Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG07338899
SIMONS, J.
Eugene Schneider (appellant) contends the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney fees in this interpleader action. We conclude that, because appellant failed to deposit the interpled funds with the court, the court properly denied his request for fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6, subdivision (a).
All further undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
Appellant is an attorney who represented Charles Elliott, the husband of respondent Juanita Elliott, until Mr. Elliott’s death in March 2007. Appellant represented Mr. Elliott in the sale of real property in Oakland, which sale did not close until after Mr. Elliott’s death. Appellant agreed to hold the proceeds of the sale pending determination of the proper disposition of the funds, which amounted to $581,927.81.
Appellant filed a petition for probate of the will of Mr. Elliott in April 2007. In August 2007, following the emergence of an apparent conflict among potential beneficiaries, appellant filed the present interpleader action. Rather than depositing the proceeds of the real property sale with the court, appellant held the funds in interest-bearing certificates of deposit.
Two of the defendants demurred to the complaint. Among other things, the demurrer contended the court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint due to the pending probate action and the interpleader action was wasteful and unnecessary because the beneficiaries would be determined in the probate action. Juanita Elliott took the same positions in her answer to the complaint and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court denied the motion and overruled the demurrer, but ordered a stay of the interpleader action on its own motion.
Subsequently, all defendants participated in a mediation and resolved the dispute over the proceeds from the sale of the property. The defendants moved for an order approving the settlement and directing the payment of the funds. Appellant opposed the request because, among other things, no provision had been made for an award to him of attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the action. Appellant filed a motion seeking attorney fees in the amount of $14,630 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $1,323.02. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for fees and expenses, approved the settlement, and directed appellant to pay over the funds.
DISCUSSION
“When a person may be subject to conflicting claims for money or property, the person may bring an interpleader action to compel the claimants to litigate their claims among themselves. ([]§ 386, subd. (b).) Once the person admits liability and deposits the money with the court, he or she is discharged from liability and freed from the obligation of participating in the litigation between the claimants. [Citations.] The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation. [Citation.]” (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122, fn. omitted.) Under section 386.6, subdivision (a), “A party to an action who follows the procedure set forth in Section 386 or 386.5 may insert [in a pleading] a request for allowance of his costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in such action. In ordering the discharge of such party, the court may, in its discretion, award such party his costs and reasonable attorney fees from the amount in dispute which has been deposited with the court.” (Italics added.) Citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Zinnel (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 393 (Zinnel), the trial court concluded appellant was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs because he did not deposit the interpled funds with the court, and section 386.6, subdivision (a), authorizes awards only from funds deposited with the court. (See Zinnel, at pp. 400-401; see also Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Gherman (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 908, 916; Phillips v. Barton (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 488, 495-496.)
Appellant contends he complied with the procedures for interpleader actions in section 386, which did not require him to deposit the interpled funds with the court, and the court should have awarded him fees because he ensured the funds earned interest while under his control. He argues that Zinnel is distinguishable because in that case the claimants did not receive interest on the interpled funds. However, he points to nothing in the statute making the availability of attorney fees turn on whether the party seeking fees ensured that held funds earned interest. Absent an agreement between the parties, a litigant is entitled to attorney fees only where “specifically provided for by statute.” (§ 1021; see also West Hills Farms, Inc. v. RCO AG Credit, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 710, 719.) “In the construction of a statute..., the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted...” (§ 1858.) Because section 386.6, subdivision (a), authorizes attorney fee awards only from funds deposited with the court, and because appellant has identified no other statutory language authorizing a fee award in the circumstances of this case, the trial court properly declined to award attorney fees.
Appellant argues it would be absurd to interpret the statute as denying attorney fees to interpleader plaintiffs who, like him, ensure claimants receive the benefit of interest on the interpled funds. (See Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [“ ‘ “[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.”... ’... ”]; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334, fn. 7 [“ ‘The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in light of the statute’s legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole.’ ”].) However, the Legislature may have preferred the orderliness and dependability of the standard procedure, in which the funds are deposited with the court, usually at the outset of the case. (See Zinnel, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 401, fn. 4; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 237, p. 317.) Appellant has pointed to nothing in the language of the statute or in the legislative history manifesting a different intent. It is not absurd to interpret the statute as awarding attorney fees only to those plaintiffs who fully give up control over the interpled funds.
Finding no basis to disagree with Zinnel, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 393, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for attorney fees and expenses.
Appellant makes a number of additional arguments in support of his claim for attorney fees, including that defendants were estopped from opposing his fee request, denial of his fee request resulted in unjust enrichment of the defendants, and several other arguments rooted in equitable principles. Because there is no indication in the record before us that those arguments were presented to the trial court, we do not consider them in this appeal. (Martinez v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1249.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
We concur. JONES, P.J., BRUINIERS, J.