Opinion
Cause No. IP00-1739-C-T/G
May 18, 2001
Entry on Motion to Dismiss
Though this entry is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Under the law of the case doctrine, it is presumed that the ruling or rulings in this entry will govern throughout the litigation before this court. See, e.g., Tr. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). It should be noted, however, that this district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, other judges in this district, or even other cases before this district judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996) ("decisions by district judges do not have the force of precedent"); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("District court decisions have no weight as precedents, no authority.").
This cause comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the motion and the parties' arguments, the court rules as follows.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in Indiana state court on October 10, 2000, seeking a declaration that he timely renewed an insurance policy issued by Defendant, the policy covers him for injuries and disabilities suffered from the accident, and for all other appropriate relief. Defendant filed its Notice of Removal on November 8, 2000, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), 1441, and 1446, invoking this court's diversity jurisdiction. On December 13, 2000, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss.
This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident on January 6, 2000, which occurred in the State of Florida while Plaintiff was testing a race car. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Nevada. ( Id. ¶ 1.) Defendant is an insurance underwriter organized under the laws of England. ( Id. ¶ 2.) Defendant through its agent offered Plaintiff personal accident insurance while he resided in the State of Nevada. ( Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) The insurance policy was to insure Plaintiff for disability and accidental medical expenses incurred while engaged in his occupation as a race car driver. ( Id. ¶ 3.) The only allegation alluding to the State of Indiana is the claim that Defendant was "doing business in Indiana by insuring drivers of the Indy Racing League (IRL)." ( Id. ¶ 2.)
II. Analysis
Defendant argues this action should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. It claims that no fact relevant to this action has any connection to the State of Indiana. In the alternative, Defendant argues that if the court finds it has jurisdiction over Defendant, Indiana is not the proper venue for this action.
A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction "only if a court of the state in which it sits would have such jurisdiction." RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). When personal jurisdiction is challenged by a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. See Steel Warehouse of Wis., Inc. v. Leach, 154 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998); RAR, 107 F.3d at 1276; Turnock v. Cope, 816 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1987).
A two-step analysis is used to determine whether an Indiana state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ind. 2000). The court must first determine whether a defendant's conduct falls within Indiana's long-arm statute. Id. Indiana's long-arm statute is embodied in Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A), which provides in relevant part: "Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state . . . submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent: (1) doing any business in this state. . . ." Ind. T.R. 4.4(A). If a basis for personal jurisdiction exists under the long-arm statute, the court must then determine if a defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy federal due process analysis. See Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1232-33.
Due process requires a defendant to have "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" RAR, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1233. If the contacts are so "continuous and systematic" in nature such that a defendant reasonably could foresee being haled into court for any matter, then general jurisdiction may be asserted over the defendant even when the controversy is not related to those contacts. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9 (1984); Anthem, 730 N.E.2d at 1234. Specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant if the suit "aris[es] out of or [is] related to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros Nacionales at 414 n. 8; see Leach, 154 F.3d at 715 ("Specific jurisdiction cannot lie without a connection between the defendants' [forum state] activity and the claims alleged in the complaint.").
Plaintiff concedes that the facts that he is a Nevada resident insured by an English corporation for an accident which occurred in Florida usually would not give rise to personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. But Plaintiff argues that this case does give rise to personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because of a service of suit clause in the insurance policy under which Defendant agreed to "submit to the jurisdiction of a Court of Competent Jurisdiction within the United States." (Compl., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff contends that this clause and the allegation that Defendant does business in Indiana establish the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. This contention is unavailing for two reasons. First, Defendant did not agree to submit to the jurisdiction of any federal court chosen by Plaintiff; rather, it agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of "a Court of Competent Jurisdiction". Courts have interpreted this phrase to mean a court having both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See Steel v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1553 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1987); see also DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that "jurisdiction" embraces both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction); Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1264-66 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of action under Fair Credit Reporting Act which allowed suit to be brought in any court of "competent jurisdiction").
Moreover, Plaintiff's bare unsupported allegation that Defendant does business by insuring drivers of the IRL is insufficient to establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiff has offered no evidence whatsoever to establish that Defendant does business in Indiana. Plaintiff has not shown that any of the insurance contracts between Defendant and drivers of the IRL have any connection to the State of Indiana. For example, there is no evidence that the policy issued to Plaintiff was part of a group policy issued to the IRL for its drivers. Further, the allegation itself cannot be reasonably read as claiming that Defendant does business in Indiana. At most, the allegation states that Defendant insures drivers who are members of the IRL. The allegation does not speak to the citizenship of any of these drivers or the place of contracting between them and Defendant.
The court finds that Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction — there is no evidence that Defendant's conduct satisfies Indiana's long-arm statute or that Defendant has minimum contacts with Indiana to satisfy due process. This finding would justify a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits and thus is without prejudice. If the applicable statute of limitations has not yet run, the Plaintiff could file this action in a district which has personal jurisdiction. The court, however, has no knowledge as to whether the limitations period has expired. If the limitations period has expired, dismissal of this action would visit a severe penalty on Plaintiff. So, rather than dismiss this action without prejudice, the court finds that in the interests of justice, this action should be transferred to another district that may exercise personal jurisdiction. The court has authority to transfer even though it lacks personal jurisdiction. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962); Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 189 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1985).
Defendant argues that the most appropriate forum is the Northern District of New York because the insurance policy at issue was entered in the State of New York. Defendant also suggests the District of Nevada, where Plaintiff resides, as another possible forum. Plaintiff has not expressed a preference for any forum. Recognizing the strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981), the court DIRECTS Plaintiff to file within ten (10) days of this date a statement regarding his preferred forum, including citations to appropriate legal authority if Plaintiff so chooses. Defendant is ALLOWED seven (7) days thereafter within which to respond.
Upon receipt of Plaintiff's statement and Defendant's response, if any, the court will enter an order transferring this action to a proper forum.