Any part of the policy from Universal Underwriters to Bill Vernon Chevrolet, Inc., inconsistent therewith is void and the pertinent provisions of the statute prevail as much as if expressly incorporated in the policy. See Johnston v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 242 S.C. 387, 131 S.E.2d 91 (1963), Schafer v. Maryland Cas. Co., 123 F. Supp. 873 (1954). I find and conclude that Universal Underwriters Insurance Company is primarily liable for payment of any judgment obtained by Anderson in the action arising out of the automobile collision heretofore mentioned and for such other relief to which plaintiff is entitled in that action with the resultant obligation to be fully responsible for the defense in that suit.
1. On October 28, 1953, Floyd C. Taylor in all his actions and representations was acting in the scope and course of his employment as an agent of the defendant. Section 37-233, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952; West v. Service Life Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 198, 66 S.E.2d 816; Williams v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 159 S.C. 301, 156 S.E. 871; Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Palmetto Bank, D.C., 23 F. Supp. 844, affirmed 4 Cir., 104 F.2d 671; Schafer v. Maryland Casualty Co., D.C., 123 F. Supp. 873. 2.
Messrs. Nelson, Mullins, Grier Scarborough, of Columbia, for Appellant, American Casualty Company, and Isadore E. Lourie, of Columbia, and Edward E. Saleeby, of Hartsville, for Appellants, Myra Register and Mrs.Margaret Register, cite: As to the acts of the insuranceagency, in dealing with the Respondent insurance company,making it an agent of the Respondent insurance companywithin the meaning and contemplation of Section 37-233,Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952: 93 S.C. 406, 76 S.E. 1089; 123 F. Supp. 873; 151 S.C. 44, 148 S.E. 648. As to the insurance agency having no power to securecancellation of the entire policy of insurance: 284 F. 420; 158 Tex. 143, 309 S.W.2d 59; 8 Cal.App. 323, 185 P.2d 832; (La.App.) 167 So. 227; Vol. 1, Restatement of the Law of Agency, p. 127; 2 C.J. 1242; 139 S.C. 369, 138 S.E. 42; 132 S.C. 340, 127 S.E. 562; 3 Am. Jur.2d 482; 132 S.C. 340, 127 S.E. 562; 284 Fed. 803; 17 Ariz. 491, 154 P. 1042, L.R.A. 1918-F, 713. As to Respondent insurance company being estopped fromdenying coverage on the automobile involved in the accident: 44 C.J.S., Insurance, 817-818, Sec. 149; 3 Couch, Insurance, 2309, Sec. 701; 168 S.C. 435, 167 S.E. 684; 124 S.C. 173, 117 S.E. 209; 104 S.C. 403, 89 S.E. 319; 97 S.C. 375, 81 S.C. 654. Messrs. deLoach deLoach, of Camden, for Respondent,Niagara Fire Insurance Company, cite: As to there beingnothing in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Actwhich forbids the cancellation of a liability policy by aninsured, and the Assigned Risk P
As to right ofinsurance company to cancel the policy: (S.C.) 50 S.E.2d 923; 233 S.C. 333, 104 S.E.2d 561; 204 S.C. 156, 28 S.E.2d 673. Messrs. A. Ray Hinnant, Clarke W. McCants, Jr., and J. Wesley Drawdy, of Columbia, for Respondents, cite: Asto the damage suffered being covered by the policy contract: 222 S.C. 133, 72 S.E.2d 174; 217 S.C. 365, 60 S.E. (2) 687; 123 F. Supp. 873; 157 S.C. 381, 154 S.E. 221; 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28, Cert. Denied 316 U.S. 693, 62 S.Ct. 1299; 168 Tenn. 424, 79 S.W.2d 556; 232 S.C. 1, 100 S.E.2d 544. As to the wrongful cancellationof the Respondent's policy entitling them to damages: 219 S.C. 520, 65 S.E.2d 871; 219 S.C. 204, 64 S.E.2d 540; 203 S.C. 263, 17 S.E.2d 230; 227 S.C. 587, 88 S.E.2d 658; 216 S.C. 309, 57 S.E.2d 638.