Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001); seeMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff in a failure-to-promote case must show β(1) she was 40 or older, (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position sought, (3) she was rejected for the position, and (4) someone substantially younger than she was given the position.β
Under this framework, a plaintiff in a failure-to-promote action must first establish a prima facie case that "(1) she was 40 or older, (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position sought, (3) she was rejected for the position, and (4) someone substantially younger than she was given the position." Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "If the plaintiff meets each element of her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that the employer's explanation is pretextual."
Consistent with this understanding, courts have afforded employers considerable latitude in selecting employment qualifications. For example, in Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2001) the Seventh Circuit considered the "qualification prong" of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in the context of an ADEA claim. 256 F.3d at 620. There the plaintiff was denied a promotion to the position of "program manager" for park recreational programs β a position that listed as one of its requirements one of several types of bachelor's degrees.
Johnson also argues that her "stealing" of customers and violation of work rules were disputed. Whether she stole customers or not is irrelevant; what is relevant is the undisputed fact that her co-workers thought she did. Johnson has failed to demonstrate that this was a false justification for Nordstrom's refusal to promote her. Likewise, the disputed allegation that Johnson violated several workplace policies was not shown to be pretextual-simply disputed. It is well established that an employer is free to develop its own criteria in determining whom to promote, and Johnson has failed to demonstrate that these were not Nordstrom's true rationales. See, e.g., Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001). Johnson's "evidence" of pretext fails to indicate that Nordstrom's proffered reasons are not worthy of credence.
However, Gomez's perception of his own performance cannot establish pretext. See Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2001); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1986). Instead, to establish pretext, Gomez must present evidence that the committee members did not believe their own assessments of his performance.
We do not tell employers what the requirements for a job must be." Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., 242 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Court concludes that Paulcheck has not satisfied his prima facie case with respect to Union Pacific's decision not to hire him as a Terminal Manager in Chester, Illinois.
We do not tell employers what the requirements for a job must be." Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., 242 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2001)). The Court concludes that Paulcheck has not satisfied his prima facie case with respect to Union Pacific's decision not to hire him as a Terminal Manager in Chester, Illinois.
In a failure-to-hire case, the elements are similar, except for step two where the plaintiff must show that he was otherwise qualified for the position sought, and for step four where the plaintiff must show the employer hired a substantially younger worker instead. C.f. Schaffier v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001). Kutka's claim could be analyzed under either formulation, because if he had been hired when initially interviewed, he would have been higher on the seniority list. He is also claiming that younger workers were moved up the seniority list ahead of him.
Under this approach, she must initially establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by demonstrating: (1) she is in a protected class (female or above the age of forty); (2) she was qualified for the promotion; (3) she did not receive the promotion despite her qualifications; and, (4) a person not in the protected class (male or substantially younger) was promoted instead. Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2001) (ADEA); Hasham v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) (Title VII). Tulley sought a promotion to the position of General Manager of the Rockford Residence Inn in January 1996. (LR 56.1(a) ΒΆ 53) Although initially a younger male applicant, Ken DeCook, was chosen, he did not work out and Tulley was offered the position in April 1996.
The City is permitted to set the necessary qualifications for an employment position. See Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist. , 256 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) ("What the qualifications for a position are ... is a business decision, one courts should not interfere with. We do not tell employers what the requirements for a job must be.").