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Schmitt v. Rashid

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Mar 17, 2004
Civil Action No. 02-0322 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 02-0322.

March 17, 2004


MEMORANDUM ORDER


Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19) filed by Defendants Tariq B. Rashid, John Quigg, Jr., and Maurice Jones, all three of whom are Pennsylvania State Police Troopers. Upon consideration of the motion, Plaintiff Harry J. Schmitt, Jr.'s brief in opposition, (see Doc. 21), and Defendants' reply, (see Doc. 23), the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In his complaint, Plaintiff Harry J. Schmitt, Jr. ("Schmitt") contends that the Pennsylvania State troopers named in this action used excessive force against him when he was twice arrested on the same day, first for driving under the influence ("DUI") and, in a separate incident, for disorderly conduct. During the early morning hours of February 17, 2000, the Chevy Blazer in which Schmitt and his brother-in-law, Charles Sharkey, were riding went off the road into a two-foot snow bank. Sharkey is deaf and mute. Wearing only t-shirts and no overcoats, Schmitt and Sharkey tried unsuccessfully to push the vehicle out of the snow bank. After some time, the men were able to flag down a car; the driver called for help and left the scene.

Sharkey's name is also sometimes spelled "Sharkie" in the exhibits submitted with the parties briefs.

Defendant-Troopers Tariq B. Rashid and Maurice Jones responded to the emergency call approximately 10 minutes after it was made. The troopers arrived to find the vehicle still stuck in the snow, Schmitt in the driver's seat and Sharkey on the passenger's side. The troopers opened the car door and detected a strong odor of alcohol, and noticed an open 5-gallon box of wine inside. A cup containing alcohol was also observed in the center console of the vehicle. The troopers instructed Schmitt to exit the vehicle for questioning. Schmitt was "falling all over the place, . . . belligerent, . . . [and] yelling" as he was questioned. Jones Dep. at 42. Schmitt could not perform a sobriety test because he was too intoxicated to stand Id. at 41. Sharkey remained in the car, and did not witness Schmitt's interaction with the troopers outside the vehicle. Sharkey Dep. at 33. Schmitt was placed under arrest for various offenses, to include driving under the influence. Both he and Sharkey were handcuffed and placed into the back seat of the patrol car for transport to the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") barracks, located 15-20 minutes from the accident site. Trooper Jones drove. Schmitt yelled and moved about in his seat throughout the drive to the barracks. The troopers stopped twice along the way, first to accommodate Schmitt's request to urinate. Rashid Dep. at 78-79. When he was removed from the patrol car for this purpose, Schmitt's handcuffs were placed in the front so that he could relieve himself. When Schmitt finished, Trooper Rashid unlocked one of the handcuffs and attempted to re-fasten the handcuffs in the back. Schmitt resisted and "started flailing his arms causing a commotion," and "trying to get away." Jones Dep. at 58, 61; Rashid Dep. at 81-82. The troopers then "grabbed [Schmitt] and took him down to the ground," at which time the handcuffs were secured behind his back. Jones Dep. at 58. Schmitt was then placed back in the patrol car.

Schmitt apparently only had on one shoe at the time, and was too intoxicated to steady himself and put on the other shoe. Jones Dep. at 39.

Though Sharkey was not placed under arrest, because he was being transported in a state police vehicle, regulations required that he also be handcuffed. Rashid Dep. at 78.

When Trooper Jones resumed driving, Schmitt continued to be "belligerent . . . moving back and forth [in his seat], yelling in Trooper Rashid's ear." Id. at 64; Rashid Dep. at 87. Trooper Rashid testified:

Schmitt, he just basically kept on with the hollering and screaming, yelling profanities. He kept leaning forward. What he would do is he would lean forward and he was screaming in my ear. I didn't know if he was trying to bite me or what.
Id. at 88. Trooper Rashid instructed Schmitt "to stop yelling in his ear, sit back and relax." Jones Dep. at 64-65. Schmitt failed to comply and when he moved forward again, Trooper Rashid pushed him in the chest back into the seat. Rashid Dep. at 91. In response to the commotion, Trooper Jones pulled over to the side of the road. Trooper Rashid then switched seats with Sharkey: Sharkey was placed in the front passenger's seat and Trooper Rashid moved to the back with Schmitt. According to Trooper Rashid, the switch was made because:

[it] was a better seating arrangement where I wouldn't be . . . in danger of him biting me or whatever, [or] him screaming or hollering in my ear. It alleviated that situation totally. I could keep a better eye on him from being seated in the back with him.
Id. at 92. Schmitt continued to talk and use profanities as they proceeded to the barracks, but he "calmed down a little" and no additional stops were made. Id. at 94.

In the police barracks, Trooper Rashid attempted to administer a breathalyzer test to Schmitt. Id. at 96. Schmitt refused to cooperate and was placed in a holding area. At 7:00 a.m., Corporal John Quigg, Jr., also a named defendant herein, arrived at the barracks to report for duty. Corporal Quigg testified that upon entering the building he could hear Schmitt yelling and screaming profanities, to wit: "Let me the fuck out of here. I want to see somebody." Quigg Dep. at 26. Troopers Rashid and Jones briefed Corporal Quigg on Schmitt's DUI arrest and his conduct throughout morning. Corporal Quigg visited with Schmitt in the holding area and detected a strong odor of alcohol on him. Id. at 27. Corporal Quigg "told [Schmitt] he was in a police station, settle down, knock off the yelling, a ride was coming, and if he would just wait, the ride would be there and he was going to be released." Id. at 26; Schmitt Dep. at 98. Schmitt continued to yell and curse.

Schmitt's mother and brother subsequently arrived to retrieve him. Corporals Quigg and David Bell escorted Schmitt to the door to release him into the custody of his family members. Corporal Quigg warned Schmitt that if he yelled obscenities in the parking lot, he would be arrested for disorderly conduct. In the parking lot, Schmitt used profanity and was arrested for a second time, and charged with disorderly conduct. Corporal Quigg, the arresting officer, did not have a set of handcuffs and twisted Schmitt's left arm behind his back, into a "compliance hold," to lead him back into the barracks. As a result of the force of the hold, Schmitt's left wrist was broken and he suffered injuries to his left shoulder blade. Schmitt was released from police custody a short time later, and sought medical attention for his injuries. Schmitt pled guilty to driving under the influence; the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed.

Corporal Bell is not a party to this action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Civ. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Where the non-moving party bears the burden at trial, the moving party may prevail on the motion by demonstrating that the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient [evidentiary] showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "To raise a genuine issue of material fact, however, the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). However, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party's evidentiary production must at least exceed the "mere scintilla threshold" to show a disputed material fact. Id. (internal quotations omitted) In considering a motion for summary judgment, all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

An issue is "genuine" when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return judgment in the non-moving party's favor, and a disputed fact is "material" if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Schmitt concedes that his claim of false imprisonment arising under the Pennsylvania State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is not legally viable. See Pl. Resp. at 3. Nor does Schmitt contest Defendants' assertion that they are entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law claims. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on count II of the complaint and all state law claims. However, Schmitt contests Defendants' claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force count arising under the Federal Constitution (count I). In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, "we [must] begin by considering the threshold question of whether the alleged facts, viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], show that [the official's] conduct violated a constitutional right."Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2002). In an excessive force case arising under Fourth Amendment, the question is whether the force used against the plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances. The "reasonableness inquiry is an objective one." Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). In conducting our analysis, "we must judge `from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'" Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Qualified immunity is not appropriate where it is found that the officer "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975),quoted in Forbes v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2002). However, "[i]f an official could have reasonably believed that his or her actions were lawful, the official receives immunity even if in fact the actions were not lawful."Forbes, 313 F.3d at 148.

A. Defendants Tariq B. Rashid and Maurice Jones (First Arrest)

Schmitt's claims against Defendants Rashid and Jones stem from their use of force against him as he was transported to PSP barracks. Because of his intoxicated state, Schmitt has no memory of the events in question and relies solely on the testimony of his brother-in-law, Sharkey, to establish the existence of material facts in dispute. The troopers state that the first stop was made to allow Schmitt to relieve himself. There is nothing in the record to dispute this claim. Sharkey testified that because he cannot hear, he does not know why Trooper Jones twice stopped during the trip to the barracks. Sharkey Dep. at 38. Further, Sharkey stated that when they stopped, "the police officer, the big one [Rashid], he got out of the car, came to the door where Harry was, grabbed Harry and took him somewhere." Id. This testimony is not inconsistent with the troopers' claim that they stopped to allow Schmitt to relieve himself.

Regarding the force used against Schmitt, the troopers testified that Schmitt had to be restrained when he resisted Trooper Rashid's efforts to re-handcuff him behind his back and put him in the patrol car. Jones Dep. at 61-63; Rashid Dep. at 84-85. There is nothing in Sharkey's testimony to contradict this version of events. Sharkey claims to have witnessed Trooper Rashid twice "bounce" Schmitt off the ground during this stop, and the second time knee Schmitt in the back. Trooper Rashid testified to having to take Schmitt to the ground in order to restrain and handcuff him. Rashid Dep. at 86. Sharkey also claims that Schmitt was handcuffed from behind at the time of his observations, but this fact (assuming its truth) does not establish that Schmitt was not resisting the troopers' attempt to restrain him. As previously noted, Sharkey cannot attest to Schmitt's conduct at this time and state whether or not Schmitt was resisting. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Schmitt was exceedingly intoxicated after 12-plus hours of drinking, and exceedingly belligerent throughout his arrest and transport to the police barracks. Schmitt was inebriated to the point that he suffered from alcohol-induced amnesia, and cannot recall what occurred to contradict or substantiate the troopers' testimony. Absent such testimony, Troopers Rashid and Jones are entitled to qualified immunity. The record establishes that the force used against Schmitt was in response to his violent and belligerent conduct, and that the force applied to restrain him was objectively reasonable and justified under the circumstances.See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 208 (2001). This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the only harm Schmitt complains of as a result of Troopers Rashid and Jones' efforts to restrain him is a red face. Sharkey Dep. at 39-40. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Troopers Rashid and Jones on the remaining count against them.

B. Defendant John Quigg, Jr. (Second Arrest)

Schmitt contends that his testimony and that of his mother is sufficient to establish the existence of material facts in dispute on his claim of excessive force against Corporal Quigg, and to defeat the corporal's assertion of qualified immunity. Schmitt can recall the circumstances surrounding his second arrest. Schmitt does not deny that he used profanity in the PSP parking lot, nor does he suggest that Corporal Quigg did not have probable cause to arrest him. Rather, Schmitt argues that he did not resist the arrest and, therefore, the force used by Corporal Quigg to effect the arrest, which caused his wrist to break, was unjustified and excessive. Schmitt recounts that Corporal Quigg kept pushing his left arm further up as they walked into the barracks, and testified: "I was on my toes . . . I was like a ballerina walking in. I was screaming, yelling, `He's breaking my arm.' I could feel it [breaking]." Schmitt Dep. at 129-30. Schmitt also relies on the statement of his mother, Dorothy Schmitt, who witnessed Corporals Quigg and Bell walking Schmitt back inside the barracks, to show material facts in dispute. In her affidavit, Ms. Schmitt avers that "[o]ne of the troopers was holding my son's left arm behind his back in an un-natural position. It appeared to me that my son's arm was pulled all the way up behind his head." Dorothy Schmitt Affidavit ¶ 5. Schmitt's mother also corroborates his claim that his arm was pushed up so high that he "was walking on his tiptoes and protesting," and states that she "heard an ungodly scream from [Schmitt]as if he was in tremendous pain." Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

Corporal Quigg testified that when he attempted to arrest Schmitt, "[Schmitt] initially started coming up with his fist clenched as if to fight; however, myself and Corporal Bell each grabbed an arm and put his hands behind his back, and since either of us had no handcuffs, we just took him right back in." Quigg Dep. at 39. Corporal Quigg later admitted, however, that Schmitt did not resist as he was escorted back into the barracks. Id. at 41. Respecting the position of Schmitt's arm, and contrary to the statements of Schmitt and his mother, Quigg claims that Schmitt's left arm was never higher than the middle of his back, and that Schmitt "never complained as far as — any time while I was in contact with him of any pain, injury or anything wrong with him." Id. at 43. Recognizing the Court must accept as true Schmitt's claim, Corporal Quigg argues in the alternative that although Schmitt did not resist, he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity in light of Schmitt's prior belligerent conduct. He contends that the force exerted was necessary "to avoid the risk of any further disturbance or violence from [Schmitt]." Def. Mot. at 5 (citation omitted).

According to Corporal Quigg, Schmitt calmed down when his mother and brother arrived. Quigg testified: "[H]e actually settled down for the first time. His big thing was let me go. . . . He wanted to get out of there. So, he was compliant as far as behaving and being quiet and nondisruptive" after his mother and brother appeared. Quigg Dep. at 35.

The Court agrees that Schmitt's prior conduct on the morning of February, 17, 2000, is relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of Corporal Quigg's handling of Schmitt. Corporal Quigg was aware that Schmitt had been belligerent and combative following his arrest for DUI, and was witness to Schmitt's yelling and swearing in the PSP barracks when reporting for work. Thus, when Corporal Quigg decided to arrest Schmitt, it was reasonable for him to use such force as was necessary to guard against a potentially violent reaction from Schmitt. However, Schmitt did not resist and Corporal Quigg was assisted by Corporal Bell in escorting Schmitt back into the barracks. Further, Schmitt claims that his arm was twisted unnaturally high behind his back as he was escorted back into the barracks, and that he was screaming in pain. The distance between the car where Schmitt was arrested and the front doors of the barracks is 25 feet. Quigg Dep. at 33-34. Given it is undisputed that Schmitt did not resist, the Court cannot find under these circumstances that the force exerted to apply the compliance hold on Schmitt, which caused his wrist to break, was reasonable or justified.

For these reasons, Corporal Quigg's reliance on Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1995), is misplaced. In that case, the injury complained of stemmed from the officer's grabbing the plaintiff's wrist and yanking her from her car when she failed to comply with his lawful order to exit the vehicle. Id. at 426. Conversely, Schmitt did not resist and his wrist was broken and his shoulder injured some point after he was arrested, and walked over 25 feet back into the police barracks with his arm tightly twisted behind his back. Such use of force is not "within the bounds of appropriate police responses." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208. Corporal Quigg also relies upon Saucier, but it too is factually distinguishable from the instant matter. First, the force complained of in Saucier was a "gratuitously violent shove." Id. at 208. "[N]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Schmitt alleges that his arm was twisted into an unnaturally high position, causing his wrist to break; such force is not the equivalent of a gratuitous shove. Second, Corporal Quigg was not faced with an urgent situation or unknown facts as Saucier, the defendant-officer assigned to protect the Vice President during a protest attended by several hundred people. As the Supreme Court noted, Saucier "did not know the full extent of the threat [the plaintiff] posed or how many other persons there might be who, in concert with [the plaintiff], posed a threat to the security of the Vice President," and his decision to hurriedly remove the plaintiff from the scene (during which the plaintiff was injured) was reasonable. Id. In this case, the only individuals in the parking lot when Schmitt was arrested were Corporals Bell and Quigg, Schmitt, his brother and Sharkey. Schmitt was quickly apprehended by the corporals and offered no resistance; this situation is not comparable toSaucier. Accordingly, in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Schmitt, Corporal Quigg is not entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is denied on Schmitt's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

Rodriguez v. Miller, 294 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2002), is similarly inapposite. The plaintiff in that case claimed harm arising from the defendant-officer's use of handcuffs, although the plaintiff claimed to have had a prior arm injury. Discounting this claim, the Eleventh Circuit specifically noted that the "[p]laintiff unequivocally state[d] that, even after the handcuffing began: `I didn't even tell him [the officer] then that my arm was specifically injured, I was just telling him that he was hurting my arm.'" Id. at 1277 n. 2 (internal punctuation omitted). In this case, Schmitt testified to screaming in pain as his arm was twisted and held behind his back in the compliance hold. Further, Corporal Quigg is alleged to have held Schmitt's arm in an unusually high and painful position while exerting unnecessary force, in the absence of resistance. Such use of force is not reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, (1) Troopers Rashid and Jones are granted summary judgment on all counts, and the Complaint is dismissed as to these Defendants, (2) Corporal Quigg is granted summary judgment on all the state law claims and Count II of the Complaint, and (3) Corporal Quigg is denied summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. An appropriate order follows.


Summaries of

Schmitt v. Rashid

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Mar 17, 2004
Civil Action No. 02-0322 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2004)
Case details for

Schmitt v. Rashid

Case Details

Full title:HARRY J. SCHMITT, JR. Plaintiff, v. TARIQ B. RASHID, et al. Defendants

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Mar 17, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 02-0322 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2004)