Opinion
2008-945 N C.
Decided October 20, 2010.
Appeal and cross appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Norman Janowitz, J.), entered November 5, 2007. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, insofar as appealed from by defendant, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,300, and, insofar as cross-appealed from by plaintiff, awarded defendant the principal sum of $553.54 on his counterclaim.
ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from by defendant, is affirmed without costs.
ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as cross-appealed from by plaintiff, is modified by reducing the award in favor of defendant on his counterclaim to the principal sum of $373.54; as so modified, the judgment, insofar as cross-appealed from, is affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: MOLIA, J.P., LaCAVA and IANNACCI, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $4,300, representing a security deposit in the amount of two months' rent, for an apartment that he had rented from defendant. Defendant counterclaimed to recover the sums of $171.22 in unpaid electric bills, $84.42 in unpaid water bills, $155 for carpet cleaning, $125 for cleaning or repair of bath/kitchen tile, and $17.90 for re-keying the locks, for a total of $553.54. After a nonjury trial, the District Court found that plaintiff was entitled to the return of his security deposit and that defendant had established his counterclaim. Defendant appeals from so much of the judgment as awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,300, and plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the judgment as awarded defendant the principal sum of $553.54 on his counterclaim.
As to plaintiff's cause of action seeking the return of the security deposit, defendant appears to argue that a rider to the lease required plaintiff to provide defendant 60 days' notice if plaintiff did not intend to renew the lease, and that, if plaintiff failed to do so, defendant was entitled to retain plaintiff's security deposit. However, that reading does not appear to reflect the parties' intention, as the lease was for a defined one-year term. A more logical reading of the provision in question was that it required plaintiff to give written notice if he intended to stay in the premises after the lease term expired, and that it provided that if plaintiff did not give notice of his intent to renew and nonetheless failed to vacate the premises, his security deposit would be subject to forfeiture. Any ambiguity in the lease must be construed against the drafter ( see e.g. Matter of Cowen Co. v Anderson, 76 NY2d 318), which in this case was defendant.
The District Court found, in essence, that plaintiff had timely vacated upon the expiration of the one-year lease, that plaintiff had not orally renewed the lease, that the lease did not require plaintiff to give written notice of his intention not to renew the lease, and that, in any event, defendant had not suffered any damages from plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the notice provision.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see e.g. Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court ( see e.g. Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126). Furthermore, the determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as the court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses ( see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511). As the court's findings and conclusions regarding the security deposit are supported by the record, we find that the judgment, insofar as appealed from by defendant, provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126). Accordingly, the judgment insofar as appealed from by defendant, is affirmed.
As to defendant's counterclaim, the record supports the District Court's finding that defendant had established his claim for the unpaid water and electric bills, and for re-keying the locks on the premises. As to defendant's claims for carpet cleaning and "bathroom/kitchen tile," it is noted that, pursuant to paragraph 36 of the parties' lease, the sum of $100 would be deducted from the security deposit for cleaning if the premises were not left clean. If the cleaning cost exceeded the sum of $100, defendant was required to provide itemized receipts for such cleaning to be entitled to a sum greater than $100. The District Court implicitly found that plaintiff did not leave the premises clean. We find no basis to disturb such finding. However, in the absence of any itemized receipt, defendant's recovery for cleaning costs was limited to the $100 amount set forth in the lease. Consequently, as defendant did not submit any itemized receipts, the District Court's award of $280 for the cost of carpet cleaning and "bathroom/kitchen tile" did not provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1807; Ross, 269 AD2d 584; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126), and its award for these items should only have been $100. Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as cross-appealed from by plaintiff, is modified by reducing the amount awarded to defendant on his counterclaim to the principal sum of $373.54.
Molia, J.P., LaCava and Iannacci, JJ., concur.