Opinion
Case No. 02-2075-JWL
June 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed suit against the United States and several individuals alleging violations of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and his civil rights. This matter is presently before the court on defendant Angela Bennett's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent it asserts claims against Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the University of Missouri Board of Curators (doc. #6). As set forth in more detail below, Ms. Bennett's motion to dismiss is granted.
In her motion, Ms. Bennett argues that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed to the extent it asserts claims against Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the University of Missouri Board of Curators because this court lacks personal jurisdiction over such claims. Plaintiff, of course, bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 456 (10th Cir. 1996). When the motion is decided on the basis of affidavits and other written materials, however, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing, and all factual disputes are resolved in that party's favor. Id. Resolving all doubts in plaintiff's favor, the court concludes that plaintiff has not met his burden of making a prima facie showing that Ms. Bennett is subject to the jurisdiction of this court.
Before a federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal question case such as this one, "the court must determine (1) whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process." Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). Neither of these two prongs is met in the instant case. First, plaintiff has not shown (or alleged) that any particular statute confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process over Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the Board of Curators. In fact, plaintiff does not reference any statute in his pleadings other than the FOIA and he neither has nor makes a legal argument that the FOIA provides for nationwide service of process. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff's civil rights claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Tenth Circuit has held that § 1983 does not provide for nationwide service of process. See McChan v. Perry, No. 00-2053, 2000 WL 1234844, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2000).
Second, as explained more fully below, plaintiff has made no factual allegations that Ms. Bennett had any contacts whatsoever with Kansas, the forum state. Thus, Ms. Bennett's motion is properly granted.
The Due Process Clause permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant so long as the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); accord Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). This standard may be met in two ways. First, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a defendant has "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities." Intercon, 205 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472). Second, a court may exercise general jurisdiction if the defendant's contacts with the forum state, while unrelated to the alleged activities upon which the claims are based, are nonetheless "continuous and systematic." In re Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum of S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Intercon, 205 F.3d at 1247 ("When a plaintiff's cause of action does not arise directly from a defendant's forum-related activities, the court may nonetheless maintain general personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on the defendant's business contacts with the forum state.").
A review of plaintiff's complaint and his papers filed in response to Ms. Bennett's motion reveals that the court cannot exercise general or specific jurisdiction over Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the Board of Curators. With respect to the assertion of general jurisdiction over Ms. Bennett, the record is completely devoid of any allegations that Ms. Bennett has had contacts with Kansas that are unrelated to plaintiff's cause of action. In fact, there is simply no evidence or suggestion before the court that Ms. Bennett had any contacts at all with Kansas, much less contacts that are continuous and systematic enough that Ms. Bennett "could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum." See Trierweiler v. Croxton Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1543 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). For this same reason, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is not appropriate here. Stated another way, there is simply no evidence or allegation from which the court could conclude that Ms. Bennett has "purposefully directed" her activities toward Kansas and that plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to those activities. See Kuenzle, 102 F.3d at 456. Rather, plaintiff's papers clearly demonstrate that, to the extent he complaints about Ms. Bennett and her activities, those activities took place solely in Missouri.
In conclusion, the court concludes that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ms. Bennett with respect to plaintiff's claims against Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the University of Missouri Board of Curators would violate the requirements of due process. Accordingly, the court grants Ms. Bennett's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent it asserts such claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Angela Bennett's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (doc. #6) is granted and plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed to the extent it purports to assert claims against Ms. Bennett in her individual capacity as a member of the University of Missouri Board of Curators.
IT IS SO ORDERED.