However, appellate review of a trial court's denial of appointment as personal representative is subject to abuse of discretion scrutiny. SeeSchleider v. Est. of Schleider , 770 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ; Hernandez v. Hernandez , 946 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Similarly, an appellate court will not reverse an order removing a personal representative absent a trial court's abuse of discretion.
However, appellate review of a trial court's denial of appointment as personal representative is subject to abuse of discretion scrutiny. See Schleider v. Est. of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 946 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Similarly, an appellate court will not reverse an order removing a personal representative absent a trial court's abuse of discretion.
We review the trial court's order to determine if there was an abuse of discretion when it denied Ruben's request to be named personal representative of Maldonado's estate. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Schleider, the Fourth District wrote:
SeeIn re Estate of Mindlin , 571 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that the trial court had no discretion to override the testator's desire to have his father appointed as personal representative where there was no evidence presented that the testator's father was not qualified for the appointment or that unforeseen circumstances existed which would have affected the testator's decision). To the extent the trial court relied upon Schleider v. Estate of Schleider , 770 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), in concluding that it had discretion to deny the appointment of the person named in the decedent's will, that reliance is misplaced because Schleider recognized a degree of discretion that is inconsistent with this court's binding precedent. For instance, in Schleider , the Fourth District relied upon the dissenting opinion in Pontrello v. Estate of Kepler , 528 So. 2d 441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (Campbell, J., dissenting), for the proposition that the trial court may refuse to appoint a personal representative named in a will upon the basis of facts presented to the court at the time of appointment thatโif presented after the appointmentโwould support removal of the personal representative.
In re Estate of Harper, 271 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Cf. In re Estate of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that "if a dispute which will result in unnecessary litigation and impede the administration of the estate is combined with other factors . . . the totality of the circumstances may rise to a level that allows the trial court to exercise its discretion in refusing to appoint the personal representative named in the will.").Id., 840 So.2d at 1133 (emphasis added).
Further, there is no evidence offered suggesting that C. Azell Prince, Jr., the person named in Ms. Prince's Will as the primary personal representative of the Estate (Doc. 46-2, p. 1.), has been unable to perform that duty. Nor is it the case that a court must always appoint one named in a decedent's Will as the personal representative of her Estate to such a position. Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So. 2d 1252, 1253-54. Because there is insufficient evidence to present a triable fact that Ms. Burgess is the duly appointed representative of the Estate, the Court grants summary judgment for Defendant as to the claims raised by the Estate, finding that Ms. Burgess lacks standing to bring suit on the Estate's behalf.
In "granting letters of administration," the circuit court is to prefer the person nominated in the will to be the personal representative. Id. ยง 733.301; Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand with instructions to the trial court to admit the decedent's first codicil, as unaltered, and appoint only the personal representatives named therein. See Schleider v. Estate of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("The general rule of law is that trial courts do not have discretion to refuse to appoint the personal representative named by the testator in the will unless that person is disqualified by law. Clearly, the testator's selection of a personal representative should be afforded great deference.
In re Estate of Harper, 271 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Cf. In re Estate of Schleider, 770 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that "if a dispute which will result in unnecessary litigation and impede the administration of the estate is combined with other factors . . . the totality of the circumstances may rise to a level that allows the trial court to exercise its discretion in refusing to appoint the personal representative named in the will.")