Opinion
No. 5-880 / 05-0709
Filed February 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, John Bauercamper, Judge.
Patti Schmitz appeals from an adverse judgment in this premises liability case. AFFIRMED.
Todd A. Locher of Locher Locher, Farley, and Michele M. Ramsey of Duncan, Green, Brown Langeness, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Les V. Reddick of Kane, Norby Reddick, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
In August 1998, Patti L. Schmitz sustained injuries when she fell from her bicycle while riding on a recreational path maintained by the City of Dubuque on a flood-control levee built by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. She sued the City, alleging negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the path. In 2002, the district court entered judgment for the City, concluding the City had immunity under Iowa Code section 670.4 (1997). Schmitz appealed. After this court affirmed, see Schmitz v. City of Dubuque, No. 02-1893 (Iowa Ct.App. Sept. 24, 2003), Schmitz sought further review and our supreme court reversed, concluding the City had failed to demonstrate its design, construction, and maintenance of the path were discretionary functions under section 670.4. Schmitz v. City of Dubuque, 682 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 2004).
On remand, the district court, after trial to the court, entered judgment in favor of the City. The district court's findings of fact in this jury-waived case are binding if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( a). After reviewing for the correction of errors at law, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we affirm.
I. Background.
The City built the asphalt path at issue in 1973 or 1974 on the flood-control levee. In 1991, the City overlaid the path with a new layer of asphalt. In doing so, the surface of the path was, in August 1998, higher than the ground on either side of the path. This is referred to as a "drop-off" in the record.
On the morning of August 30, 1998, Schmitz and three other people were riding their bicycles on the path in a single-file line. Although Schmitz had never ridden on this trail before, she frequently walked the trail and frequently rode her bicycle elsewhere. After Schmitz's party met two joggers who were coming in the opposite direction, Schmitz steered her bicycle off the path. When she passed the joggers and tried to ride back onto the path, her wheel caught on the drop-off and she fell, breaking her ankle. The drop-off was approximately two inches at the location of the accident.
The construction of the path is inconsistent with voluntary industry standards, which in part state "that pavement edges should be uniform and not have any sharp drop-offs." The district court found, given the dimensions of the levee, it would be impossible for the City to conform to these voluntary standards. The district court also found and concluded the drop-off was a known or obvious danger, and "Schmitz should have noted the conditions of the trail and anticipated the potential harm to a biker from those conditions." The district court also concluded each party was fifty percent negligent in the matter. The court entered judgment in favor of the City.
Both parties filed post-trial motions. In its ruling, the court stated the City "should not be charged with anticipating this harm, due to the obviousness of the harm to [Schmitz], her familiarity with the area, and the long standing use of this trail in this condition by the public." It also stated it "felt obligated" to make findings and conclusions about negligence, "even though it believes that its other conclusions were dispositive of the claim." Schmitz appeals.
II. Schmitz's Arguments on Appeal.
Citing Iowa Code section 668.3(1)(a), Schmitz argues the district court's finding and conclusion of equal negligence is inconsistent with its entry of a judgment in favor of the City. She also argues the district court's finding and conclusion of a "known or obvious danger" is not inconsistent with a finding of equal negligence. Finally, she argues she proved her damages and prays that this court direct an entry of a judgment in her favor.
III. Discussion
We are confronted with a district court decision that contains an apparent contradiction; therefore, we must interpret and construe the judgment. In doing so, the district court's intent is the "determining factor." Local Bd. of Health v. Wood, 243 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1976). We give "great weight" to the interpretation of the judgment by the authoring trial judge. In re Estate of Cooper, 215 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1974). While we attempt to interpret and construe the judgment so that all provisions are given meaning, see Batliner v. Sallee, 254 Iowa 561, 564, 118 N.W.2d 552, 554 (1962), we will adopt a construction of the judgment that will support, rather than destroy, the judgment. Williams v. Bourne, 248 Iowa 189, 193, 79 N.W.2d 751, 753 (1956); In re Estate of Evans, 228 Iowa 908, 918, 291 N.W. 460, 464-65 (1940). We also note that, when findings of fact conflict with the judgment, the judgment controls. Lackender v. Morrison, 231 Iowa 899, 902, 2 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1942); Estate of Evans, 228 Iowa at 918, 291 N.W. at 464-65.
With these principles in mind, we conclude the district court clearly intended to find and conclude (1) the danger of the drop-off was "known or obvious" and (2) the City should not have anticipated "the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." Our conclusion is reinforced by the district court's ruling on the post-trial motions filed by the parties, in which it stated this was its intention. We further give great weight to the district court's statement, in its ruling on the parties' post-trial motions, that its finding of equal negligence was surplus language.
Having concluded the district court entered judgment because it found the City should not have anticipated the harm from this known or obvious danger, we further conclude this finding is supported by substantial evidence. We have given our attention to the record, especially the photographs of the trail where Schmitz's accident happened, and, after having done so, we conclude substantial evidence supports both of the district court's key findings. Substantial evidence supports a finding that the danger posed by the drop-off between the trail's paved surface and the shoulder was "`known or obvious.'" See Wiesler v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1), at 218 (1965)). Furthermore, substantial evidence supports a finding that the City need not have anticipated the harm "`despite such knowledge or obviousness.'" Id. (quoting Restatement § 343A(1)). Concerning the latter finding by the district court, we, like the district court, consider Schmitz's familiarity with the trail to be a crucial factor in this case.
In support of reversal, Schmitz cites Wiesler and Konicek v. Loomis Brothers, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1990). In our view, neither case provides a basis for the relief she seeks. Both cases state the general rule, found in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343A, that a possessor of land is not liable for injuries sustained by invitees and caused by "known or obvious" activities or conditions "unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." Wiesler, 540 N.W.2d at 450; Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618. Schmitz correctly notes that both cases stand for the proposition that a possessor of land may still be liable for an injury caused by a known or obvious condition. She further correctly observes that a known or obvious condition does not preclude a finding of comparative fault by the possessor of land. These rules of law do not aid her, for liability only arises when the possessor of land should have anticipated the harm, notwithstanding the "known or obvious" nature of the harm. Wiesler, 540 N.W.2d at 450; Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618. As the district court did not find the City should have anticipated this harm, it could not have imposed liability on the City.
From our review of Schmitz's briefs, it does not appear that she argues this crucial finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, she relies on the district court's finding of equal negligence. As noted above and in light of the district court's ruling on post-trial motions, we view this finding as surplus language. Additionally, the district court's finding that the City should not have anticipated the harm despite the known or obvious nature of the drop-off (a finding supported by substantial evidence) means that the City had no duty to warn Schmitz of the drop-off or to take action to remove the danger posed by the drop-off. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618. As the City had no duty to Schmitz, the district court's "finding" of equal negligence is, as to this alleged breach, irrelevant.
Since we affirm the judgment, we need not consider Schmitz's claim for damages.
Were we to find facts anew, we may have reached a different conclusion. We are, however, constrained by our standard of review, the arguments of the parties, and the record made in the district court. Operating within such constraints, we affirm.
IV. Conclusion.
After considering all issue presented, whether or not discussed in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.