Opinion
D074663
12-13-2019
JENNIFER D. SCHAFFER, Respondent, v. MICHAEL A. SCHAFFER, Appellant.
Michael A. Schaffer, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Landay Roberts, Malcolm B. Roberts, John K. Landy; Law Office of Waddy Stephenson and Waddy Stephenson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17FL004841C) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Margo Lewis Hoy, Judge. Affirmed. Michael A. Schaffer, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Landay Roberts, Malcolm B. Roberts, John K. Landy; Law Office of Waddy Stephenson and Waddy Stephenson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of issue preclusion "prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case . . . ." (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings LLC).) For the reasons we discuss below, the doctrine of issue preclusion resolves this appeal.
In May 2017, Michael Schaffer (Michael) filed an application for entry of a 1989 judgment from a New York court (New York Judgment) as a California judgment, pursuant to the Sister State Money Judgments Act (Code of Civ. Proc, § 1710.10 et seq.) (the Act). Jennifer Schaffer (Jennifer) filed a motion to vacate entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment (§ 1710.40) on numerous grounds, including that the New York Judgment was not a money judgment, and was thus not subject to entry under the Act. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court (Judge Camarena) entered an order in October 2017 vacating entry of the New York Judgment "because it . . . does not seek to enforce a monetary judgment." Michael filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration in February 2018. Michael did not appeal from the October 2017 order.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Act "provides an expeditious and economical registration procedure for enforcing sister-state money judgments in California." (Washoe Development Co. v. Guaranty Federal Bank (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521-1522.) " 'This statutory scheme manifests a legislative intent that its use or applicability be predicated upon a judgment first obtained and rendered outside of this state. The judgment in this state, following the judgment of a sister state, is ministerial only, that is, an activity by the clerk of this court.' " [Citation.]" (Aspen Internat. Capital Corp. v. Marsch (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1199, 1203.)
The order was appealable. (See Neuman v. Barbera (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 437, 440, fn. 2 (Neuman) ["An order made on a motion to vacate under section 1710.40, subdivision (b) is an appealable order"].)
In March 2018, Michael filed another application for entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment pursuant to the Act. Jennifer again filed a motion to vacate entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment (§ 1710.40). In addition to the grounds asserted in her prior motion to vacate, Jennifer maintained that the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York Judgment was a money judgment subject to entry under the Act. The case was assigned to Judge Hoy. On August 1, 2018, Judge Hoy entered an order vacating entry of the New York Judgment for the second time. In her order, Judge Hoy asserted that the New York Judgment is "not a monetary judgment."
Michael appeals from the August 1, 2018 order. On appeal, Michael claims that this court "should reverse the trial Court's [August 1, 2018 order] and identify the [New York Judgment as] valid." Jennifer raises numerous grounds for affirming the order, including that the issue of whether the New York Judgment constitutes a money judgment subject to entry under the Act as a California judgment was determined by the October 2017 order, from which Michael did not appeal. Jennifer argues that the doctrine of issue preclusion prevents Michael from relitigating that issue in this proceeding. In his briefing, Michael does not address the doctrine of issue preclusion other than to assert that Judge Camarena's October 2017 order "is void because it is in conflict with the full faith and credit clause[]."
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
We affirm the August 1, 2018 order on the ground that the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York judgment constitutes a money judgment that may be entered as a judgment in California under the Act.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings related to Michael's May 2017 application for entry of the New York Judgment
In May 2017, Michael filed an "Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment." (Some capitalization omitted.) In his application, Michael requested entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment and attached a copy of a March 1989 divorce judgment from the State of New York. The New York Judgment stated that it incorporated a "Stipulation" between Michael and Jennifer that disposed of "all economic and support matters of the marriage." The clerk filed the application, and Michael served a document entitled "Notice of Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment" (some capitalization omitted) on Jennifer.
It does not appear that Michael attached the Stipulation to his application; the application contained in the clerk's transcript does not include the Stipulation. However, the Stipulation is contained in the clerk's transcript as an exhibit attached to Jennifer's June 2017 motion to vacate entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment.
The Stipulation is referred to as the "marital settlement agreement" in portions of the record.
The following month, Jennifer filed a motion to vacate entry of the New York Judgment. In her notice of the motion, Jennifer maintained that the application was defective for numerous reasons, including that "the judgment is not a money judgment, the judgment was already satisfied, [Michael] released [Jennifer] from the provisions . . . he seeks to enforce, [and] the enforcement of the judgment is barred by estoppel, laches, and the applicable statute of limitations."
Jennifer filed a brief in support of her motion in which she argued that "[t]he New York Judgment is not a money judgment subject to [the Act]," among other contentions. (Some capitalization omitted.) In her motion, Jennifer noted that a "sister state judgment," that may be entered as a California judgment under the Act is " 'that part of any judgment . . . which requires the payment of money . . . .' " Jennifer argued that the New York Judgment "does not specify any monetary amount to be paid to [Michael] by [Jennifer.]" Jennifer further argued:
"Presumably, Michael . . . seeks to enforce provisions of the incorporated by reference [marital settlement agreement], even though he did not attach it to his filing. Jennifer . . . , through her attorney has reviewed the [marital settlement agreement] and cannot find any provision of the [marital settlement agreement] that would constitute a money judgment that Michael . . . could register under the Act."
Jennifer lodged two declarations in support of her motion, and several exhibits, including a copy the New York Judgment and the Stipulation incorporated into the New York Judgment.
After additional briefing, Judge Camarena held a hearing on Jennifer's motion. The minute order from the hearing states in relevant part:
"The Court finds that the New York Judgment is not a monetary judgment subject to [the Act]. The judgment filed does not contain a monetary award. An order to split proceeds of the sale of a home is
not a money judgment. There is no amount listed in the [marital settlement agreement], which was provided by [Jennifer]."
In October 2017, Judge Camarena entered a formal order to "vacate entry of sister-state judgment." (Capitalization omitted.) That order states in relevant part:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the entry of the sister-state judgment is VACATED because it is defective and does not seek to enforce a monetary judgment."
Michael filed a motion for reconsideration. In November 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion and directed Jennifer to prepare a formal order to that effect. In February 2018, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration. B. Proceedings related to Michael's March 2018 application for entry of the New York Judgment
The motion for reconsideration is not contained in the record.
In March 2018, Michael filed a "2nd Amended" "Application for Entry of Judgment on Sister-State Judgment." In the application, Michael again requested entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment pursuant to the Act.
In April 2018, Jennifer filed a motion to vacate entry of the New York Judgment as a California judgment (§ 1710.40) and the matter was assigned to Judge Hoy. In her motion, Jennifer maintained that the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York Judgment constituted a money judgment subject to entry under the Act because Judge Camarena had previously decided the same issue. Jennifer argued in part that "[t]he proceedings in which . . . entry of the [f]irst California Judgment [was vacated] lasted seven months," and that Michael's "second entry of the New York Judgment in California pursuant to the [Act] serves no purpose other than to harass Jennifer . . . and it fails for the reasons his first attempt failed." Jennifer outlined the elements of issue preclusion, and contended that each element of the doctrine was met in this case, arguing in part:
"Michael['s] . . . second entry of the New York Judgment implicates (a) the final adjudication (b) of an identical issue (i.e., the New York Judgment is not [a] monetary judgment subject to the [Act]) (c) that was actually litigated and necessarily decided and (d) is asserted against a party in the first proceeding (i.e., Michael . . .)."
Jennifer supported her motion with a declaration and several exhibits, many of which she had offered in support of her prior motion.
Michael filed an opposition to Jennifer's motion to vacate. In his opposition, Michael argued that the New York Judgment was a "money judgment pursuant to both New York State law and California law." Michael did not address the effect of Judge Camarena's prior ruling other than to assert that it was wrong. For example, Michael argued, "This court, last September made a terrible ruling when it vacated my judgment as not being a money judgment." Together with his opposition, Michael lodged a declaration in which he acknowledged that Judge Camarena had vacated entry of the New York Judgment because "according to [Judge Camarena] I did not have a money judgment."
Michael also argued that the court should deny Jennifer's motion based on the affirmative defense of unclean hands. His argument with respect to that issue was as follows:
"I am not going to go into real detail, but I must state to this court that Jennifer Schaffer comes to this court and asks equity. She asks that you vacate my judgment. According to the Blain doctrine, Blain v. Doctor's Co. [(1990)] 222 Cal.App.3d 1053 . . . , there are [three] elements that must factually be met for one to assert the affirmative defense of unclean hands; analogous case law, [and] unconscionable conduct that leads directly to the damages alleged by respondent in this case. Whether the elements exist is a factual issue. If they do exist, then this all becomes a matter of judicial integrity. As the court in Kendall Jackson Winery v Sup. Ct. (E&J Gallo Winery) [(1999)] 76 Cal. App. 4th 970 . . . states, once the elements to establish unclean hands are met, the court must close its doors to the wrongdoer because to do otherwise, would be to reward her for her misconduct, and bring judicial integrity into question."
Jennifer filed a reply brief in which she reiterated her argument that the issue of whether the New York Judgment constituted a money judgment had already been decided by Judge Camarena and that Michael could not relitigate the issue. Jennifer argued that Michael's contention that Judge Camarena's ruling was incorrect was irrelevant because the doctrine of issue preclusion "applies even if a prior ruling was erroneous." Jennifer further maintained that if Michael disagreed with Judge Camarena's ruling, "he should have appealed that ruling."
On August 1, 2018, after further briefing and a hearing, Judge Hoy entered an order vacating entry of the New York Judgment for the second time. In her order, Judge Hoy stated:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Michael Schaffer's entry of the New York Judgment in California pursuant to the [Act] be VACATED. The Marital Stipulation Agreement that . . . [Michael] sought to enforce, incorporated but not merged into the New York Judgment, is not a monetary judgment under New York law, and, therefore, is not enforceable in California."C. Michael's appeal
Michael appeals from the August 1, 2018 order.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The scope of Michael's appeal
In his opening brief, Michael makes numerous assertions with respect to the merits of Judge Camarena's October 2017 order vacating entry of the New York Judgment. For example, he argues that Judge Camarena's order was "totally improper," and that the order must be "reversed."
As noted in part I, ante, Michael did not appeal from Judge Camarena's October 2017 order vacating entry of the New York Judgment. Since the October 2017 order was an appealable order (Neuman, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p 440, fn. 2), Michael may not seek review of the October 2017 order in this appeal. (See, e.g., Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509 [" '[a] party who fails to take a timely appeal from a decision or order from which an appeal might previously have been taken cannot obtain review of it on appeal from a subsequent judgment or order' "].) B. The doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York Judgment constitutes a money judgment that may be entered as a California judgment under the Act
Michael contends that Judge Hoy erred in concluding that the New York Judgment is not a money judgment that may be entered as a judgment in California under the Act. Jennifer contends that Judge Hoy's order may be affirmed on the ground that the doctrine of issue preclusion prohibits Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York judgment constitutes a money judgment that may be entered as a California judgment under the Act. We agree with Jennifer.
1. Governing law and standard of review
a. The doctrine of issue preclusion
" '[I]ssue preclusion,' . . . ' "precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." ' " (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 895.) Issue preclusion applies: "(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party." (DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 825.) Courts will not apply the doctrine if policy considerations outweigh the doctrine's purpose in a particular case. (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 804 (Samara).)
"The question of the applicability of . . . issue preclusion is one of law to which we apply a de novo review." (Samara, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.)
While Jennifer raised the issue of issue preclusion in her April 2018 motion to vacate, Judge Hoy did not rely on this rationale in granting Jennifer's motion. Nevertheless, we may affirm Judge Hoy's order based on the doctrine of issue preclusion since "we review the lower court's ruling, not its reasoning; we may affirm that ruling if it was correct on any ground." (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38.) For the reasons that we explain in the test, we conclude that Michael's attempt to relitigate the issue of whether the New York Judgment constitutes a money judgment under the Act is plainly barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. When the preclusive effect of a prior ruling is as clear as it is in this case, we encourage trial courts to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion in order to discourage a party such as Michael from attempting to relitigate a matter that has previously been decided.
b. The Act
"Partially in response to the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the California Legislature enacted [the Act] to provide economical and expeditious registration procedures for enforcing sister state money judgments in California." (Bank of America v. Jennett (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 104, 114.) "A California judgment can be obtained simply by registering a sister state judgment with the specified superior court, thereby avoiding the necessity of bringing a completely independent action here." (Ibid.)
Section 1710.10, subdivision provides in relevant part:
"As used in this chapter:
"[¶] . . . [¶]
"(c) 'Sister state judgment' means that part of any judgment, decree, or order of a court of a state of the United States, other than California, which requires the payment of money . . . . "
In Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, the Court of Appeal summarized the Act's provisions as follows:
"In California, pursuant to the [Act], in a special proceeding '[a] judgment creditor may apply for the entry of a judgment based on a sister state judgment by filing an application pursuant to Section 1710.20.' (§ 1710.15, subd. (a).) An application for entry of a judgment based on a sister state judgment shall be filed in a superior court.' (§ 1710.20, subd. (a).) '[T]he clerk shall enter a judgment based upon the application for the total of the following amounts as shown therein: [¶] (1) The amount remaining unpaid under the sister state judgment. [¶] (2) The amount of interest accrued on the sister state judgment (computed at the rate of interest applicable to the judgment under the law of the sister state). [¶] (3) The amount of the fee for filing the application for entry of the sister state judgment.' (§ 1710.25, subd. (a).)
". . . [T]he entry of a sister state judgment by the clerk is a ministerial, not a judicial, act, and the [Act] 'simply permits the registration of a sister state judgment so it may be enforced against property located in this state. [Citation.]' [Citation.] An application for entry of a sister state judgment under the [Act] is not the exclusive means to enforce the sister state judgment in California. As an alternative, such enforcement may be sought through a traditional lawsuit. (§ 1710.60.) [¶] . . . After notice of entry of that judgment, the judgment debtor may make a motion to vacate the judgment." (Id. at p. 838.)
2. Application
Judge Camarena's October 2017 order constituted a "final adjudication" that resolved the "identical issue" raised by Michael in this proceeding, namely, whether the New York Judgment is a money judgment subject to entry as a California judgment under the Act. (DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 825.) The record also demonstrates that the issue was "actually litigated," and "necessarily decided," by Judge Camarena. (Ibid.) Finally, it is undisputed that Michael was a party to both proceedings. Thus, all of the elements of the doctrine of issue preclusion are met. (Ibid.)
We see nothing in the record demonstrating that we should decline to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion on the ground that policy considerations outweigh the doctrine's purpose in this case. (See Samara, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
Michael does not address these elements in his briefing on appeal. However, in his reply brief, he argues that Judge Camarena's ruling was "clearly erroneous and there is no res judicata effect to his incorrect ruling that conflicts with the full faith and credit clause." Michael also argues in his reply brief, "Judge Camarena's ruling . . . is void because it is in conflict with the full faith and credit clause . . . ." We are not persuaded.
To begin with, the doctrine of issue preclusion may be applied "even where the issue was wrongly decided in the first action." (Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 407.) This follows from the fact that the purpose of the doctrine is to preclude relitigation of the merits of an issue. (See DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 824 [stating that the doctrine of issue preclusion "prevents relitigation of previously decided issues"].) If the doctrine could be applied only if the prior decision were determined to be correct, the doctrine would have no purpose. Thus, Michael's assertion that Judge Camarena's ruling was "clearly erroneous," is not a basis for avoiding application of the doctrine.
In so stating, we do not intend to suggest that Judge Camarena's ruling was erroneous. In addition, we observe that Michael had an available remedy to challenge Judge Camarena's order—he could have appealed the October 2017 order to this court.
Michael's unsupported assertion that Judge Camarena's ruling was "void" also fails to establish that he may relitigate that ruling here. (See, e.g., Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1100 (Pajaro) [noting that "a void judgment will not operate as a bar to relitigation of the issues purportedly adjudicated"].) In Pajaro, the court explained that " '[a] judgment is void if the court rendering it lacked subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction "relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it." ' " (Ibid.) Michael points to nothing in the record suggesting that Judge Camarena lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the parties, such that Judge Camarena's ruling was void under California law. Thus, even assuming that Michael were correct in asserting that Judge Camarena's ruling violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this would not establish that the ruling is void.
Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrine of issue preclusion prevents Michael from relitigating the issue of whether the New York judgment constitutes a money judgment that may be entered as a California judgment under the Act.
Michael also asserts that "the affirmative defense of 'unclean hands' should have been applied by both judges." Michael forfeited this argument by violating the rule that requires that each point be presented in an appellate brief under a separate heading or subheading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); see, e.g., Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. City of Selma (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 187, 201 ["[appellant] forfeited the argument by violating the rule that requires each point be presented in an appellate brief under a separate heading"].)
In any event, the unclean hands doctrine does not provide a basis for reversal. The doctrine can be applied only " 'if the inequitable conduct occurred in a transaction directly related to the matter before the court and affects the equitable relationship between the litigants.' " (Ditzian v. Unger (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 738, 747.) Michael's claim of unclean hands relies on actions by Jennifer occurring nearly 40 years ago that Michael suggests support the conclusion that "he would not have signed" a letter that Jennifer contends released her from the provisions of the Stipulation. Jennifer's alleged conduct was unrelated to whether the New York Judgment is a money judgment under the Act and whether Michael could relitigate that issue in this proceeding. Thus, we reject Michael's contention that the unclean hands doctrine provides a basis for reversing the trial court's August 1, 2018 order.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The August 1, 2018 order is affirmed. Michael is to bear costs on appeal.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J. O'ROURKE, J.