Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. GIN057778, Michael B. Orfield, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
We affirm an order quashing a subpoena on defendant, a resident of Mexico. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the evidence she presented was not sufficient to establish as a matter of law that defendant had substantial, continuous and systematic contacts with the state at the time the complaint was served such that California could exercise general jurisdiction over defendant. At most the evidence plaintiff presented showed that defendant had, at or near the time of service, some relationship with a California business. Plaintiff's evidence, however, did not show that defendant exercised the level of control over or participation in the business which would permit California to exercise jurisdiction over him with respect to matters unrelated to the business. Moreover, there is nothing in the record which shows defendant's activities in the state were in any meaningful way connected to plaintiff's injuries. Thus the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion.
I
According to her complaint, on December 23, 2004, while she was vacationing in Baja, California, plaintiff and appellant Karen Schaffman was attacked by two Rottweilers owned by defendant and respondent Nasser Honarvar. Schaffman alleged that following the attack she was detained by Honarvar in his home and was only taken back to her campground sometime later by his daughter. Schaffman's injuries required hospitalization in both Mexico and the United States.
Schaffman initially filed a complaint in Mexico against Honarvar, and it was dismissed. In December 2006 Schaffman filed a complaint in the United States against Honarvar and others. Shortly thereafter Schaffman served the complaint on Honarvar in Mexico without following the procedures set forth in the Hague Convention on Service Abroad. In response to the complaint, Honarvar filed a motion to quash service of the summons. In support of his motion, he filed a declaration in which he stated that he had lived in Mexico for 25 years, that he was retired and had no business in California. In his declaration Honarvar conceded that he had relatives in California and that he visits them from time to time. In his motion he asked that the summons be quashed both because it had not been properly served on him and because California lacked jurisdiction over him.
In response to the motion, Schaffman filed a declaration from an adjuster, Charles Page, retained by her attorneys. According to Page, Honarvar is also known as "Rick Honarvar," and as of January 18, 2005, Honarvar was listed by Dunn & Bradstreet as the owner of Rick's Ornamental Ironworks, a business located in Oceanside, California. Page further determined that Rick's Ornamental Ironworks had a contractor's license which was scheduled to expire in August 2005 and that Honarvar had certified to the California State Licensing Board that he owned 10 percent or more of Rick's Ornamental Ironworks. Page also produced copies of two quitclaim deeds. By way of the first 2003 quitclaim deed, a relative gave Honarvar title to the property where the business was located. By way of a second 2005 quitclaim deed, Honarvar transferred title to another relative. Both transfers were without any consideration. The first quitclaim deed directed that upon recording, the deed be mailed to Honarvar in care of the business address of Rick's Ornamental Ironworks. In executing the second quitclaim deed, Honarvar listed an address in Valley Center, California, and identified himself to a notary with a California driver's license. Finally, according to Page, Honarvar was the plaintiff in four actions brought in San Diego Superior Court in 2001 and 2002.
In response to Page's declaration, Honarvar submitted a second declaration in which he explained that he used the business address of Rick's Ornamental Ironworks and the Valley Center address as mailing addresses because he did not believe the Mexican postal system was reliable.
The trial court granted Honarvar's motion to quash. The trial court found that Honarvar was a resident of Mexico at the time of Schaffman's injuries and that he did not have sufficient contacts with California to warrant exercise of jurisdiction over him with respect to Schaffman's claims. The trial court further found that Schaffman failed to comply with the Hague Convention on Service Abroad.
I
Schaffman does not dispute that she failed to serve her complaint in compliance with the Hague Convention on Service Abroad and that she was required to do so. However, she argues the trial court nonetheless erred in finding that California cannot exercise jurisdiction over Honarvar. Contrary to Honarvar's argument, because the two issues are distinct and independent of each other, Schaffman may limit her challenge on appeal to the jurisdictional portion of the trial court's order. (See Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Constr. Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 798, 804-806.)
II
"When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. [Citation.] When there is conflicting evidence, the trial court's factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record. [Citation.]" (434, 449.)
"Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are 'substantial ... continuous and systematic.' [Citations.] In such a case, 'it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant's business relationship to the forum.' [Citations.] Such a defendant's contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction." (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446.)
"If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts with the forum state, the defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction if (1) ' "the defendant has purposefully availed [itself] of forum benefits"' with respect to the matter in controversy, (2) ' "the 'controversy is related to or arises out of'' [the] defendant's contacts with the forum,' " ' and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. [Citations.]" (DVI, supra, (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090 (DVI).)
III
In her principal argument on appeal, Schaffman contends she established as a matter of law that California may exercise general jurisdiction over Honarvar. However, our review of the record supports the trial court's implicit finding that Honarvar did not have the substantial, continuous and systematic contact with California necessary to support general jurisdiction over him.
The first difficulty Schaffman has in establishing general jurisdiction over Honarvar is the requirement that the defendant have continuing contact with the forum. The courts which have considered the issue have found that in order to establish general jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant's activities in the forum must have been ongoing, not simply at the time the plaintiff's claim arose but also at the time the defendant was served with the complaint. (See Serafini v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 70, 80 (Serafini); DVI, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101.) "To determine whether to exercise general jurisdiction, it is also necessary to examine the defendant's contacts at the time the complaint was served. Exercise of general jurisdiction comports with ' ''traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" ' [citation] and is ' "reasonable' and 'fair" ' [citation] when the defendant has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum at the time the complaint is served on that defendant." (DVI, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101.) In both Serafini and DVI, the courts held that the plaintiffs' failure to establish forum-related activity at the time of service defeated assertions of general jurisdiction. (Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 80; DVI, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101.)
Here, Page only relayed information with respect to Honarvar's activities in the period up to 2005; however, the complaint was not served on Honarvar until some time in late 2006 or early 2007, at which point Honarvar quitclaimed the property where his business was located to a third person and by which time the business's contractor's license had apparently expired. There is nothing in Page's declaration which sets forth the scope and nature of Honarvar's activities in California at the time the complaint was served. Thus Schaffman did not meet her burden of showing continuous contact with California.
In addition to failing to show continuous contact with the state, Schaffman also failed to meet her burden of showing substantial and systematic contacts with the state. Admittedly, there is a dearth of authority with respect to general jurisdiction over natural persons. (See Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) We do know that mere ownership of property here will not support jurisdiction over the owner. (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 270.) In addition, we note: "The Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws says a state 'should have a similar range of [general] jurisdiction' over non-resident natural persons as is provided with respect to foreign corporations." (Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) With respect to corporations, the cases are now fairly clear that mere ownership of a domestic subsidiary by a foreign parent is not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over the parent. (DVI, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1092-1094.) Rather general jurisdiction is conferred only when the subsidiary is the alter-ego of the parent, the subsidiary acts as a representative of the parent's business in the forum, or the parent controls the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary such that the subsidiary is nothing more than an extension of the parent. (Ibid.) By analogy, a natural person who exerted a similar level of control over a domestic business might also be subject to general jurisdiction in this state. (See Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 79.) However, with respect to Honarvar's interest in Rick's Ornamental Ironworks, Schaffman again failed to meet her burden. Nothing in Page's declaration discloses what, if any, level of control Honarvar exercised over Rick's Ornamental Ironworks. Indeed, the successive quitclaim deeds suggest that Honarvar may not have had, even at the time of Schaffman's injuries, more than a nominal interest in the business.
This leaves only Honarvar's participation in litigation here, his driver's license and his use of local addresses. These prior contacts are not themselves substantial or systematic and cannot make Honarvar, as a matter of law, subject to California's general jurisdiction. (See Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147-149 (Cornelison); Crea v. Busby (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 509, 515-516.) In Cornelison the court found that California did not have general jurisdiction over a trucker who had a state license issued by the Public Utilities Commission, made 20 trips a year into the state and had a contract with a domestic freight broker. The court found that those activities were not so wide-ranging or substantial as to justify jurisdiction over all claims regardless of their relevance to the plaintiff's claims. (Ibid.) Honarvar's activities here are, by comparison, narrower and less substantial.
We note that Schaffman contends the trial court should not have relied on Honarvar's statement that he was a resident of Mexico. However, even if the trial court disregarded Honarvar's declaration, Schaffman still bore the burden of showing that Honarvar was either a resident or had substantial contacts with the state. She failed to do so.
In sum, the trial court did not err in failing to find that California had general jurisdiction over Honarvar. Schaffman makes no claim on appeal that her claim was in any way related to Honarvar's activities in California, and thus there is no basis upon which to find special jurisdiction.
Order affirmed. Respondent to recover his costs of appeal.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., McDONALD, J.