The PFD statute defines a state resident for PFD purposes as a person who meets the basic eligibility requirements of AS 01.10.055 as well as other PFD-specific requirements. It is permissible for Alaska to define a “resident” differently for purposes of PFD eligibility than for other purposes. Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 942 (Alaska 2000) (“ ‘[T]he residency requirement for PFD eligibility may differ from other residency requirements.’ ” (quoting Brodigan v. Alaska Dep't of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 733 n. 12 (Alaska 1995))). In this case, there is no dispute about Heller's intent to remain in Alaska or whether he satisfies the preliminary requirement of AS 01.10.055.
See AS 01.10.055(b) (providing that person seeking to demonstrate intent to remain may, if "required by law or regulation," have to maintain principal place of abode in Alaska for longer than default 30 days or provide additional proof of intent); see also Heller v. State, Dep't of Revenue , 314 P.3d 69, 81 (Alaska 2013) ("[T]he residency requirement for PFD eligibility may differ from other residency requirements." (quoting Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue , 7 P.3d 938, 942 (Alaska 2000) )).See AS 43.23.005(a)(1)-(7) (listing PFD eligibility requirements including but not limited to state residence).
(Emphasis added).Eagle v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 153 P.3d 976, 980 (Alaska 2007) (quoting State, Dep't of Revenue v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58, 71-72 (Alaska 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 941-42 (Alaska 2000); Brodigan v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 733 n. 12 (Alaska 1995).Andrade, 23 P.3d at 72 (quoting Church v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State, Dep't of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska 1993).
The ALJ issued a summary adjudication decision, applying a five-factor test explained in Western Alaska Building &Construction Trades Council v. Inn-Vestment Associates of Alaska ( Western Alaska ) and determining that the Act covered the entire construction project.See Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue , 7 P.3d 938, 941-42, 946 (Alaska 2000) (treating summary adjudication and summary judgment interchangeably). Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting out summary judgment standard); see, e.g. , In re N. Star 1300, LLC , OAH No. 19-1092-CON at *3 (Dec. 18, 2020) ("Summary adjudication in an administrative proceeding is the equivalent of summary judgment in a court proceeding.
The state has shown that AS § 21.89.020(c) bears a substantial See State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001) (stating levels of analysis); Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 944 (Alaska 2000) (stating economic claims are reviewed under minimum scrutiny analysis). Page 994.
AS 29.45.030(f).Schikora v. State, Dep’t of Revenue , 7 P.3d 938, 944 (Alaska 2000). "When examining [a statute’s] impact on the right of interstate migration, the relevant questions are whether [the benefit conferred by the statute] operates in such a way that the reasonable recipient would be deterred from exercising the right to travel, and the degree of that deterrence."
' We have interpreted this language to require a 'sliding scale of review' rather than the tiered approach of federal equal protection analysis.") (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., Ross I, 292 P.3d at 909-10 (applying sliding-scale test for reviewing equal protection challenge to PFD eligibility requirements); Harrod, 255 P.3d at 1001 (same); Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 944-45 (Alaska 2000) (same); Church v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999) (same); State, Dep't of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 628 (Alaska 1993) (same). "We have consistently held that a party raising a claim controlled by an existing decision bears a heavy threshold burden of showing compelling reasons for reconsidering the prior ruling."
In interpreting municipal ordinances, we use our independent judgment and will "adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."See Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 941 (Alaska 2000).See Balough v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245, 254 (Alaska 2000).
Here, because the burden on access is not overly onerous, we apply an intermediate level of review. Schikora v. State, Dep't. of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938, 944 (Alaska 2000).State, Dep't of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192-93 (Alaska 1983)).
Id. at 625; see also Brodigan v. Alaska, Dep't of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 732 (Alaska 1995).Church v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 733 n. 12); see also Schikora v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 7 P.3d 938 (Alaska 2000).Church, 973 P.2d at 1129.