The facts underlying that case are significantly distinct from the facts underlying this appeal, the legal principles relevant to that case are inapplicable here, and its underlying rule—that a release of one tortfeasor releases all—has been discredited. Additionally, the reasoning in Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 989 P.2d 10 (1999), which gave due regard to contract law, also cuts against the remaining coguarantors' effort to extrapolate from Jackman a principle so generalized that it is elastic enough to apply here.We begin by underscoring the narrowness of the actual issue in Jackman as well as the court's resolution of that issue.

New Market did not address the situation before me where the surety was released. I also am not persuaded by the City's case, Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 989 P.2d 10 (1999), because it concerned a promissory note signed by all as principals, rather than the release of a surety or guarantor. Likewise, the City's cases discussing the liability of principals and sureties for delay damages are not helpful because the rulings rest on the scope of bonds issued under the Miller Act, which is not implicated here. See United States ex rel. Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc. v. Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1981). Finally, Stanley's case, Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 980 P.2d 407, 413-15 (Cal. 1999), relies on the terms of the bond and construction contract to conclude that the surety could be liable for delay damages. It does not discuss the effect on the principal of the release of the surety.

f the document as a whole; (2) if the provision is ambiguous, the court examines extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent; and (3) if ambiguity remains after such examination, the court will use appropriate maxims of construction); Roe v. Doe, 161 Or. App. 477, 984 P.2d 344, 349 (1999) (in construing a contractual provision, the court first looks at the text of disputed provision in the context of the document as a whole and next, "if, but only if, an ambiguity exists, we `examine extrinsic evidence[.]'") (quoting Yogman, 325 Or. at 363, 937 P.2d at 1022); see also Hoffman Constr. Co. of Alaska v. Fred S. James Co. of Or., 313 Or. 464, 470, 836 P.2d 703, 706 (1992) (determining whether undefined term in insurance contract was ambiguous first from its plain meaning and next from its context in the policy and the broader context of the policy as a whole); accord Croshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 Or. 303, 985 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1999) (applying analysis from Hoffman); Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 1999 WL 498175, at *9 (1999) (citing Hoffman as stating Oregon's rules for interpretation of contracts generally). Here, as the discussion in the following section makes clear, even if I were to follow Abercrombie and examine the extrinsic evidence to determine whether the easements are ambiguous as opposed to examining such evidence only after determining that they are indeed ambiguous, I conclude that there is no conflict between the parties' intent as seen in the extrinsic evidence and the clear and unambiguous words used to express that intent in the documents.

, 53 A.L.R. 1420 (1928).Id. See, also, Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 989 P.2d 10 (1999).We understand the qualifiers in our recitation of the common-law rule to require consideration of general principles of contract interpretation when determining whether the common-law rule is applicable. Generally, the question is whether the language of the release at issue is unqualified such that it amounts to a complete satisfaction of the debt, or whether the language of the release is qualified such that it operates as merely a partial satisfaction of the debt.

G.L. has been criticized for making the application of stare decisis too rigid. See Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 104–05, 989 P.2d 10 (1999) (Durham, J., concurring) (so stating); Keltner v. Washington County, 310 Or. 499, 512–13, 800 P.2d 752 (1990) (Unis, J., dissenting) (“The self-imposed rule of judicial restraint [adopted in G.L.] earns this court the dubious distinction of being the only state in the union to limit its traditional judicial common law-making authority so substantially.”). But G.L. itself does not purport to establish a rigid “rule” for applying stare decisis to common-law decisions; rather, it illustrates common reasons that this court might be willing to reexamine precedent.

We recognize that defendants likely make this argument solely to preserve it should either party seek and obtain review before the Supreme Court. Defendants directly "acknowledge[ ] that this court is bound by Oregon Supreme Court case law" and the principle of stare decisis . Accordingly, we must reject defendants' argument that Howard/Dawson was wrongly decided. See Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc. , 143 Or.App. 276, 284, 922 P.2d 703 (1996), rev'd on other grounds , 329 Or. 86, 989 P.2d 10 (1999) ("We are not in the business of overruling decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court. Correction, if any, lies elsewhere." (Footnote omitted.)).

See also Starr v. Heckathorne, 270 Or 238, 240, 527 P.2d 401 (1974) (judgment creditor entitled to only one satisfaction of his judgment against joint tortfeasors). Assuming that the holding in Cooper remains good law, but see Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or 86, 100, 989 P.2d 10 (1999) (release of one joint and several obligor on a promissory note does not release automatically the other joint and several obligors), we reject VTNA's contention that the satisfaction of plaintiffs judgment against TEC extinguished its claim against VTNA. Unlike in Cooper, plaintiffs breach of contract claim in this case did not allege the joint liability of VTNA and TEC, and plaintiffs satisfaction of the judgment against TEC does not prevent plaintiff from pursuing an appeal on its claim against VTNA for its separate contractual obligation. Second, VTNA asserts that plaintiffs appeal should be dismissed because it puts at risk plaintiff's judgment against TEC. Citing Pac. Gen. Contrs. v. Slate Const. Co., 196 Or 608, 611, 251 P.2d 454 (1952), VTNA asserts that a party may not claim the benefits of a judgment and at the same time appeal from it.

Defendant's argument is properly addressed to the Oregon Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 143 Or App 276, 284, 922 P2d 703 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 329 Or 86, 989 P2d 10 (1999) (We are not in the business of overruling decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court."). In his fourth assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court not only should have merged his convictions on retrial for attempted aggravated murder and attempted murder — which the court did — but should also have merged those convictions with the convictions for the underlying felonies that were affirmed by this court in Wilson II 161 Or App at 324.

Our point is not, of course, that Campbell is no longer good law. "We are not in the business of overruling decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court." Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 143 Or App 276, 284, 922 P2d 703 (1996), rev'don other grounds, 329 Or 86, 989 P2d 10 (1999). Rather, the foregoing observations compel two conclusions, either of which is dispositive.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court's statutory construction decisions — whether pre- or post- PGE — remain binding on us until the court itself reexamines them or until the legislature alters the statutes that they construed. Bell v. Morales, 207 Or App 326, 334, 142 P3d 76 (2006); see also Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 143 Or App 276, 284, 922 P2d 703 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 329 Or 86, 989 P2d 10 (1999) ("We are not in the business of overruling decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court."). As we have noted, the Supreme Court has never suggested that Berry is anything but good law.