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Schmidt v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Nov 1, 2006
No. 4-05-00900-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 1, 2006)

Opinion

No. 4-05-00900-CR

Delivered and Filed: November 1, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.

Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 886625, Honorable al Alonso, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.

Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Walter Schmidt was convicted of driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to six months in jail and a $1500 fine, with the jail term probated for a year. On appeal, Schmidt argues that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm.

Background

On May 20, 2004, at approximately 2:13 a.m., San Antonio Police Sergeant Alejandro Valdez, a patrol supervisor, observed a large white pickup truck driven by Schmidt tailgate a small car, cross three lanes without signaling, and accelerate up to 72 mph in a 45 mph zone. Valdez continued to follow Schmidt until Schmidt drove onto the wrong side of the street. At that point the officer turned on his overhead lights and stopped Schmidt in a restaurant parking lot. Once stopped, Valdez observed Schmidt exit his truck. Schmidt was unsteady on his feet and looked dazed. Additionally, Valdez noticed that Schmidt's speech was slurred and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Valdez inquired whether Schmidt had anything to drink and Schmidt admitted that he had six or eight beers that evening. Valdez subsequently administered several field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN), the one-leg stand, the Rhomberg balance, the walk and turn test, and a portable breathalyzer test (PBT). Because Schmidt exhibited sufficient clues of intoxication in each test, Valdez concluded that Schmidt had lost the use of his normal mental and physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol into his system. The second officer to arrive at the scene was Joel Zulaica. When Zulaica initially approached Schmidt, he noticed that Schmidt was unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes, and had a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath. Schmidt admitted to Zulaica that he had six or seven beers and Zulaica administered the HGN test which indicated that Schmidt was possibly intoxicated. Schmidt refused to perform any additional field sobriety tests and also refused to give a breath sample. Zulaica arrested Schmidt who later refused to perform the field sobriety tests at the police station.

Discussion

Schmidt argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that at the time of the police stop, he did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties because of his alcohol consumption. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(A) (Vernon 2003). In support of his contention, Schmidt points to several authorities that state the accuracy of the field sobriety tests are less than 100%. Schmidt also addresses other factors that could have affected his test results such as uneven testing surfaces, poor lighting, sleep deprivation, and being more than 50 pounds overweight. However, the issue on appeal is not whether there is evidence from which a jury might have concluded Schmidt was "not guilty." In contrast, the issue in a legal sufficiency analysis is whether there is any evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, from which "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To support a DWI conviction, the evidence must show that the defendant drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated on a public road, street, highway, or alley. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003); Dumas v. State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ ref'd) (citing Ford v. State, 571 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978)). The uncorroborated testimony of an arresting officer is sufficient to prove the element of intoxication. Dumas, 812 S.W.2d at 615. Valdez testified during trial that he believed Schmidt was intoxicated because of his aggressive driving, unsteady feet, dazed look, the strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and Schmidt's admission that he had consumed six to eight beers that evening. Additionally, Schmidt's performance on the HGN, Rhomberg balance, walk and turn, and PBT tests gave Valdez additional proof of his intoxication. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the offense of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt. As the trier of fact, the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Whitaker v. State, 977 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Additionally, reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury. Id. We therefore hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We also hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The only question to be answered in a factual sufficiency review is whether, considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Evidence can be factually insufficient if, when considered by itself, the evidence is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or when contrary evidence exists that is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard could not be met, so the verdict should not stand. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85; Burkett v. State, 179 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.). When performing the factual sufficiency review, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder's and we will give deference to the fact finder's determinations, including determinations involving the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 481-42. To support Schmidt's conviction for DWI, the State was required to prove that Schmidt operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003); Dumas, 812 S.W.2d at 615. Schmidt contests the element of intoxication. Under the Penal Code, intoxication may be proven when the evidence shows that the defendant has lost the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of alcohol consumption. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(A) (Vernon 2003). Schmidt's defense was based on the testimony of the police officers and his friend William Flynn. On cross-examination, Valdez admitted that several non-alcohol related issues such as fatigue and brain damage could have contributed to the impairment that Schmidt displayed. William Flynn testified that Schmidt had normal use of his mental and physical functions and did not have any trouble operating his vehicle, but did admit that Schmidt tailgated another car and that he cut across a couple of lanes of traffic without signaling. Schmidt testified that he met his friends at a bar around 9:00 p.m. and stayed until 2:00 a.m. He said that during that time he had six to seven evenly spaced beers and he drove from the bar because he felt fine and had the least to drink of the group. Regarding the sobriety tests, Schmidt offered several reasons for his poor performance such as his mistaken belief that some of the tests were complete before Valdez said they were. Schmidt also cited his being tired and overweight as possible bases for his field test failures. Additionally, he posited that one need not be drunk to be an aggressive and careless driver. However, there was considerable evidence supporting the officers' intoxication conclusion. Schmidt admitted that he had consumed between six and eight beers that evening and he exhibited six clues on the HGN test, which has been recognized as a reliable indicator of intoxication. Burkett, 179 S.W.3d at 26 (citing Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 931, (1994)). Additionally, the jury may infer guilt from Schmidt's refusal to submit to additional field sobriety tests and his refusal to give a breath sample. Id. at 26-27 (citing Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). Viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or that Schmidt's contrary evidence is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. We thus overrule Schmidt's factual sufficiency point of error.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


Summaries of

Schmidt v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Nov 1, 2006
No. 4-05-00900-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 1, 2006)
Case details for

Schmidt v. State

Case Details

Full title:WALKER SCHMIDT, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

Date published: Nov 1, 2006

Citations

No. 4-05-00900-CR (Tex. App. Nov. 1, 2006)