Opinion
Civil No. JFM-03-16.
January 22, 2004
Dear Counsel:
I have reviewed the memoranda submitted in connection with defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.
The motion is granted. I am persuaded that the Maryland courts would not permit recovery of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice case arising from alleged negligent representation in connection with a commercial transaction. Denying such recovery would be entirely consistent with the view expressed by Maryland courts in analogous circumstances that emotional distress damages are not recoverable where a plaintiff has otherwise suffered only property damage, rather than physical injuries. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm., 338 Md. 341, 658 A.2d 675 (1995). This conclusion is also consonant with the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W. 2d 879 (Tex. 1999); Reed v. Mitchell Timbanard, P.C., 903 P.2d 621 (Ariz.App. 1995); Hanumadass v. Coffield, Ungaretti Harris, 724 N.E.2d 14 (Ill.App. 1999); Gautam v. De Luca, 521 A.2d 1343 (N.J.Super. 1987); Wehringer v. Powers Hall, P.C., 874 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1995). But see Salley v. Childs, 541 A.2d 1297 (Me. 1988).
Hunt v. Mercy Medical Center, 121 Md. App. 516, 710 A.2d 362 (1998), a medical malpractice case relied upon by Schafer, is distinguishable on the ground that in Hunt the plaintiff had suffered physical injury, rather than property or commercial damage. Schafer is also misguided in relying upon Roebuck v. Steuart, 76 Md. App. 298, 544 A.2d 808 (1988). It is true, as Schafer contends, that in Roebuck the court did not hold that as a matter of law emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a legal malpractice case involving underlying property or commercial damage. Rather, it held only that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to establish emotional distress. However, the court was not required to reach the broader question, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has recently and somewhat vociferously stated that no weight should be given to purported sub silentio holdings. See Dehn v. Edgecombe, 152 Md. App. 657, 834 A.2d 146 (2003).
I decline plaintiff's request to certify this question for resolution by the Maryland Court of Appeals. A federal district judge should be reluctant to impose upon a state's highest court the responsibility to resolve a legal issue by certification where the judge believes (as I do in this case) that state precedents provide firm and predictive guidance. That is particularly true in cases such as this where the party seeking the certification has chosen to bypass the ordinary state court appellate process by filing a federal action.
Despite the informal nature of this ruling, it shall constitute an Order of Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.