Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107

14 Citing cases

  1. Koch v. Cedar Cty. Freeholder Bd.

    276 Neb. 1009 (Neb. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    In Koch v. Cedar Cty. Freeholder Bd., 276 Neb. 1009, 1021, ___N. W.2d___,___(2009), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that "because the district court was allowed to accept new evidence and consider the question of transfer anew, it did not err in allowing the filing of new or amended petitions."

    We therefore conclude that the insufficiency of certain legal descriptions does not prevent the Board from exercising jurisdiction over the petitions. Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 453, 299 N.W.2d 527, 530 (1980).Id.

  2. Bartlett v. Dawes Cty. Bd. of Equal

    259 Neb. 954 (Neb. 2000)   Cited 17 times
    In Bartlett, the Dawes County assessor had divided the county into four agricultural "market areas" for property tax purposes.

    The rule regarding collateral attack on a judgment applies not only to courts of general jurisdiction, but also to administrative boards and tribunals acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980). See, also, County of Adams, supra.

  3. In re Interest of Jeremy T

    600 N.W.2d 747 (Neb. 1999)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding statutes and case law do not authorize placement of juvenile in "dual custody" of two separate agencies simultaneously

    The Department, however, did not perfect a timely appeal from the June 6, 1996, order, nor can that order be collaterally attacked in the present appeal. The error committed by the trial court was an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, but it was not outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See, Mayfield v. Hartmann, 221 Neb. 122, 375 N.W.2d 146 (1985); Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980) (distinguishing between want of jurisdiction and error in exercise of jurisdiction). Jurisdiction of the subject matter means the authority to hear and determine both the class of actions to which the action before the court belongs and the particular question which it assumes to decide.

  4. County of Adams v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equal

    252 Neb. 847 (Neb. 1997)   Cited 5 times
    Stating that the actions of equalizing property values between counties is quasi-judicial in nature

    We first consider whether the Subdivisions may collaterally attack the prior judgments of the Board. In Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 451, 299 N.W.2d 527, 530 (1980), we stated: It is well settled that where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its judgment is not subject to collateral attack.

  5. Scott v. Mattingly

    241 Neb. 276 (Neb. 1992)   Cited 14 times

    Id. at 26, 290 N.W.2d at 809. See, also, Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980); Fisher v. Housing Auth. of City of Omaha, 214 Neb. 499, 334 N.W.2d 636 (1983). In State ex rel. Kizzier Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. GMC, 211 Neb. 626, 319 N.W.2d 735 (1982), an automobile dealership filed an application with the Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Board requesting that the board order a competing dealership to cease dealing in a particular make of cars. After a hearing, the board refused to do so.

  6. In re Appropriations D-887 and A-768

    482 N.W.2d 11 (Neb. 1992)   Cited 4 times
    Stating the issuance of a surface water permit by a DNR predecessor is a "final and binding adjudication" of an appropriator's rights under the permit

    Beerline cannot now collaterally attack the Board's decision. See Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980) (the rule that a judgment is not subject to collateral attack if the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter applies to administrative boards and tribunals acting in a quasi-judicial capacity). The 1905 adjudication clearly limits Beerline to 1 cfs per 70 acres of land to which water is actually and usefully applied.

  7. State ex Rel. Ritthaler v. Knox

    351 N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    State ex rel. Southeast Rural Fire P. Dist., supra. Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 451, 299 N.W.2d 527, 529-30 (1980). "[A] party to a proceeding in the district court, where such court has jurisdiction over the person and subject-matter, will be bound by the judgment in the case when collaterally attacking it, even though the judgment was irregularly or erroneously entered."

  8. In re Application of Ochsner

    344 N.W.2d 632 (Neb. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    While it is clear that 49-301 applies to all civil, criminal, and administrative actions, there appears to be an inconsistency in Nebraska case law as to when an action is deemed "pending" within the meaning of the general saving statute in an administrative proceeding. Cf., United Mineral Products Co. v. Nebraska Railroads, 177 Neb. 802, 131 N.W.2d 388 (1964); Kaup v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 226, 188 N.W.2d 891 (1971); Clark v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 232, 188 N.W.2d 889 (1971); Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980). To the extent that there are conflicts between these cases, we are of the opinion that Kaup v. Sweet, supra, and Clark v. Sweet, supra, represent the law in this jurisdiction.

  9. State v. Reuter

    343 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1984)   Cited 11 times

    The difficulty with that position, from his point of view, is that a judgment is not subject to collateral attack unless that attack rests upon a lack of jurisdiction over the parties or of the subject matter. Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 299 N.W.2d 527 (1980). His reliance upon Garrett v. State, 118 Neb. 373, 224 N.W. 860 (1929), for the proposition that the decree of dissolution is subject to collateral attack in this case is misplaced.

  10. Sileven v. Tesch

    326 N.W.2d 850 (Neb. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    In Sileven v. Tesch, 212 Neb. 880, 326 N.W.2d 850 (1982), we stated that there was a distinction between want of jurisdiction and error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.

    This appeal must be dismissed because Sileven's attempt to use the writ of habeas corpus to cause a review of his incarceration is not proper. Sileven is attempting to collaterally attack the judgment by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. In Schilke v. School Dist. No. 107, 207 Neb. 448, 451, 299 N.W.2d 527, 529-30 (1980), we said: "Where a judgment is attacked in a way other than a proceeding in the original action to have it vacated, reversed, or modified, or a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack is a `collateral attack.' County of Douglas v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W.2d 740 (1945); State ex rel. Southeast Rural Fire P. Dist. v. Grossman, 188 Neb. 424, 197 N.W.2d 398 (1972).