Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5970 (PBT).
August 23, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of August, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant Raylon Corporation's ("Raylon")Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (Doc. 7), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
To state "a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassm ent, a plaintiff must [allege] either that she submitted to the sexual advances of her alleged harasser or suffered a tangible employment action as a result of her refusal to submit to those sexual advances." Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Raylon terminated her due to her refusal to subm it to the sexual advances of a nonemployee, Defendant Craggs. An employer may be held liable for the sexual harassment of its employees by nonemployees. Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation om itted) (under "T itle VII, . . . employers can be liable for a customer's unwanted sexual advances, if the employer ratifies or acquiesces in the customer's demands."); see also Graves v. County of Dauphin, 98 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (collecting cases). Thus, the mere fact that Craggs was not a Raylon employee is not grounds to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, in light the facts as pled in the complaint. The same applies to count IV, which alleges violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa.C.S. § 951 et seq.
It is FURTHER ORDERED, upon consideration of Defendants L'Orèal USA, Inc. ("L'Orèal") and David Craggs' ("Craggs") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6), and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (Doc. 9), that the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
(a) The motion to dismiss Count I is GRANTED as to Defendant David Craggs.
(b) The motion to dismiss Count I and III is DENIED as to Defendant L'Orèal.
(c) The motion to dismiss Count III is DENIED as to Defendants L'Orèal and Craggs.
Count I alleges violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Individual employees may not be held civilly liable under Title V II. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Third Circuit has held that "the proper inquiry under Title VII for determining employer status looks to the nature of the relationship regardless of whether that party may or may not be technically described as an `employer.' The inquiry, as articulated by Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 160 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973), looks to the level of control an organization asserts over an individual's access to employment and the organization's power to deny such access." Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 728 (3d Cir. 1997) (add'l citations omitted). In her complaint, Plaintiff avers that her position with Raylon required that she work "regularly with employees, co-workers, supervisors, and sales personnel from both Defendant RAYLON . . . [and] Defendant L'ORÈAL," and that Craggs, though employed with L'Orèal, maintained a supervisory position over her. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 39. In light of these facts, that Plaintiff was not directly employed by L'Orèal does not preclude her from stating a claim against L'Orèal under Title VII and PHR A, alleging sexual harassment and sex discrimination. Further, given Craggs' senior executive position, L'Orèal may be held vicariously liable for his conduct if it is proven that Craggs exerted control and/or influence over the decision to terminate Plaintiff and her termination was unlawful. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998).
Count III is not predicated simply on section 955(a) of the PHRA, but the statute generally. See Compl. ¶ 60. Nor are individuals and non-employers exempt from liability under the PHR A. The Third Circuit has recognized that section 955(e) of the PHRA "contemplates liability that extends beyond that of Title VII . . . [and] forbids `any person, employer, employment agency, labor organization or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful discriminatory practice.'" Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). "Person" is defined under the statute to "include one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers." 43 Pa.C.S. § 954(a). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Craggs "either terminated . . . or recommended her termination, or caused her termination and . . . [she] would not have been terminated but for Defendant CRAGGS' actions." Compl. ¶ 42. Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and to put Craggs and L'Orèal on notice of the claims against them under the PHRA.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall file and serve an Answer to the Complaint within ten (10) days of this Order.