Opinion
# 2015-045-020 Claim No. 121710 Motion No. M-85910 Motion No. M-85912 Cross-Motion No. CM-86281
06-17-2015
SCHIFF v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Ann Marie Schiff, Pro Se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Theresa N. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion to amend claim and to compel discovery. Defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the claim.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-045-020 |
| Claimant(s): | ANN MARIE SCHIFF |
| Claimant short name: | SCHIFF |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 121710 |
| Motion number(s): | M-85910, M-85912 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-86281 |
| Judge: | GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA |
| Claimant's attorney: | Ann Marie Schiff, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Theresa N. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | June 17, 2015 |
| City: | Hauppauge |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
The following papers were read and considered by the Court on these motions: Claimant's Notice of Motion to Compel Discovery, Claimant's Affidavit in Support with annexed Exhibits, Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Compel with annexed Exhibits, Claimant's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel, Claimant's Notice of Motion to Amend Claim, Claimant's Affidavit in Support with annexed Exhibits, Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Amend Claim and in Support of Motion to Dismiss with annexed Exhibits, Claimant's Reply to Motion to Amend Claim and in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Amend Claim, Claimant's Second Reply to Opposition to Motion to Amend Claim, Defendant's Correspondence in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated May 6, 2015 with attachments and Claimant's Correspondence in Response dated May 15, 2015.
Claimant, Ann Marie Schiff, has brought a motion to compel discovery and a separate motion to amend her claim in this matter. Defendant, the State of New York opposes the motions and has brought a cross-motion to dismiss the claim.
The underlying claim in this matter arose on June 14, 2012 when claimant was present at the Cohalan Court Complex in Central Islip, Suffolk County, New York. Claimant alleges that on that date at approximately 10:55 a.m. she was speaking on her cellphone in the lobby of the court complex when Court Officer Joanne Stephens directed claimant to get out of the chair she was sitting in because she was trespassing. Claimant allegedly removed herself from the chair without assistance, went to Officer Stephens' supervisor and reported what she deemed Officer Stephens' inappropriate behavior. Claimant also asked for Officer Stephens' badge number before exiting the building. Claimant then sat on the benches outside the courthouse and was again on her cellphone when Officer Stephens, her supervisor and two men in green vests came over to where she was seated. Claimant asserts that she was then taken to a room where she was charged with disorderly conduct.
Turning to claimant's motion to compel discovery, claimant served defendant with a demand for a bill of particulars on April 18, 2013. Defendant served a response to the demand on May 16, 2013 wherein it objected to claimant's demands. After a Court conference in this matter, defendant served a second response to claimant's demand on October 24, 2013. Defendant contends that it has provided whatever non-objectionable documents exist regarding claimant's requests.
A motion to compel responses to demands and interrogatories should not be granted where the demands and interrogatories seek information which is irrelevant, overly broad or burdensome (Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enters., Inc., 84 AD3d 1283 [2d Dept 2011]). The Court is mindful that this action is being pursued by a pro se litigant, however it is clear that much of claimant's demands are palpably improper. Nevertheless, defendant provided responses to these demands. The Court finds defendant's responses to the demands to have been reasonable and responsive. Additionally, the Court also finds that there has been no showing that defendant's conduct was willful, contumacious or in bad faith (id.). As a result, claimant's motion to compel discovery is denied.
Claimant has also filed a motion to amend her claim in which she seeks to add various individuals as well as the New York State Unified Court System as defendants in this matter. These amendments are impermissible in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction wherein claims primarily seeking monetary damages against the State of New York are brought (CCA § 9). Individuals cannot be sued in their individual capacity in the Court of Claims (CCA § 9). It is well settled that the State of New York is the real party in interest for claims against state agencies (Morell v Balasubramanian, 70 NY2d 297 [1987]). It is equally clear that claims against a state officer for conduct undertaken in an official capacity and in the exercise of an official governmental function are essentially claims against the State of New York (id.; Woodward v State of New York, 23 AD3d 852, 856 [3d Dept 2005]). Thus, claimant's motion to amend her claim is denied.
Lastly, defendant moves to dismiss the claim on various grounds. Initially defendant argues that the claim fails to state a cause of action under Court of Claims Act § 8-b. It is clear that the facts of this matter do not support a claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b nor has claimant attempted to fulfill the requirements for bringing a claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3).
Defendant next argues that there is no cause of action for negligent prosecution or investigation. It is well settled that there is no recognized cause of action in the State of New York sounding in negligent prosecution or investigation (Coleman v Corporate Loss Prevention Assoc., 282 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 2001]).
Defendant further argues that claimant has failed to establish a cause of action for false arrest/unlawful imprisonment. The elements of a false arrest cause of action are: (1) the defendant intended to confine claimant; (2) claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451 [1975], cert. denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]).
At issue herein is whether claimant's confinement was privileged. Since there was no arrest warrant, defendant must show that the Court Officers possessed probable cause to believe that claimant committed a crime. Probable cause, which has been equated with reasonable cause in New York, consists of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe claimant guilty (Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d 78 [1983]). Probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (Rodgers v City of New York, 106 AD3d 1068 [2d Dept 2013]; Norasteh v State of New York, 44 AD3d 576 [1 Dept 2007]).
In support of its motion defendant has submitted the affidavit of Court Officer Joanne Stephens. Officer Stephens detailed the facts and circumstances which led her to arrest claimant for Disorderly Conduct, Penal Law 240.20 (7). Defendant also provided the Court with the transcript of the Suffolk County District Court proceeding disposing of the charges against claimant. In the proceeding Judge William G. Ford issued a final order of observation and dismissal of the accusatory instrument. He determined that claimant lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings or to be able to assist in her own defense. He then referred the case to the Office of Mental Health and remanded claimant into the custody of the Suffolk County Sheriff. In response to these documents, claimant provided the Court with a copy of her CPL 730, psychiatric examination result. Dr. Paris Arianas examined claimant and gave his opinion that claimant was an incapacitated person as a result of mental disease or defect. As a result claimant lacked the capacity to understand the proceeding against her. Dr. Arianas recommended that claimant be remanded into the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene for in-patient psychiatric hospitalization.
Where an officer in good faith believes that a person is guilty of a crime and his belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man, under the circumstances, to believe likewise, he has such probable cause for his belief as would justify him arresting claimant (Minott v City of New York, 203 AD2d 265 [2d Dept 1994] quoting (People v Coffey, 12 NY2d 443 [1963]). It is clear from Officer Stephens' personal observations that she reasonably believed claimant had committed a crime (Norasteh v State of New York, 44 AD3d 576 [1 Dept 2007]). Given the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds that defendant has established probable cause as a matter of law in this action.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution a claimant must prove (1) the initiation or continuation of legal action against him, (2) termination of the proceeding in his favor, (3) absence of probable cause to commence the proceeding, and (4) actual malice (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451 [1975], cert. denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Therefore, once probable cause has been established, a cause of action to recover for malicious prosecution cannot be successfully maintained. Additionally, in order for a criminal matter to be terminated in favor of the accused, the final disposition must be one which indicates innocence (Hollender v Trump Vil. Coop., 58 NY2d 420 [1983]). The final disposition in this case did not indicate innocence. Further, the claim fails to allege the elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
To the extent claimant is alleging physical injuries, the claim fails to state any facts suggesting that there was any excessive force or for that matter any physical contact whatsoever between claimant and any State employees (Rodgers v City of New York, 106 AD3d 1068 [2d Dept 2013]). In fact, claimant alleges that she removed herself from the chair she was sitting in without any assistance from the court officers.
To the extent claimant is alleging a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress it must also be dismissed. It is well settled that causes of action against the State alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress are prohibited as against public policy (Afifi v City of New York, 104 AD3d 712 [2d Dept 2013]; Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830 [2d Dept 2009]; Wheeler v State of New York, 104 AD2d 496 [2d Dept 1984]). Additionally, a claim against the State for negligent infliction of emotional distress will only arise out of a few limited circumstances which are not found in the present action (Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95 [2000]; Losquadro v Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 216 AD2d 533 [2d Dept 1995]). Further, claimant's allegation of negligent infliction of emotional distress is duplicative of other causes of action (Afifi v City of New York, 104 AD3d 712 [2d Dept 2013]).
To the extent that claimant is alleging civil rights violations under the federal constitution such claims are beyond the jurisdiction of this court and must be dismissed (see Court of Claims Act § 9). Additionally, the Court of Claims should not imply a State Constitutional remedy when an adequate alternative remedy is available to claimant (Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180 [3d Dept 2006]; Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78 [2001]; Remley v State of New York, 174 Misc 2d 523 [Ct Cl 1997]).
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, claimant's motions are denied and defendant's motion to dismiss the claim is granted.
June 17, 2015
Hauppauge, New York
GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA
Judge of the Court of Claims