Opinion
October 15, 1951.
On June 12, 1948, plaintiff obtained a final judgment of divorce against defendant, which required defendant to pay plaintiff for the support of herself and the two children of the marriage the sum of $100 a week. In May, 1951, defendant moved for an order terminating an order of sequestration, entered April 11, 1951, or, in the alternative, permitting the defendant to substitute a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the court. By order, entered July 12, 1951, the motion was denied, without prejudice to renewal thereof in its alternative aspect not sooner than three months after the entry of the order to be entered thereon uopn a showing that there are no outstanding arrears. By order, entered July 30, 1951, reargument was granted but, on reargument, the original decision was adhered to. Defendant appeals from both orders. Order, entered July 30, 1951, insofar as appealed from, reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and defendant's motion granted to the extent of permitting defendant to substitute a surety company bond in the sum of $7,500 for the said order of sequestration, dated April 11, 1951, upon condition that defendant furnish proof that there are no outstanding arrears, that all intervening payments have been made, and that the fees and disbursements of the receiver and his counsel as fixed by the court have been paid; otherwise, the order is affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. The denial of defendant's motion in its alternative aspect was an improvident exercise of discretion. Appeal from order, entered July 12, 1951, dismissed, without costs. Nolan, P.J., Johnston, Adel, Wenzel and MacCrate, JJ., concur.