Opinion
NO. 2016-CA-000558-MR
01-26-2018
PAULA SCHANDLE APPELLANT v. RAQUE THOMAS APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Christina R.L. Norris Prospect, Kentucky NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TARA HAGERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-501498 OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. JOHNSON, JUDGE: Paula Schandle ("Schandle") brings this appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division, offsetting the alleged amount owed to Schandle by Raque Thomas ("Thomas") for medical care for their minor children against the amount owed to Thomas by Schandle for overpayment of child support. The overpayment occurred when Thomas continued to make full payments despite one of their children having graduated high school and reaching the age of majority. After reviewing the record in conjunction with the applicable legal authorities, we VACATE the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court and REMAND this matter back to the court for further proceedings in light of this Opinion.
BACKGROUND
Schandle and Thomas divorced in 2003 after a nine-year marriage. The parties had two minor children at the time of the divorce, a daughter and a son. As part of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement, which was incorporated into the parties' divorce decree, dated December 20, 2002, Thomas was to pay child support pursuant to the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines and provide medical and dental insurance for the children. Since their divorce, the two parties have experienced ongoing acrimony over a plethora of issues regarding money and the parenting of the children, particularly the medical treatments and associated costs for the children.
The court ordered the parties into mediation on December 1, 2010, to resolve issues following various motions for contempt against Thomas filed by Schandle. Following mediation and pursuant to an Agreed Order entered on April 27, 2011, the parties agreed that Schandle would be responsible for the first $100.00 of medical expenses per year per child, with Schandle and Thomas splitting the remaining cost with 25% to be paid by Schandle and 75% to be paid by Thomas.
Alleging noncompliance by Thomas concerning the Agreed Order entered on April 27, 2011, the parties again found themselves before the court on Schandle's motion for contempt. The court, albeit under a different judge, ruled in its Order, entered November 7, 2011, that Thomas was responsible for 75% of the children's medical expenses that exceeded the initial $100.00 per child, that Schandle had demonstrated via saved receipts the care tendered and amount owed, and that Thomas could not refuse to pay simply because he did not agree with the medical care and/or medical prescriptions given to the children. The court ordered the parties to follow the agreed upon terms of the April 27, 2011 Agreed Order.
Schandle again alleged that Thomas failed to abide by the terms of that Agreed Order in reference to the children's medical expenses and filed yet another motion for contempt on September 2, 2015. Thomas filed for a modification of child support on September 14, 2015, since one of the children had turned eighteen and graduated high school. The court held a hearing on October 9, 2015, to address these issues, the findings of which led to the appeal now before us. The court gave Thomas an opportunity to supplement the record with his proof, which resulted in a document filed by Thomas on October 20, 2015, disputing the assertions of the amounts owed by him to Schandle.
In its Order entered on March 18, 2016, the court acknowledged the agreement between the parties in regard to the proportional share of the children's medical expenses owed by each party but held that:
Due to the parties' conflicting testimony and the bulk of medical bills, invoices, and receipts tendered by both parties, the Court is unable to determine whether the parties have paid their proportional share of the children's extraordinary medical expenses since their Agreed Order of 2012. The Court finds that because [Thomas] was entitled to a reduction in his base child support obligation when the parties' son was emancipated in 2015, upon graduating from high school at the age of eighteen, his overpayment of child support shall be applied to the unreimbursed medical expenses between 2012 and 2015. Therefore, [Thomas] is ordered to comply with the Agreed Order of February 9, 2012, regarding extraordinary medical expenses prior to 2012, but the Court finds that he has satisfied his obligation to contribute toward expenses from 2012 to 2015.According to the proof tendered to the court by Schandle, $14,499.91 represents 75% of the medical expenses for the children for the time period between 2012-2015 owed by Thomas. The amount of child support overpaid by Thomas amounted to $2,750.04. Therefore, the amount allegedly owed by Thomas to Schandle after subtracting the overpay in child support is $11,749.87.
Schandle argues that the court abused its discretion in making this ruling and offsetting the respective wildly disparate amounts owed by each party to the other.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, we review the trial court's findings of fact only to determine if they are clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998).
This Court cannot set aside a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. If supported by substantial evidence, the court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. Black Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1964). The "test for substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone, or in the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Ky. App. 1999).
ANALYSIS
In the Agreed Order from April 27, 2011, stemming from the first series of motions for contempt against Thomas, the court held:
[Thomas] expressed some concern that [Schandle] has incurred unreasonable medical expenses, taken the children to the doctor too frequently, and scheduled non-emergency procedures against his wishes. However, the Mediated Agreement provides an avenue for the resolution of disputes related to medical diagnoses and treatment. [Thomas] cannot refuse to pay his
proportional share of medical expenses already incurred as a form of protest.Contrasting this finding with the findings of the court after conducting its hearing on October 9, 2015, where the court cited "conflicting testimony" as the reason behind offsetting the disparate amounts, we find the court made factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record in its Order entered on March 16, 2016.
. . .
Absent any motion to amend or revise the Agreed Order, the Court shall enforce the parties' mediated agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, [Thomas] is to pay 75% of the children's uninsured medical expenses, with [Schandle] paying the first $100 per year per child. [Schandle] provided receipts from payments she has made and bills that remain outstanding. [Thomas] testified that he had made payments toward the outstanding medical bills, but he offered the Court no evidence to support his testimony. The Court has reviewed the financial documents before it and determined that between February 2005 and April 2011 [Schandle] paid $4,303.71 in co-pays for doctor's visits, prescription medicines, and other uninsured medical expenses for the parties' two children. The Court also finds that $3,908.40 in medical bills remain unpaid for that time period. The total past medical expenses are $8,212.11. [Schandle] is responsible for the first $200 each year in uninsured medical expenses or a total of $1,400.00 for the years 2005 through 2011. [Thomas] must pay seventy-five percent of the remaining balance of $6,812.11.
Schandle has provided voluminous receipts concerning the outlays she has made in regard to paying for the medical expenses of the children, proof of her attempted communications with Thomas regarding the Children's medical expenses, and testimony that certain medical providers could not bill Thomas directly. Thomas raised numerous issues with Schandle's evidence in his lone filing but did not tender corresponding evidence. As we stated in Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793, 796-97 (Ky. App. 2007):
[Appellant] first contends the Fayette Family Court erred in applying principles of equity in its interpretation of the enforcement of the Separation Agreement signed by the parties in 1994 and incorporated into the decree of dissolution of marriage. Instead, she contends the family court should have enforced the Separation Agreement as if it were a contract. We agree.
. . .
. . . KRS 403.180(5) specifies the "[t]erms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms " (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the statute, the family court was clearly in error when it applied principles of equity in interpreting enforcement of the parties' Separation Agreement. The terms of the Separation Agreement should have been enforced as contract terms. Thus, reversal and remand for further proceedings is required.
. . .
The family court's finding on this issue is vague and incomplete. It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to
summarily state Debra did not provide sufficient evidence on this issue. We believe Debra has filed proper evidence in the record relating to her payment of at least a portion of the health insurance premiums for the children. Thus, we reverse on this issue and remand the matter to the family court to make further specific findings as to this issue.Similar to our ruling in Bailey, the trial court in this instance erroneously weighed the evidence in the record and issued a vague and incomplete finding. The court is ordered to make findings in line with its April 27, 2011 Agreed Order reflecting a detailed analysis of each parties' tendered evidence concerning the medical costs of the children with any calculus concerning monies owed by one party to the other construed in strict comportment with the Property Settlement Agreement. Thomas levying post-treatment criticism of the Children's medical expenses or bald allegations of payments without proof are not valid defenses.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings and more specific findings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Christina R.L. Norris
Prospect, Kentucky NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: