Any other amount would be the product of speculation, conjecture, and guesswork. See Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("[T]here must be a reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount awarded. . . . It is incumbent upon the party seeking damages to present evidence to justify an award of damages in a definite amount.
Thus, there must be sufficient evidence to satisfy the mind of a prudent person as to the amount of damages sustained, as well as a reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount awarded.See Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). A. Overpayment of MMF
Instead, the only testimony was that it was possible that BB & T may have received a payment of as much as $1.8 million from the FDIC but that further evidence would be needed to be sure. This testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding that BB & T had, in fact, received a payment of $1.8 million as a result of charge-offs on the Kraz loan. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lee, 884 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“ ‘[T]here must be some reasonable basis in the evidence to support the amount [of damages] awarded.’ ” (quoting Camper Corral, Inc. v. Perantoni, 801 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)) (alteration in original)); Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“Damages cannot be based upon speculation and guesswork, ... but must have some reasonable basis in fact.”). Thus, in the absence of any legally sufficient evidence to support this credit against the principal of Kraz's loan, we must reverse this portion of the final judgment and remand for correction.
Instead, the only testimony was that it was possible that BB&T may have received a payment of as much as $1.8 million from the FDIC but that further evidence would be needed to be sure. This testimony is legally insufficient to support a finding that BB&T had, in fact, received a payment of $1.8 million as a result of charge-offs on the Kraz loan. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lee, 884 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (" '[T]here must be some reasonable basis in the evidence to support the amount [of damages] awarded.' " (quoting Camper Corral, Inc. v. Perantoni, 801 So. 2d 990, 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)) (alteration in original)); Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("Damages cannot be based upon speculation and guesswork, . . . but must have some reasonable basis in fact."). Thus, in the absence of any legally sufficient evidence to support this credit against the principal of Kraz's loan, we must reverse this portion of the final judgment and remand for correction.
We agree. In ruling that Jane Doe had the burden to prove her damages in a definite amount, the trial court cited our opinion in Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Schimpf, we held that “[i]t is incumbent upon the party seeking damages to present evidence to justify an award of damages in a definite amount.”
We agree. In ruling that Jane Doe had the burden to prove her damages in a definite amount, the trial court cited our opinion in Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Schimpf, we held that "[i]t is incumbent upon the party seeking damages to present evidence to justify an award of damages in a definite amount."
Until one of those occurrences, there are no provable damages. See Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So.2d 579, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating damages cannot be based on speculation or guesswork but rather must have some reasonable basis in fact); George Hunt, Inc. v. Dorsey Young Constr., Inc., 385 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (“[E]vidence as to the amount of damages cannot be based on speculation or conjecture, but must be proven with certainty.”). I would reverse the judgments on appeal and dismiss the case without prejudice.
Until one of those occurrences, there are no provable damages. See Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So. 2d 579, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating damages cannot be based on speculation or guesswork but rather must have some reasonable basis in fact); George Hunt, Inc. v. Dorsey Young Constr., Inc., 385 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) ("[E]vidence as to the amount of damages cannot be based on speculation or conjecture, but must be proven with certainty."). I would reverse the judgments on appeal and dismiss the case without prejudice.
As such, Sea World's burden of proof was that which is required in a breach of contract action — the presentation of evidence "sufficient to satisfy the mind of a prudent, impartial person" as to the amount of awardable damages. Schimpf v. Reger, 691 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). That is, there must be a reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount awarded. Id.