The rationale often stated is that the marriage relationship has greater significance than ordinary private contracts — that the maintenance of the marital status is a matter of vital concern to the state and that individuals should not be allowed to tamper so lightly with a relationship of such fundamental importance. E.g., Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831 (1949); DeVries v. DeVries, 195 Ill.App. 4 (1915); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673, 93 A.L.R. 701 (1934); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup., 1942); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup., 1944); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939); Phipps v. Phipps, 216 S.C. 248, 57 S.E.2d 417 (1950).
With the legal consequences of such ceremonies under other circumstances, either in the United States or France, we are not concerned. E.g., Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831; Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673. These and the other cases cited by petitioners are collected and discussed in a note, 14 A. L. R.2d 624 (1950).
We find no Massachusetts case involving a marriage entered into only to legitimate a child, but a number of courts in other states have refused annulments sought by parties to such marriages, even where they had agreed in advance not to live together and to seek an annulment. See Schibi v. Schibi, 1949, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831, 14 A.L.R.2d 620; Erickson v. Erickson, Sup. 1944, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588; Wagner v. Wagner, 1947, 59 Pa.Dist. Co.R. 90; Bove v. Pinciotti, 1942, 46 Pa. Dist. Co.R. 159; Campbell v. Moore, 1939, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784.
Appellants maintain that neither the secret reservations of Costa, nor the limited purpose for which Diogo and Gonzalez married their respective spouses, renders these marriages invalid under the domestic relations law of New York or of most other American jurisdictions. See N.Y. Domestic Relations Law, §§ 6, 7; Barker v. Barker, 88 Misc. 300, 151 N.Y.S. 811 (Sup.Ct. 1914); Gregg v. Gregg, 133 Misc. 109, 231 N.Y.S. 221 (Sup.Ct. 1928); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup.Ct. 1942); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup.Ct. 1944); Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831, 14 A.L.R.2d 620 (1949); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673, 93 A.L.R. 701 (1934); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939); DeVries v. DeVries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (1915); 14 A.L.R.2d 624; Note 20 U. Chi.L.Rev. 710 (1953).
Since the parties married in Washington, D.C., we must look to the law of that jurisdiction. See General Statutes 46-32 (b) (now 46b-40 [b]); Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 291, 170 A.2d 726 (1961); Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 198, 69 A.2d 831 (1949); Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 197-98, 175 A.2d 574 (1934); Delaney v. Delaney, 35 Conn. Sup. 230, 232-33, 405 A.2d 91 (1979). General Statutes 46-32 (b) (now 46b-40 [b]) provided: "An annulment shall be granted whenever, from any cause, the marriage is void or voidable under the laws of this state or of the state in which such marriage was performed."
The sole question is whether the agreement of the parties at the time of marriage bars granting of the divorce. Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831, 14 A.L.R.2d 620. Code 1961, 16-403.
Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 196, 175 A. 574. The latter proceeds upon the theory that the marriage is void ab initio. Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 200, 69 A.2d 831. A bigamous marriage is prohibited by law. General Statutes 8546. It is void. A judgment of annulment contributes nothing to its invalidity but a record that it is invalid.
An annulment renders the marriage void ab initio while a dissolution is based upon a valid marriage which terminates as of the date of the judgment of dissolution. See Mazzei v. Cantales, 142 Conn. 173, 178, 112 A.2d 205 (1955); Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 200, 69 A.2d 831 (1949); Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 196, 175 A. 574 (1934). We need not address the legal consequences of an annulment as opposed to a dissolution of marriage in this case, or whether the trial court dismissed this case on correct grounds.
" The law is clear that mutual consent is essential to a valid marriage." Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 198, 69 A.2d 831 (1949). " [W]hen only one party consents to the contract there is no marriage."
"The law is clear that mutual consent is essential to a valid marriage." Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196 (1949). "While it is true that, in passing upon a petition to annul a marriage, courts may well take into consideration whether there has been cohabitation or not, the fact that there has been none subsequent to the marriage ceremony is not of controlling importance, and particularly this is true where there has been prior sexual intercourse."