fla.3d DCA 1981); Harman v. Harman, 523 So.2d 187 (Fla.2d DCA 1988). Apropos of that problem, we find that the provision authorizing appellant to purge the contempt adjudication, by paying the full amount of the arrearage, to be tantamount to no purge provision because he can't pay it. It should be reduced to installments payable in addition to his current obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the order appealed from in all respects except as to the purge provision and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to reconsider that provision in the light of the evidence and such further evidentiary offerings as the court and counsel may deem appropriate.

  9. Harman v. Harman

    523 So. 2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 14 times
    Holding a general reservation of jurisdiction did not preserve the court's jurisdiction to alter the property rights determined in the final judgment of dissolution

    However, such discovery may be had where a party who is entitled to alimony demonstrates that a party owing the alimony has deliberately limited his or her income for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the alimony obligation, and is living off the income of the successor spouse in furtherance of the scheme to avoid the alimony obligation. Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In the instant case, from the record, it is unclear whether the trial court relied upon the husband's present wife's income in determining the husband's ability to pay the $250.

  10. Montgomery v. Montgomery

    426 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 5 times

    However, such discovery may be had where a party who is entitled to alimony demonstrates that a party owing the alimony has deliberately limited his or her income for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the alimony obligation, and is living off the income of the successor spouse in furtherance of the scheme to avoid the alimony obligation. Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Respondent has failed to make such a showing and, in fact, admits in her response to the instant petition that the real issue here is whether petitioner has overstated his expenses, thereby misleading the trial court as to his ability to pay alimony. Considering the present posture of this case, the respondent is entitled to only such discovery as will permit her to place before the trial judge the facts necessary to assess the petitioner's ability to pay.